American Task In Persia

THE AMERICAN TASK
IN PERSIA

© CUncdwat SHudio, Washington

Dr. a. C. Millsi'augh, Administrator-General of the Finances of

Persia

THE AMERICAN TABK
IN PERSIA

BY

A. C. MILLSPAUGH, Ph.D.

ADMINISTRATOR-OBNEKAL OF TBR FINANCES OF PERSIA

LONDON

T. WERNER LAURIE, LTD.
30 New Bridge Street, E.C. 4
1924

To

MY MOTHER

PREFACE

It is my purpose in this book to tell the story of
the American Financial Mission in Persia since
the beginning of its work in 1922, and incidentally
to interpret modern Persia from my own point of
view. The present volume may be considered,
not as the completed story of the American Fi-
nancial Mission in Persia but rather as an intro-
duction to the story. As I write, I am engaging
a dozen more Americans to go back with me to
Persia, to assist the people of that country in
working out their policies of reform and progress.
The work of the mission is not yet finished.

The history of this Oriental people during the
last three years is to my mind a record of prog-
ress in the face of extraordinary difiBculties. The
problem of Persia should, in my opinion, be of
vital interest to any other people which desires to
see the stabilization of the world, and the achieve-
ment everywhere of eflScient government based
on the will of the governed.

In outlining the experiences that I have had and
the information that I have gained, I have en-
deavored to avoid premature conclusions and
generalizations from insuflBcient data. If for-

vii

PREFACE

eigners who have grown more cynical than I, sus-
pect me of undue optimism, they should have in
mind that the genuine sympathy and affection
which I have acquired for the Persian people are
products of the intimate and none too easy experi-
ence of one who has conscientiously aimed to keep
himself open-minded; and my present opinions
may for that reason alone be in themselves sig-
nificant.

If any Persian should feel that I have been un-
kind or unwise in describing certain of the
anachronisms, survivals, and weaknesses of his
people and his country, he should remember that
frankness is one of the conditions of understand-
ing, that a problem cannot be solved until its
elements have been stated, and that it is impossible
to measure progress already made or estimate thq
prospects of progress in the future unless one
sees the points of departure, the distance already
traveled, and the obstacles and handicaps which
have been overcome. It would be difficult, for
example, to appreciate the greatness of Lincoln
without a knowledge of his. humble origin and his
homely humanity.

With regard to nomenclature, I have not been
entirely consistent or correct. Shortly before my
departure from Persia, the titles borne by most
Persian officials were abolished, and I have not
been able in all cases to learn their present names.

viii

PREFACE

It has seemed necessary, therefore, to continue to
give them .in general the names by which they
were previously known to the world. In the case
of the Prime Minister who bore the title of ‘ ‘ Sar-
dar Sepah, ’ ’ I have used the family name which he
himself now prefers, Beza Khan Pahlevi.

Other and perhaps more serious inaccuracies
may be found in this book, but I hope that these
may be charitably attributed to the fact that the
American Mission in Persia has been engaged in
a most absorbing employment, with no time for
writing or even for the systematic collection of
data, and that this book has taken form during the
intervals of a westward sea-voyage on the Medi-
terranean and the Atlantic and during the spare
moments of a brief business sojourn in America.
Almost no information has been available to mo
except that received incidentally to the doing of
our work in Persia. This is a personal, not an
official narrative. Accordingly, I must assume
full responsibility for its shortcomings. On the
other hand, it would never have seen the light,
even as a by-product of our work, if I had not re-
ceived the loyal and able cooperation of my
associates of the American Mission, and if the
mission had not been permitted by the officials of
the Persian Government, by the deputies of the
Parliament, and by the Persian people to make
its investigations and do its work. Prom the

PREFACE

nature of the case, those to whom I am indebted
for the information that I have used and for the
points of view that I have expressed are too
numerous to mention, and I am compelled to con-
tent myself with a general acknowledgment. I
am, however, under special obligations to my wife
for her unfailing encouragement, to Professor A.
V. Williams Jackson, of Columbia University, to
Thomas Pearson, and to Mr. W. Morgan Shuster,
President of the Century Co., — ^who himself occu-
pies a niche in Persia’s Hall of Fame — ^for his
assistance and suggestions.

I wish to make it perfectly clear that no one in
Persia and not a single official of the Persian or
any other government has seen the manuscript of
this book or has been consulted regarding its con-
tents or conclusions. The responsibility for it is
wholly mine.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGR

I Introduction 3

II The American Mission Takes Up Its Task 27

III How We Found the Finances .... 52

IV Persian Psychology 84

V Persian Politics 109

VI Using Strange Tools 150

VII Getting Down To Work 172

VIII Gathering Clouds 199

IX Fair Weather 219

X Agriculture, Manufacturing, Transpor-
tation, AND Commerce 247

XI Natural Resources and Other Assets . 287

XII Conclusion 308

Index 319

ILLUSTRATIONS

FACIXQ

PAGE

Dr. a. C. Millspaugh, Administrator-General op

THE Finances op Persia .... Frontispiece

Panoramic View op Teheran 16

View of the Gardens op Golistan, Looking To-
ward THE Entrance op the Shah’s Palace . 33

Constructing the First High-Power Government
WireliEss Station in Persia; Near Teheran 64

Camel Caravan 81

A Train op the Railway prom Teheran To the
Shrine op Shah Abdul Azun 81

Keza Khan Pahlevi, Prime Minister, Minister op

War, and Commander-in-Chiep op the Army 112

His Imperial Majesty, Ahmad, Shah op Persia . 129

New Gate op Army Drilling-Grounds at Teheran 144

His Imperial Highness, the Valiahd, Crown
Prince op Persia 161

Americans in ‘‘Djobbeh” and ‘‘Kola” Apter the
Opening op the Majless, January 29, 1924.
From Lept to Right, Mr. McCaskey, Dr.
Millspaugh, and Colonel MacCormack . . 192

Agha Seyed Hassan Modarres, Leading Civil
Deputy 209

xiii

ILLUSTRATIONS

TACINQ

PAGE

Prime Minister at Demonstration op Persian

Army Airplanes 224

Cutting Rice in the Province op Guilan . . . 224

Army Barracks at Teheran 241

School for Military Cadets at Teheran . . . 241

Interior Hall op Dr. Millspaugh ’s Summer

Home at Tajrish . . * 256

Garden op Dr. Millspaugh ’s Summer Home at
Tajrish 256

Mirza Hassan Khan Pirnia (Formerly Muchir
Ed Dowleh), Leading Independent Deputy,
Prime Minister, Junb-October, 1923 . . . 273

Mostowpi Ol Memalek, Influential Indepen-
dent Deputy, Prime Minister, Pebruary-

June, 1923 273

Mirza Hossein Khan Pirnia (Formerly Motamen

Ol Molk), President op the Majless . .273

Sardar Moazzam Kiiorassani, Minister op Public
Works 273

T ADA YON, Leader op the Majority in the Majless,

AND Chairman op the Budget Commission . 304

Firouz Mirza, Deputy op Kermanshah and a Ma-
jority Leader in 1922-23 304

Arbab Khaikrosrow Shahrokh, Progressive Par-
see Deputy and Business Manager op the
Majless 304

Mirza Mohamed Ali Khan Foroughi (Formerly

ZoKA Ol Molk), Minister op Finance . . 304

xiv

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

THE AMERICAN TASK
IN PERSIA

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

WHEN the American Financial Mission
arrived in Persia, in the fall of 1922,
we were welcomed by one of the news-
papers of Teheran as follows :

You are the last doctor called to the death-bed of a
sick person. If you fail, the patient will die. If you
succeed, the patient will live. I do not applaud your
arrival. I shall applaud, if you succeed.

His Imperial Majesty the Shah, at the audience
which he granted us in Paris on our way to Persia
and during subsequent conversations in Teheran,
expressed a similar sentiment, and added that he
considered the American Mission “the last hope
of Persia.'^ Many other Persians echoed these
expressions.

In spite of these symptoms of mental depres-
sion, the patient, as I look back after two and

3

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

one half years of intimate observation, appears
to me to have enjoyed a fair expectation of life.
Three thousand years of existence supplies in it-
self presumptive evidence of exceptional vitality
and recuperative power.

Persia, according to the diagnosis of the “last
doctor, ’ ’ was a case of arrested development with
complications. The complications were many and
some of them may have been serious ; but they did
not indicate any necessity for a major operation,
for an international strait-jacket, for diplomatic
massage or manhandling, or even for much ad-
vice. Persia seemed likely, not merely to live but
to grow healthy and vigorous if left alone on a
simple, nourishing financial diet with active eco-
nomic exercise in the open door.

Historically, Persia was a world empire long
before Rome extended its power beyond Italy;
and the Persians were one of the few peoples'
who defied and defeated the Roman armies.
Cyrus, Darius, and Xerxes are familiar names to
any one who has passed the first year of high
school. Unfortunately for a correct understand-
ing of the country, ancient Persia has been too
commonly represented in school texts as a bar-
barian threat to the Western civilization which
was then budding at Athens. Little attention has
been given to the contributions of Persia itself
to civilization. Persia either created or ap-

4

INTRODUCTION

propriated and improved much of the best in the
science and art of the ancient world. The con-
tinuous existence of Persia as a nation, from re-
mote antiquity to the present time, the archi-
tectural grandeur exemplified by the ruins of
Susa and Persepolis and by many other monu-
ments and antiquities, the poetry of Firdusi,
Sadi, and Hafez, to say nothing of such minor
poets as Omar Khayyam, the persistence through
the centuries of beautiful and artistic work in
textiles, silver, brass, and pottery, the present
progressive movement linked with the mainte-
nance of nationality — all these things and many
others illustrate the extraordinary vitality and
power of recuperation possessed by the Persian
people.

Standing between the East and the West, in-
vaded by East and West and invading both, the
Persians have always had a rare capacity for
drawing on the special gifts of other peoples with-
out losing their own characteristics and integrity.

Persia’s problem — ^her case of arrested develop-
ment— gets its first explanation in geography and
its second in history.

With the exception of the Caspian provinces
and the shores of the Persian Gulf, Persia is a
table-land, buttressed and crossed by mountain
ranges. Save for the Karun, in the extreme
southwest, there are no navigable rivers in

5

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Persia. The meager streams of the plateau flow
toward the interior and lose themselves in salt-
deserts. Moreover, the topographical conditions
which present obstacles to commerce are no
doubt important factors in determining the cli-
mate of Persia. The rainfall between the Cas-
pian coast and the Elburz Mountains is too abun-
dant, but in the interior it rarely exceeds Six
inches. As a result, while dry farming is possi-
ble in a few regions, the agriculture of Persia has
depended chiefly on artificial irrigation ; and,
although agriculture has remained the chief in-
dustry of the country, it has, due to transporta-
tion difficulties, played little part in commerce.
With an area of 628,000 square miles, — greater
than that of France and Italy, — ^Persia has a
population which, in the absence of a recent
census, may be estimated at about twelve mil-
lions.

Persia in the time of Cyrus and Darius was a
world empire characterized by splendid power and
creative civilization. Darius’s post-road was a
transportation wonder of the ancient world ; even
now one can see from the Hamadan-Kazvin-
Teheran highway the huge earth mounds said to
have been thrown up by Shah Abbass in the six-
teenth century to serve as a chain of communica-
tion by signals across the country; imbelievable
tales are told of the speed of Persian couriers.

6

INTRODUCTION

Persia, nevertheless, has never been, either ex-
ternally or internally, a commercial country.
The development of a true commerce has lain to
the west, with Phoenicia, Athens, Venice, the
Hanse towns, Holland, and England.

The medieval trade routes to India and China
passed down the Eed Sea from Alexandria; or
overland from Antioch or Damascus, through
Bagdad and down the Euphrates and the Persian
Gulf ; or from Trebizond on the Black Sea, along
the south end of the Caspian, through Bokhara
and Samarkand in present-day Russian Tur-
kestan. The ships and caravans of the time
naturally took the lines of least resistance; they
merely skirted Persia; they did not originate in
the country or pass through it except at the bor-
ders. Moreover, the discovery of the westward
route to India and China did not seem likely, from
the economic point of view, to improve the situa-
tion of Persia. In course of time, however, the
British Empire, assuming the governance of
India, became a neighbor of Persia, and in the
second half of the nineteenth century the tide of
Russian expansion reached the borders of Iran.
During this pregnant period, Persia not only
came into territorial contact with two Western
powers, but she began to sense the significance of
the recently acquired world positions of the
United States and Germany. During this period,

7

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Persia became to other countries an object of
intensive economic interest.

The tide of commerce had rolled back on Persia.
Modern industrial civilization, with its potent
political accessories, had found Persia in its path.
West and East had met again, but not as in the
time of Cyrus and Xerxes, of Alexander, and of
Crassus. Persia was no longer an empire amdng
empires. She had now become a buffer state and
one of the world’s last and most extraordinary
frontiers.

In 1872, British telegraph lines crossed Persia ;
in the following year, the Shah for the first time
visited Europe; in 1876, a concession for the
Caspian fisheries was given to a Russian subject;
in 1888, the first railway in Persia, a short line
from Teheran to the shrine of Shah Abdul Azim,-
was constructed ; in the following year, a conces-
' sion was granted to British interests for a statb
bank, including exclusive mineral rights ; in 1890,
the British obtained a tobacco concession. From
that year, Persia became increasingly more im-
portant in the economic policies of foreign
powers; and for the last thirty-five years the
question of transportation in the Middle East has
repeatedly arisen in international negotiations, as
well as in Persia’s plans for its own economic de-
velopment. The imminence of the problem to
Persia, as well as its international significance,

8

INTRODUCTION

was shown at the end of the nineteenth century,
when the Turkish links of the railroad from Berlin
to the Persian Gulf began to become actualities.
Later, the British obtained railroad options in the
south of Persia ; and the Russians, highway con-
cessions in the north. It became clear that trans-
portation offered the key to Persia’s economic
future.

Political dangers which may have arisen in the
past from geographical location, have been partly
obviated by Persia’s extraordinary topography.
The country is walled with rock as its cities and
villages are with mud. Sailing up the Persian
Gulf, one sees on his right the coastal edge of
the plateau of Iran rising abruptly and unbroken,
an impenetrable gray rampart. A trip in an
automobile through the passes of the southern,
northern, or western ranges of Persia is an ex-
perience which if its interest and impressiveness
were fully appreciated would alone serve to at-
tract many more tourists than now visit Persia.

Entering Persia from the south, the west, or the
north, one is compelled to climb passes some of
which attain an elevation of over ten thousand
feet. The interior of the country is an enormous
saucer-like table-land with elevations of from two
thousand to eight thousand feet, rimmed with
motmtains which are among the most magnificent
in the world. The king of them all, Demavend,

9

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

seems a worthy rival of Fujiyama in grandeur,
with the point of its snow-capped cone rising
twenty thousand feet above sea-level. Viewed at
sunset from Teheran, which lies about sixty miles
to the southwest, the colors of its cone changing
from white to gold, then to purple, and finally to
gray as the sun sinks in the west, Demavend,
always impressive, becomes for a few moments
each day as glorious as Persia’s western sky
itself.

In an age of commerce and economic penetra-
tion, merely to “bound” a country does not
describe its real relation to contiguous countries.
The Caspian Sea, lying between Russia and
Persia, is not a true geographical frontier. It is
not a barrier ; it is an exposure, an invitation ; it
is an obvious and easy path between Russian and
Persian ports, and it is not surprising that the
northern neighbor should have gained a position of
predominance in the commerce of the whole of the
marvelously rich territory between the Elburz
Mountains and the sea. Across the frontier of
Azerbaidjan, a railroad extends south from Tiflis
to Tabriz ; and east of the Caspian, in Turkestan,
another Russian railroad almost touches the
Persian province of Khorassan at Askabad. An
Ijidian railroad terminates a few miles within the
Persian frontier at Duzdab, and another British-
controlled line leads north through Iraq from

10

INTRODUCTION

Basrah on the Persian Gulf, through Bagdad to
Khanikin, a few miles from Kasr-Shirin, the
Persian terminus of the west-east road to
Teheran. Draw a straight line from Khanikin
to Duzdab and it roughly coincides with the line
fixed in the British-Eussian Agreement of 1907 as
the southern boundary of the Eussian sphere of
influence.

Eussia and Persia, therefore, have in common
two land frontiers, one approached and the other
penetrated by a railroad, with the Caspian Sea
between. The British and Persian empires like-
wise share two land frontiers, one approached and
the other penetrated by a railroad, with the
Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf between.
Along the eastern frontier, Afghanistan, and
on the western, Turkey, share with Persia the
precarious distinction of keeping apart two great
empires.

I have mentioned the capacity possessed by the
Persian people for drawing on the special gifts
of other peoples without losing their own char-
acteristics and integrity.

Persia has never, like Far-Eastern countries,
barred her doors to foreigners or followed a de-
liberate policy of isolation. On the one hand, —
like England, for example, — she has been, in the
course of her long existence in a transit region of
the world, repeatedly captured and nourished by

11

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

alien invaders ; on the other hand, she has, perhaps
more than any other country, invited foreigners
to give her expert assistance, not as a confession
of political subordination or of incapacity but
rather in the spirit that an American university
listens to the lectures of a foreign professor, or
an American municipality, desirous of non-
political and expert administration, appoints a
city manager, budget director, or police chief
from another part of the country.

In 1900, the Customs Administration of Persia
was placed in charge of foreign officials; and in
1903, Monsieur Naus, Belgian Director of Cus-
toms, was for a short time in general charge of
the finances. In 1907, Monsieur Bizot, a French
oflScial, was appointed Financial Adviser and re-
mained in Persia two years without powers and
without noticeable result. In 1911, Mr. W. Mor-
gan Shuster, with a group of American assistants,
came to Persia on the invitation of the Imperial
Government, to reorganize and administer the
finances of the country. Within a month after his
arrival, the Majless passed a law conferring on
him comprehensive powers as Treasurer-General ;
he was supported by a majority of the Majless and
by a large body of public opinion; and, since the
unfortunate termination of his work by reason of
international complications, the Persians have
never ceased to respect him as an incarnation of

12

INTRODUCTION

their own highest aspirations. After the depar-
ture of Shuster, Monsieur Mornard, the Belgian
Director of Customs, became Treasurer-General,
but his tenure was short and he did not bring
about any fundamental improvement in the
financial situation. After the World War, a
British Treasury official, Mr. Armitage-Smith,
served for some months as Financial Adviser to
the Persian Government.

When I arrived in Persia, I found Belgians ad-
ministering the Customs and Posts Administra-
tions, Swedes directing the police department,
French doctors in charge of the Pasteur Institute,
and French professors installed in the Ministry of
Justice, codifying the laws and teaching in the law
school. The Swedes were later dismissed; but
steps were taken to employ a forest expert from
Germany and an expert in tea-culture from the
Netherlands.

While the appointment of foreign advisers and
administrators in Persia may not always have
been calculated and freely willed by the Persian
Government or the Persian people (foreign eco-
nomic interests and pressure were doubtless
strong factors in this connection), nevertheless it
is clear that Persia for a quarter of a century has
held in its administrations with more or less con-
sistency the signs and seeds of progress.

It is not our concern to balance the credits and

13

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

debits of the past. Progress in Persia is not
wholly imported ; it is not a wholly exotic
product fed by imitativeness and passing whims.
Persia has of course adopted, and has received
without any volition on her part many of the
obvious material aspects of Western civilization;
but it is more significant that she has learned and
applied so quickly and consistently certain of the
essential principles of our modern organized so-
ciety. A most noteworthy thing to me is that the
Persian Government and the thinking classes of
the Persian people have comprehended more
clearly than foreigners the theory of participation
by foreigners in Persian administrations.

Foreign administration in Persia has not been
to the Persians in any sense a stultifying sur-
render, and apparently it has not discouraged— ^
perhaps it has even encouraged — the existence
and growth of nationalistic spirit and political
skill among the Persian people. The fact is,
Persia is a weak country and in many respects an
immature country. The experience of Persians
in constitutional government and administration
dates only from 1906. For the Persians, more-
over, the task of completing and consolidating
their political revolution is complicated by the
coincidence of a comprehensive transition from
economic and social conditions which in many
respects are primitive or medieval. The inevita-

14

INTRODUCTION

bility of this transition, they cannot escape, if
they would. With respect to countries like
Persia, the modern industrial world — ^largely ig-
norant, itself, of the forces that drive it and of
the reasons for its aggressiveness — ^lays down a
minimum standard of efficiency as the price of
independent existence.

Persia has long felt this pressure and has de-
sired to meet the demands of the modem world.
Moreover, there has been a noticeable desire
among thinking Persians for the more varied and
stimulating life that results from or accompanies
economic development. Persians have been
thinking somewhat in terms of welfare.

They have seen, however, that economics must
precede welfare and finance must precede eco-
nomics. Although politically engrossed, they
have seen that finance and politics are as un-
congenial as the proverbial lion and lamb, and
that, to change the metaphor, an untrained polit-
ical bull plays quick havoc in the financial china-
shop.

A financial administration — or, for that matter,
any other technical administration — is, under the
best of conditions, a difficult piece of machinery
for a representative government to operate. It
is naturally still more difficult when represent-
ative govermnent is in the first stages of develop-
ment. The Persians themselves are the first to

15

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

confess frankly their administrative and financial
difficulties. In the absence of an enlightened and
effective public opinion in support of honest, effi-
cient, and law-observing administration, the sys-
tem of responsible cabinet government which ex-
ists in Persia captured and corrupted the financial
administration. There is, therefore, a settled
conviction among enlightened Persians that Per-
sian finances must be kept free of politics and
personal influence, and accordingly must be man-
aged, for some time to come, by foreigners.

The inability of Persian politicians at the pres-
ent time to manage Persian finances should not
be construed to indicate any inherent incurable
incapacity for self-government or even for techni-
cal administration. That the Persians should
recognize clearly their situation and needs ^.nd
should on their own initiative invite foreign ex-
pert assistance, as they have repeatedly donie in
recent years, seems to me evidence, rather, of
their good sense and of their genuine desire for
the improvement of their administrations. As a
matter of fact, other countries have at one time or
another and in one way or another received in-
struction from foreigners. In our own Revolu-
tion, we did not scorn to be drilled by French and
Germans ; and in the World War we quickened our
preparation by learning from the French and the
British. Many American cities have adopted the

16

INTRODUCTION

city-manager system of government, whicli is a
recognition of the fact that one of the simplest
and surest means of making administration
efficient and economical is to call in a technically
qualified outsider, give him an adequate salary,
secure him in his position for a reasonable time,
and equip him with adequate powers. The fact
that the Government of Afghanistan has recently
asked the Persian Government for certain admin-
istrative advisers indicates that the theory of rel-
ativity has some application in governmental mat-
ters. In any event, it would lead to a better un-
derstanding among nations and to a speedier im-
provement of their internal administrations, if
the strong nations as well as the weak should more
frequently exchange officials and specialists.

The Persians, furthermore, are most insistent
that their foreign employees should confine them- •
selves to their administrative tasks and should
not mix in political or religious matters. A stipu-
lation to this effect is written in the contracts of
all foreign officials. With regard to the admin-
istrative work of foreigners, the Persians are
highly critical and exacting.

In 1921, the Persian Government, then headed
by Muchir ed Dowleh, — ^a patriotic liberal who
during his public career in Persia has won gen-
eral respect for his honesty, dignity, sound judg-
ment, and statesmanlike aims, — ^formulated the

17

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

main headings of an economic policy which in-
cluded the employment of American advisers for
the Ministries of Finance and Public Works and
the Municipality of Teheran, the granting of a
petroleum concession in the northern provinces to
an American-controlled company, the attracting
of American capital to other Persian investments,
and the flotation of a loan in America.

The Persians looked upon America as a rich
and powerful country whose government and peo-
ple had already shown their humanitarian tend-
encies and their friendliness and sympathy for
the Persian people. They did not doubt the disin-
terestedness of America ; and entertained no fear
that Americans, under cover of concessions or
loans, would interfere in the politics of an Eastern
country or attempt to dominate its government.
The Persian Government, in a communication to
the Department of State, had pledged itself to tlie
principle of the open door; and the Persians no
doubt felt that the presence of Americans and
American capital in Persia would contribute to
the creation of conditions under which the open
door would become an actuality and the danger of
spheres of influence or a partition of the country
would be definitely past. The ‘ ‘ American policy ’ ’
of the Persian Government appeared to be based,
therefore, on a strong desire to insure in a practi-
cal way the independence and integrity of Persia

18

INTRODUCTION

through economic and financial cooperation with
a nation whose interests in the country would be
likely to coincide with those of the Persian people.

The desires of the Persian Government were
conveyed by its minister at Washington, Mirza
Hossein Khan Alai, Persia’s ablest diplomat,
whose colorful personality, quick command of
English, indefatigable activity, devotion to his
country, and touching confidence in Americans,
quickly won for him a large circle of American
friends. Mr. Alai arrived in the fall of 1921, and
immediately began his representations at the De-
partment of State and his negotiations with
American companies. As Economic Adviser of
the department, it was my privilege to have fre-
quent conferences with him, and the acquaintance
thus established with him and with Persian ques-
tions had, doubtless, much to do with my selection
as Administrator-General of the Finances of
Persia.

In July, 1921, the Department of State, after
prolonged consideration, suggested my name as a
person with whom the Persian Legation might
wish to communicate in regard to the appointment
of a Financial Adviser. In suggesting my name,
the department made it perfectly clear that I
would undertake my work in Persia in a purely
private capacity, and that all connection with the
department would cease immediately upon my en-

19

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

tering the employment of the Persian Govern-
ment. It was made clear, further, that the Ameri-
can Government assumed no responsibility for
any action that I might take as an oflScial in the
employment of the Persian Government.

The attitude of the American Government in
this respect has been understood perfectly by the
various members of the financial mission and by
Persian officials ; we have conducted ourselves ac-
cordingly; and I am confident that there will never
be any disposition on the part of the Persian or
any other government to hold the Government of
the United States responsible for the acts of
Americans employed in Persian administrations.
With regard to their relationship to their own
governments, the position of other foreigners em-
ployed in Persia appears to be somewhat dif-
ferent. The Belgians employed in the Customs
Administration, for example, are career officials
of the Belgian Customs Administration assigned
to Persia by the Belgian Government.

My contract with the Persian Government was
signed by Mr. Alai and myself on August 14, 1922.
In the contract I was given general charge of the
financial administration and the preparation of
the government budget. It was agreed by the
Persian Government that it would neither grant
any commercial or industrial concession nor take
any decision on a financial question without prior

20

INTRODUCTION

consultation with me. Explicit powers assigned
to me involved effective control over the per-
sonnel of the financial administration, over ex-
penditures, and over the creation of financial ob-
ligations.

Between the signing of the contract and our
departure on September 30, 1922, the Persian
Legation engaged on my recommendation a num-
ber of capable assistants to accompany me.
The municipal adviser. Dr. Ryan, and his assis-
tants who were engaged later, did not form a part
of the financial mission. My American colleagues
in Persia thus far have been Dr. E. L. Bogart, Mr.
Frank H. Gore, Mr. Charles I. McCaskey, Col. D.
W. MacCormack, Mr. Edmund H. Jones, Maj.
Melvin Hall, Mr. T. C. Mitchell, Mr. C. C. Early,
Capt. Thomas Pearson, Mr. James H. Flannagan,
and Mr. John A. Dunaway.

Although the Persian Government during its
long history has taken numerous partial censuses
for fiscal and military purposes and has not been
indifferent to the value of statistics, I found that
the publication of well-planned financial reports
and accounts had been started by Mornard and
had ceased with his passing, although the customs
and postal statistics were still being published an-
nually by the Belgian officials in the administra-
tions concerned. As a result, we were unable to
find anything in the United States except the most

21

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

general and inaccurate figures of Persian rev-
enues and expenditures. We were not informed
at all concerning the amount of the floating debt,
and were given nothing but startling guesses at
the sum of the salaries of government employees
in arrears. We knew that the deficit must be
large; and apparently, so far as we could learn,
the then Persian minister of finance knew no
more.

There are no American press correspondents in
Persia, and as a result the American newspapers
and their readers in general are apparently almost
as ignorant of real conditions there as they are of
conditions in the sacred city of Lhasa. Due
largely, I suppose, to the remoteness of the coun-
try, only its sensational occurrences are reported
in American newspapers, — for example the niur-
der of Vice-Consul Imbrie, the earthquake;, at
. Torbat, the Parisian sojourns of the Shah, the
movement to establish a republic, and the late un-
pleasantness between the Prime Minister and the
Sheikh of Mohammerah, events all of which are
important and some tragic, but which, torn from
related events and surrounding conditions, give
an utterly misleading conception of the situation
in Persia.

There are several books which, although not up
to date, present an informing description of sig-
nificant historical events, conditions, and char-

22

INTRODUCTION

acteristics in Persia. Of these, I recall with par-
ticular appreciation Dr. Browne’s “Persian Rev-
olution” and “A Year Among the Persians”;
Professor Jackson’s “Persia, Past and Present”;
Shuster’s “Strangling of Persia”; Balfour’s
“Recent Happenings in Persia”; Sykes’s “His-
tory of Persia”; and the inimitable “Haji
Baba,” which, although fiction, is truer than
much that purports to be fact.

The conversations that we had, in America and
on our way to Teheran, with those who had visited
Persia, as well as the articles in the foreign
press with respect to our mission, were eminently
useful, but were not calculated to increase our
optimism. The warnings that we received were
kept in mind and served to temper our enthusiasm
and keep us on our guard before experience had
taught us its lessons. The Persian correspond-
ent of the “Near East” said in its issue of Octo-
ber 19, 1922 :

The American Financial Mission, under the leadership
of Mr. Milspaul [sic] will arrive in this country shortly.
Skeptics give him three months to get to know his work,
three months in getting his work in motion, three months
in collecting his salary before leaving Persia in despair.

In Paris, we were received by the Shah in his
apartment at the Hotel Meurice. After the pres-
entation and some affable words of welcome from

23

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

his Imperial Majesty, I made a brief prepared
speech which was answered by the Shah with ex-
pressions of friendliness and assurances of sup-
port. After the audience, in a private conversa-
tion, he again expressed his good-will. Nassir ol
Molk, who was regent in the time of Shuster, a
wise, experienced old man, was present at the in-
terview and acted as interpreter.

The route that we took to Persia, the only prac-
ticable one at that time, was by way of the Ked
Sea, Bombay, and the Persian Gulf to Basra,
thence by rail via Bagdad to Quaratu on the Per-
sian Iraq frontier, and thence by automobile to
Teheran through Kermanshah, Hamadan, and
Kazvin. The trip took six weeks. At the present
time Teheran may be reached in three weeks from
New York, either through Russia or by way of
Beirut, Syria, across the desert by automobile
transport to Bagdad, thence by train or auto-
mobile to Khanikin on the Persian-Iraq frontier,
and on to Teheran by automobile.

Traveling by automobile in the East is not un-
comfortable or expensive; the roads, when not
the smooth hard floor of the desert, are being con-
stantly improved; and rest-houses and little ho-
tels are springing up along the way.

We were met in Bagdad by a young Persian
named Mirza Mahmoud Khan Nassery, who had
been educated in England and who spoke English

24

INTRODUCTION

perfectly. He had been sent by the Minister of
Finance with a ferarsk (servant) of the ministry
named Ismail Khan, to arrange for our transpor-
tation and comfort during the remaining portion
of the journey. They performed their tasks
most efficiently.

Thoroughly pessimistic concerning the char-
acter of Persian officials and the condition of the
finances, Nassery was nevertheless exceptionally
intelligent and he was able on the way to give me
much valuable information concerning the tax sys-
tem of Persia. He was later appointed an assist-
ant in the Direct Tax Administration and proved
to be one of our most industrious and valuable
Persian employees.

We were hospitably received by local officials
and other prominent Persians at the principal
towns on the road to Teheran ; we had our fill of
crisp bread, pilow, dookh, mast, and other appe-
tizing Persian dishes ; we tasted the rare delicious-
ness of Persian melons ; we pushed past tribesmen
emigrating with their flocks of sheep ; near Ker-
manshah we saw the ancient stone inscriptions of
Taghi Bostan and Bisitoon; near Hamadan we
saw hot mineral springs bubbling up near the
road ; in spite of the chilly November air, we were
impressed by the matchless view of mountains
and valleys from the high passes; we met with
a gust of rain near Kazvin, a sign of luck said the

25

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Persians; we passed caravans of camels, pack-
mules, pack-horses, two-wheel wagons pulled by
one horse and four-wheel wagons pulled by two
or four horses, groups of donkeys with heavy
burdens and tinkling bells, some automobiles and
motor-trucks indicating the advent of fast
machine transport ; and in the evening of Novem-
ber 18, 1922, we entered Teheran to find Mokhber
ed Dowleh Park, one of the largest in Teheran,
rented for us, a house almost completely fur-
nished, servants salaaming on the steps, and a
warm dinner ready to eat and faultlessly served.

26

CHAPTER II

THE AMERICAN MISSION TAKES
UP ITS TASK

Due to the difficulty of obtaining berths
on the east-bound steamer from Mar-
seilles, the American Mission — consist-
ing, with its families, of seventeen adults, a boy of
seven, and a six-months-old baby — ^had separated
at Paris into two parties. Mr. Pearson, my spe-
cial assistant, Mr. Flannagan, my secretary, and
I took the first available P. and 0. boat to Bom-
bay and the remainder of the party followed a
week later. At Bagdad, Mr. Pearson was taken
with malaria, and as a result, Mr. Flannagan and
I, with Nassery and Ismail, went on to Teheran
without him.

On the morning after our arrival, we took a
look about Mokhber ed Dowleh Park. A rec-
tangle of about thirty acres, it is one of the largest
and most beautiful gardens in Teheran, being sec-
ond in size to the famous Attabek Park, where
Shuster had been housed and which is now oc-
cupied by the Soviet Legation. Our residence is
perhaps a quarter of a mile outside the city wall,

27

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

and in this location we have enjoyed more pri-
vacy than would have been our lot within the
city.

The same residence had been placed at the dis-
posal of Mr. Armitage-Smith ; and Djavad Khan,
the English-speaking head servant who had been
engaged for my service, had acted in a similar
capacity for the British Financial Adviser and for
some of the foreign legations.

In Mokhber ed Dowleh Park, two houses had
been constructed, an enormous one which had been
used as the anderun or family residence and a
smaller house which had been used as the hirun
or place of reception and business for the Persian
master. The smaller house had been furnished
by the Government for the use of myself, Mr.
Pearson, and Mr. Flannagan; the larger house
was intended as the residence of several other
members of the mission. Built in the French
style, with ornate decorations, impressive en-
trances, large windows, spacious rooms, and high
ceilings, the houses leave little to be desired, so
far as appearance is concerned.

A Persian garden, such as Mokhber ed Dowleh
Park, is a striking contrast to the sun-baked
streets or bare fields outside. Within the walls of
the garden, art and nature join in creating
trees, shrubbery, flower beds, walks, streams,
waterfalls, pools, and fountains that not merely

28

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

delight the eye but become as much a part of the
conception of home as the rooms and furniture of
the house. Water is the life and the most pre-
cious adornment of a Persian garden ; and in our
park were two large, deep, clear pools stocked
with goldfish, and three smaller pools with foun-
tains in their centers. Lawns are rare in Persia
and there was none in our garden, partly perhaps
because of the shade cast by the thickly planted
poplars, sycamores, and shrubbery.

In the spring after our arrival, we built a tennis-
court and cleaned the largest pool for swimming ;
and, aside from other forms of recreation, we have
taken pleasure in walking about the garden and,
in the cool of the day, along the roads outside.

In the smaller house, we have five large rooms
and three halls, each with a fireplace. The
kitchen, servants’ quarters, and store-rooms are
in the basement, where the rooms follow exactly
the plan of the floor above. The rooms are diflS-
cult to heat and to furnish attractively and com-
fortably according to American taste. We have
set up iron stoves in some of the rooms, but the
reception room, living-room, and dining-room are
heated by fireplaces burning wood or Persian
coal. Electricity, produced by a steam-power
plant in the city, is available for lighting many of
the buildings of Teheran, but most of the private
residences, including those of Mokhber ed Dowleh

29

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Park, are lighted by kerosene lamps. Water is
heated in a samovar and baths are brought to the
rooms, in large circular tubs. It is surprising
how little one misses in Persia the so-called mod-
ern conveniences of American houses. The fires,
lights, and baths are attended to by the servants,
good furniture is made in Teheran to order, and,
on the whole, a permanent resident there can live
as comfortably as in the West.

In addition to Djavad Khan, we found several
other servants at the house ; but these were soon
reduced in number to four : two house servants, a
cook, and a cook’s boy, to whom were added, after
Mrs. Millspaugh’s arrival, a baji or woman-
servant. The Persian servants are as a rule
highly efficient, and, due to the economic condi-
tions of the country, there is no lack of them.
They are attentive to details, respectful, and faith- ,
ful -to their employers. Persian servants will
rarely steal money or valuables, but they have
their own commercial ethics according to which
commissions on purchases for the house are con-
sidered by them a legitimate supplement to their
salaries.

On the day following our arrival in Teheran, I
called at the American Legation and on Fahim ol
Molk, the Minister of Finance, the latter receiving
me with marked cordiality and evidence of relief.
He introduced me in his house to the editor of

30

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

the newspaper “Iran,” but advised me afterward
to have nothing to do with Persian newspapers.
Fahim ol Molk, on becoming minister a few
months before, had reached the climax of a career
in the financial administration, during which he
had served in several more or less responsible
positions. He impressed me at once with his per-
sonal attractiveness, his intelligence, and his
ample information on matters pertaining to Per-
sian finances. For several weeks he had been em-
barrassed by the lack of funds and by the demoral-
ization in the administration, and he evidently
welcomed the presence of one who could in the
future draw the fire of critics and assume the
responsibility for actions which he knew would be
as unpopular as they were necessary. In one of
our early interviews, he told me that I should be
“the real Minister of Finance,” and during the
remainder of his tenure of office he acted as if his
sole function were to advise me regarding the
conduct of the administration.

In company with Fahim ol Molk, I visited the
then Prime Minister, Ghavam os Saltaneh, who
presented me to the other ministers. At the time
of my arrival, Ghavam os Salteneh was being sub-
jected to savage attacks in the Parliament ; and it
was natural that the initiative of the Government
should be more or less paralyzed. Following my
call on the Prime Minister, I was received by the

31

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Yaliabd or Crown Prince in company with Ali
Knli Khan, Nabil ed Dowleh, who had been Per-
sian Minister in Washington at the time of the
employment of Shuster, and who was at the time
of my arrival Master of Ceremonies of the Court
of the Crown Prince. The Valiahd — a handsome,
genial, intelligent young man — greeted me affably
and assured me of his friendly attitude.

In the course of these calls, I was introduced to
the interesting Persian custom of drinking tea.
Whenever you visit a Persian, his servants
promptly set before you a cup or a glass of tea
with a bowl of lump sugar. On a little table in
front of you there are also usually sweetmeats,
candies, and cigarettes. If your visit is pro-
longed,— as it is likely to be in Persia, where calls
last commonly from one to several hours, particu-
larly when host and guest have business matters
of mutual interest, — tea will be repeatedly serveil
to you, and often chocolate also. When you visit
a Persian oflScial in his home or office, at any hour
of the day, tea and cigarettes appear. In the
summer, tea is supplemented by sherbet and ice-
cream. Smoking is perhaps not so general or
carried to such excess in individual cases as in
America. Persians who smoke, prefer cigarettes
of Persian tobacco and Persian make ; they rarely
smoke cigars; and I have never seen a Persian
with a pipe of Western model, although many

32

View op the gaiidens op Goi.istax,' looking towaiiu the extkance of the Shah’s palace

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

smoke the ItcXyan or water-pipe, which is some-
times passed around when more than one Persian
are present.

After personal calls on the active high officials
of the Government, I left cards at the houses of
the ex-prime ministers and other dignitaries of
the State, calling on a few of them personally, and
finally completed the round of preliminary formal-
ities by dropping cards at the foreign legations.

With respect to calling at the foreign legations,
I was particularly desirous to do no less and no
more than what might be dictated by Persian eti-
quette. Certain legations at Teheran have in the
past taken an attitude toward the Persian Gov-
ernment and its officials which if adopted in a
Western capital would prompt an emphatic pro-
test from the Government concerned and would
lead to the recall of the offending diplomat. Cer-
tain legations had been the mouthpiece of policies
which, whether justly or not, created suspicion,
distrust, and hostility in the minds of Persians.
Many Persians who were friendly, and in some
cases improperly friendly, to one legation, were
hostile to another. I realized that at the time of
our coming to Persia the situation had changed,
and that the legations had abandoned many if not
all of the practices which had persisted in the
past. Nevertheless, I was engaged by contract
to serve an independent government and it was,

33

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

natvually, not my ■wish to give to the legations any
recognition which might be misconstrued by the
Persian people or the legations themselves. It
was intimated to me that Persian administrations
were filled with Russian and British spies and
that many if not most of the leading Persian of-
ficials put the interests of a foreign government
ahead of the interests of their own country.’ The
patriotic party in the Majless had brought the
American Mission to Persia because they wanted
the finances managed by neutrals. On the other
hand, the diplomats at Teheran represented gov-
ernments and nations which had vast and varied
interests in Persia and would inevitably and prop-
erly be brought into the discussion of many finan-
cial questions. It seemed to me, therefore, that
there should be no act on my part which might
in any way embarrass me in the handling of
financial questions affecting foreigners. Accord-
ingly, on the second day after my arrival in
Teheran I asked the Minister of Finance whether
I should make the first call on the legations. He
laid the matter before the Council of Ministers
and telephoned me that such was the custom of the
country and the Government had no objection to
my doing so. The ministers or their charges d’af-
faires promptly returned my call, and although
I was later to be publicly attacked by my Persian
and foreign enemies, I was never criticized, so far

34

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

as I know, for establishing social relations with
the legations. When the Russian and French
ministers, who were absent at the time, arrived
in Teheran, they paid the first call on me. The
Italian minister, also arriving later, apparently
believed that ho should receive the first call, and
so, to my regret, we have never exchanged calls
or enjoyed social relations.

This whole matter of calling and dropping cards
may seem a petty and irrelevant detail. I gave
attention to it and speak now at some length of
it, because matters of this kind develop in Persia,
not altogether without reason, an extraordinary
importance.

Intimations also were made to me that I should
call on certain of the prominent deputies and on
the under-secretaries of the ministries. On the
latter I did not call; but later, when it seemed
to me that there was some possibility of misun-
derstanding on the part of the deputies, I left my
card at the houses of a number of the leaders of
the Majless. I was surprised, however, although
on the whole reassured, to be told that one of the
deputies had remarked on receiving my card that
I “should get down to work and not waste time
in dropping cards.”

When I arrived in Teheran, the Shah had
started back from Paris, and Reza Khan Pahlevi,
then known simply as Reza Khan or by his title

35

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

“Sardar Sepah,” the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Minister of War, had gone to Bushire
on the southern coast to meet him. On the day
that I installed myself in my office at the Min-
istry of Finance, I was visited by a friend and
admirer of the Minister of War, a young English-
speaking Persian named Mirza Beza Khtin Af-
shar, who had studied at Ohio State University
and at Columbia. He brought me a cordial letter
of welcome from the Minister of War; and as Af-
shar had an excellent command of English, I took
him, at his request, into my service as interpreter.
In this capacity he worked faithfully and loyally
until in 1923 he was elected a deputy of the Maj-
less from Urumiah, his native place. Another
letter from the Minister of War had been handed
me the previous day by Mirza Sultan Mohammed
Khan Amerie, a young English-speaking Persian
in charge of the Indirect Tax Administration, who
enjoyed the confidence of the Minister of War and
who was later to become one of our most useful
Persian assistants. These letters from Beza
Khan confirmed by other information left me in
no doubt that this powerful personage had a keen
appreciation of the bearing of finance on military
power and that ho was desirous of establishing
relations of friendship and cooperation with the
American Mission.

With the minister, I went through the formality

36

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

of visiting the various administrations and bu-
reaus, and then in the following weeks began seri-
ously to familiarize myself with organization and
procedure and to collect as much information as
possible concerning the financial situation. I
found that it was as difficult in Teheran as it was
in Washington to obtain an adequate presentation
of the facts. With the exception of the Customs
Administration, which had been under Belgian
direction for a quarter-century and had reports
and reflations printed in French, and the In-
direct Tax Administration, which supplied me
with a clear and detailed memorandum in English,
prepared by Amerie, we were unable to inform
ourselves concerning the various branches of the
administration except in a painfully slow, uncer-
tain, and piecemeal manner. We had consulta-
tions day and night with Persians reputed to be
honest and experienced in the finances. We dis-
covered in these consultations that most Persians
find it difficult to adopt an objective point of view.
They were attempting to impress us with their
long experience and honest service ; and there was
scarcely one that had not performed, according
to his own testimony, notable achievements in in-
creasing the revenues. Many of them warned us
of the intrigues of Persians and foreigners
against us ; aiid all of them expressed an earnest
wish to devote their abilities, at adequate salaries,

37

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

to the service of the American Mission. I re-
ceived under the seal of secrecy reports concern-
ing the alleged dishonest activities of scores of
Persian and foreign employees of the ministry,
and I received anonymous letters warning me
against people, ranging from my head servant to
the Prime Minister. I filed these various reports
and letters and gave them no attention at the
time, because it was my determination to make no
move in an atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue
without being reasonably sure of the facts. My
American colleagues, assigned to their respective
branches of administration, were having similar
experiences and following a similar policy. Mr.
Gore, an expert auditor, assumed the direction of
the Administration of General Accounts; Dr.
Bogart took charge of the Bank-i-Iran and the
Imperial Mint; Mr. Early took over the Admin-
istration of Direct Taxation; Mr. McCaskey, who
had been engaged as Director of Indirect Taxa-
tion, was assigned to supervise Treasury opera-
tions ; Colonel MacCormack and Mr. Mitchell, who
had been engaged as provincial directors, were
temporarily assigned to the investigation of the
revenues. When Mr. Jones and Major Hall ar-
rived during the winter, the former was sent to
the Province of Azerbaidjan and the latter to
Khorassan. Mr. Dunaway, Mr. Pearson, and Mr.
Flannagan took up their work in my own office.

38

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

M. Lambert Molitor^Le Belgian Administrator-
General of the Customs, had been employed in
Persia for over twenty years, and with a staff of
about a dozen Belgian officials was exercising a
thorough control over the Customs Administra-
tion. A few weeks before the arrival of the
American Mission, the contracts of the Belgian
officials had been renewed for three years. The
discovery of this fact, after my arrival, caused me
no disappointment, for although my contract pro-
vides that no foreign official shall be employed in
the financial administration without my approval,
it was far from my intention to attempt to get rid
of the Belgians, or, in the absence of clear admin-
istrative reasons, to interfere with their work.
It seemed to be the part of wisdom to give our
first attention to the other administrations, which
had lacked foreign direction,' and to turn to the
Customs Administration, which appeared to be al-
ready well organized, only when it obviously re-
quired attention. When I entered Persia, the
Belgian officials in the provinces met me with a
message from Monsieur Molitor in which he gave
me assurances of his loyal cooperation ; on my ar-
rival in Teheran, Monsieur Molitor gave these
assurances his personal confirmation; and the
Belgian charge d’affaires lost no time in return-
ing my call and assuring me of the cordial sup-
port of the whole Belgian community. I have

39

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

never had reason to doubt the sincerity of these
assurances. Monsieur Molitor and his Belgian
associates have worked with their American col-
leagues without friction or perceptible jealousy.
Had Monsieur Molitor been influenced by the in-
trigues which later started, or had he entertained
petty personal considerations, our relations might
have been less happy and the work of the Amer-
ican Mission correspondingly complicated.

In spite of the specific provisions of my con-
tract, one of the first important questions that
had to be decided was whether the American Mis-
sion was to be a group of advisers or of adminis-
trators. The Persian Government had originally
asked for a Financial Adviser. Such was the
title that had been borne by Mr. Armitage-Smith
and Monsieur Bizot had been permitted to advise
only. Indeed, Monsieur Bizot, whom I met in
Paris, told me in many phrases that I must spend
at least two years in investigation and study be-
fore attempting to take any positive action. Be-
fore my engagement, the Persian Government
had instructed its legation at Washington to urge
the Financial Adviser, whoever he might be, to
come to Persia without defined powers. Upon
my insistence that certain specific powers be ac-
corded me, the Majless, when including these
powers in the law of my engagement, changed my
title from Financial Adviser to Administrator-

40

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

General of the Finances. In any event, it was
never my intention that the American Mission
should be a group of advisers with no power to get
their advice accepted and executed. I realized
that the finances of Persia could not be reformed
without radical action, and that the general prin-
ciples of sound fiscal administration were quite as
well known to the Persians as to us. The Per-
sians, however, as they themselves knew, were
helpless to put these principles into practice,
mainly for the simple reason that they were in
politics. In spite of the obviousness of our posi-
tion, the Minister of Finance was apparently
laboring under a misunderstanding. He began
by addressing me as le Conseiller in French and
Mostashar in Persian, meaning “adviser,” and
before I had definitely selected Afshar as my in-
terpreter, the minister transferred from the Cus-
toms Administration to my office a friend of his
to be my “Chief of Cabinet.” I sent the young
man back whence he had come, and called the min-
ister’s attention to my contractual power over
all appointments. In accordance with my con-
tractual power over payments, I also issued an
order to the Imperial Bank of Persia that no check
drawn by the Government should be honored un-
less it bore my counter-signature. A few days
later, the minister signed with me a joint instruc-
tion to all the branches of the financial adminis-

41

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

tration to the effect that in the future all em-
ployees were to be responsible in the first instance
to me and no order or instruction should be
obeyed unless it bore my signature. A firm in-
sistence in the early days on the recognition of
my contract powers, was, I am convinced, the only
means by which I should ever have had any op-
portunity whatever to exercise those powers.
Had the American Mission conae to Persia with-
out powers, or, possessing paper powers, had
elected to become advisers, we should doubtless
have been less hard worked, less harassed, and
in some quarters more popular, but we should
have been a sore disappointment to those deputies
of the Majless and other Persian patriots who
looked to the American Mission for energetic,
action and effective leadership.

It is true that, unfamiliar as we then were with
Persian conditions, it was necessary to take no
fundamental action except after much investiga-
tion and study. During the first months, we in-
variably told callers who came with complaints,
proposals, claims, or other business, that no
decision could be taken until after careful in-
vestigation. Dossiers had to be translated and
completed; accounts, most of which were far in
arrears, had to be obtained and examined; most
important of all, it was necessary to ascertain cur-
rent fiscal needs and the revenue possibilities, be-

42

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

fore we could lay down any plan for the handling
of individual cases, which usually involved ar-
r eared obligations. We proceeded with the reor-
ganization of the jSnancial administration little by
little and most cautiously, and it was not until the
second year of our work that we were ready to
propose to the Majless any taxation projects.

Effective control of the financial administration
was, however, the essential thing. To get it at all,
we had to get it quickly. After getting it, al-
though we found that it burdened us with an
enormous amount of responsibility and routine
work, it enabled us immediately to stop the visible
leaks and to make the obviously necessary im-
provements; and incidentally it afforded us by
far the best opportunity to get the information
needed for our investigations.

The next important decision concerned the
Minister of War. My first glimpse of this ex-
traordinary man was in a garden just outside the
city walls on a December day in 1922, at the end
of his long journey from Bushire, where he had
met the Shah on the return of the latter from
Paris. Eeza Khan was walking among his oflScers
— a tall, straight, powerful figure ; a strong, ruddy
face ; eyes and nose like those of an eagle. There
was much in his appearance to indicate strong
will. I was to learn later, from personal contacts,
of his courtesy, cordiality, and common sense.

43

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

From humble origins, Beza Khan had sprung sud-
denly into prominence in 1921 at the time of the
coup d’etat of Seyed Zia Din who, becoming Prime
Minister, had made Beza Khan Minister of War.
Ho has since remained continuously Minister of
War and Commander-in-Chief of the Army.
Gifted with unusual powers of decision and leader-
ship, a stern disciplinarian, possessing organiz-
ing ability of no mean order, he had built up a
well-drilled and well-equipped army with which
he had already subjugated the tribes of Azerbaid-
jan and was maintaining satisfactory conditions
of order and security throughout most of the coun-
try. There was a tendency to look upon him as
a dictator, and ho was regarded by all Persians
with wholesome respect. He was tenacious of his
power and prestige ; ho naturally looked upon the
army, his own personal creation, with the keenest
pride and affection, and rightly considered it the
first essential instrument in the unification, nation-
alization, and reconstruction of the country. Nat-
urally, he was likely to be on his guard against
anybody who by chance might fail to appreciate
the services of the army or who might take steps
which would diminish its prestige or impair its
strength. He was stated to have been in favor of
the coming of the American Mission, and it was,
I am convinced, his purpose to give it support ; but

44

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

he must have viewed with no little apprehension
this group of strangers whose work might affect
profoundly all branches of the Government, in-
cluding the army.

Reza Khan’s apprehension was doubtless
heightened by the fact that, nine months before, he
had taken over a large part of the financial ad-
ministration in order to insure the payment of
the troops. He had realized with his character-
istic directness and good sense that an army
could not be kept together without food, cloth-
ing, and equipment ; and, to provide these
essentials, it had to be regularly and ade-
quately paid. He has the utmost confidence in
his own power to get things done; and when the
disorganized politics-infested Ministry of Finance
failed to furnish the necessary funds, he had cer-
tain of its branches transferred temporarily to
the Ministry of War, to be directed by his own
appointees, the revenues to be paid directly to the
army. When we arrived in Teheran, the Admin-
istration of Indirect Taxation, — comprising the
important opium, tobacco, excise, and miscellane-
ous indirect taxes, — the Administration of Public
Domains, the Alimentation Service, and the finan-
cial agency of Teheran, were administered di-
rectly and their net revenues received by the
Ministry of War. In addition, that ministry re-

45

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

ceived the surplus revenues of the Telegraphs
Administration of the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
graphs.

In the absence of a national army or constab-
ulary, Shuster had been compelled, in order to
have the force necessary to collect the taxes, to
organize a Treasury Gendarmerie. I also real-
ized that, in order to collect the taxes, the exist-
ence of force, if not the actual use of it, would be
in our case equally necessary. • With an adequate
force already organized by Reza Khan, it was
clearly inadvisable for us to undertake the crea-
tion of a gendarmerie which would have dupli-
cated expenses, and which would, moreover, have
furnished occasions for friction and misunder-
standing between the Ministries of War and Fi-
nance. Needing force to collect the revenues, 1
saw no other course than to try in every way
possible to win the support and cooperation of
Reza Khan and through him the support and co-
operation of the army.

From a broader point of view, I looked upon
Reza Khan as one of the most significant and en-
couraging phenomena in Persia. He seemed to be
the leader that the country needed. He had shown
constructive genius ; he had taken the preliminary
steps necessary to the making of a modem nation ;
it was apparent that no hope existed for the sol-
vency, prosperity, and progress of Persia except

46

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

on the basis of peace, order, and security; it oc-
curred to me, also, that it would be difficult to
conceive of any justification for foreign interfer-
ence if the Persian Government showed that it
was able according to modern standards to pro-
tect lives and property and to execute the law
within its borders. It seemed essential that in
return for the cooperation which I expected from
Eeza Khan, I should endeavor to assist him so far
as possible in the accomplishment of those aims
which were for the good of Persia. On the other
hand, it was clearly necessary for us to obtain
direct control over all branches of the financial
administration and to centralize in our hands, to
the utmost possible extent, all the revenues and ex-
penditures of the country.

Calling on Eeza Khan at his house with Pahim
ol Molk and Afshar, I found that his attitude and
remarks tended to confirm the conclusions that I
had reached. Accordingly, I proposed that he re-
turn to the Ministry of Finance the administra-
tions which were then under his control; that he
render to the Ministry of Finance an appropriate
accounting of the army expenditures; and that in
return the Ministry of Finance, if we were able
to obtain an advance from the Imperial Bank of
Persia, should guarantee the regular payment of
the army budget until the end of the fiscal year,
i. e., March 21, 1923. To these proposals he

47

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

agreed and the interview was closed with mutual
assurances of friendship and cooperation.

We immediately arranged for an advance from
the bank of four million tomans, and not only
kept our promise regarding regular payments to
the army for many months after the end of the
fiscal year, but since December, 1922, have paid —
on occasions, of course, with some delay — all the
current authorized expenditures of the Govern-
ment. Eeza Khan promptly returned the trans-
ferred administrations. Colonel MacCormack
took charge of the Administration of Public Do-
mains, the Alimentation Service, and the Teheran
Financial Agency, and Mr. Mitchell was assigned
to supervise the Administration of Indirect Tax-
ation.

We had another object in view in obtaining the
advance from the bank. We arrived in Persia
about four months before the close of the fiscal
year. The treasury was empty. Payments of
salaries and other expenses of the Government
were at that time from one to eight months in ar-
rears, and there were for previous years various
unpaid obligations amounting to large sums.
The school-teachers and the police were unpaid
and were threatening to strike. Pensioners, of
whom there were about fifty thousand, were tak-
ing hast, gathering at the Ministry of Finance,
and otherwise contributing to the demoralization

48

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

of the administrations. There were various
claims by foreigners and foreign governments.
The Court had not received any money for several
months. The salaries of the deputies of the Maj-
less were in arrears. Dealers to whom the Gov-
ernment owed money were refusing to furnish
further supplies until they received payment.
Employees of the Ministry of Finance engaged in
the collection and handling of revenues were not
receiving their salaries; and in such a situation,
with the loose control then exercised, they natu-
rally not only helped themselves from such rev-
enues as passed through their hands, but also were
not over-energetic in the collection of revenue.
Furthermore, we could foresee for several months
no prospect of a substantial increase of revenue.
The oil royalties for the year 1922-23 would not
be paid until December, 1923. It appeared to be
necessary, therefore, to relieve the pressure on the
Ministry of Finance in order to begin our work;
to reestablish, so far as possible, the morale of
government employees, particularly those con-
cerned with the finances and with the maintenance
of order in the cities; and finally to obtain the
confidence and support of the people, who judge
the success of a financial administration largely
by its ability to make payments.

It is a pleasure to record in this connection one
of the most heartening surprises that I have ex-

49

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

perienced in Persia. When we went to Persia, I
was told that we should be expected to perform
the impossible ; to draw from the thin air and arid
plains a miraculous flow of gold, or, like the
swarthy magician who entertains tourists at Cairo
by extracting live chickens from their pockets, to
conjure loans and investments out of the pockets
of surprised and delighted Western bankers.
The experiences of Persian officialdom since 1890
had been perverting and corrupting. Big busi-
ness, engaged in sharp competition in a weak
country, does not preoccupy itself with the train-
ing of the people or with the elevation of their
moral standards. It would not have been surpris-
ing, therefore, if the Persians had expected some-
thing from us which we were not prepared to give,
or if they had lost hope in the capacity of Persia
to finance itself. Persian officials in the past
have of course sought, and at times received,
foreign loans, not for productive and constructive
purposes or even for meeting the legitimate cur-
rent expenses of the Government but rather for
the corrupt enrichment of politicians. It is true
that the governments that have been in power
in Persia during the last two years also desire,
like the governments of many other countries,
to obtain foreign loans, and have made it quite
clear that they prefer to raise the loans in
America; but they fully accept the principle that

50

AMERICAN MISSION TAKES UP TASK

any such loans should be expended under the strict
control of the American Mission and only for pro-
ductive and constructive purposes. Persian of-
ficials, and deputies of the Majless at the time of
our arrival, were heartily sick of subsidies to be
frittered away by extravagant and corrupt offi-
cials, and of advances from foreign governments
or foreign companies conditioned by political fa-
vors or economic concessions. They were in many
respects as suspicious and careful in considering
a loan proposition as would be the lending banker
himself. It may be added that the Constitution
provides that no loan can be contracted by the
Persian Government without the approval of the
Majless.

51

CHAPTER III

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

The more information we gathered, the
more humility we felt. One foreign news-
paper had intimated that only supermen
could accomplish the work we had undertaken.
We realized quite well that we were not supermen
or financial geniuses. As a matter of fact, the
job in Persia, from the information I had obtained
in America, did not seem to me to be, on the whole,
a job for financial experts in the narrow sense.
The financial situation in Persia, however bad' it
might prove on acquaintance to be, seemed a
symptom of a disorder rather than the disorder
itself. As so-called rheumatism can often be
cured by a dentist, so it seemed to me that the
financial troubles of Persia would eventually be
relieved by the removal of the hidden sources of
infection.

The condition of Persian finances in 1922, does
not constitute any ipso-facto condemnation of
Persian capacity. There is abundant financial
ability among the Persians; and there were and
still are numerous Persians who not only know as

52

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

well as we do what reform measures should be
adopted but also have the requisite energy,
courage, and will to undertake the task. Persian
ministers of finance, with honest intentions, had
undertaken the task, but they had failed because
the storm created by reform was too powerful for
political appointees to weather.

Financial disorders appear in all countries.
Finance, as I see it, is not an exact science.
Western nations have all had their financial
troubles and have learned by experience. Up to
a few years ago the United States had suffered
from a recurring series of crises and panics; we
had had “wild-cat” banks, an inflated currency,
and “cheap” money movements ; we had, at times,
issued bonds to pay current expenses; in our ex-
penditures we have been prodigiously wasteful;
we have had no semblance of a national budget
system until within the past few years ; one State
Capitol bears splendid witness, it is supposed, to
the graft which entered into its construction and
furnishing; only a few months ago, a branch of
our own Treasury Department was grossly, per-
haps criminally, mismanaging and wasting its
appropriations, which in amount roughly approxi-
mate the budget of the Persian Government;
much of the corporation financing in America,
public and private, to judge from recent legis-
lation, is considered to be unsound if no longer

53

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

actually “frenzied”; scarcely a financial step has
been taken by our Treasury Department which
has not been met by the criticism of experts.
And the experts themselves, if they were given
executive authority, could do little better, unless
they combined with financial skill a divine under-
standing of the feelings and forces that pervade
a complex modern society.

The financial problems of Persia seem to have
been little different, essentially, from those which
appear sporadically in America and which can
be found in many other countries at the present
time.

The first of the differences between Persia and
some of the other countries that occurs to me, is
that Persia has always been, up to this time, near
the margin of financial subsistence; her budget
has been small; her economic system almost sta-
tionary ; her taxes inelastic ; and her expenditures
inadequate for her expanding needs. In Persia,
therefore, any disorder, inefficiency, waste, leak-
age, irregularity, or error, has been relatively
more conspicuous and serious than in many other
countries, which doubtless suffer from the same
conditions but which nevertheless enjoy a fairly
good rating. Another obvious difference between
Persia and some other countries is that Persia
has not had time to establish an administratively
efficient political organization. For that matter,

54

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

few other countries have solved this problem.
Persia appreciates, perhaps more than other
countries, the need of experts in her administra-
tions, and she has been no slower than other coun-
tries in putting into effect the approved legisla-
tive principles which are supposed to encourage
and protect administrative efficiency. Persia,
however, cannot do everything at once, any more
than other countries.

The natural effects of politically induced mal-
administration were aggravated by the war and
by the subsequent economic depression. During
the war, the country was overrun, portions of the
territory devastated, exports reduced, and gov-
ernment thrown into chaos. On our arrival a
number of refugees were in Teheran from the
devastated area of Azerbaidjan. They had taken
bast in the Majless, and the Government was
giving them a subsidy, but had taken no effective
steps toward sending them back to their homes or
toward rehabilitating their properties. Although
some had once been prosperous proprietors, they
were tending rapidly toward pauperization. A
fund had been raised by private contributions
for the relief of Urumiah; but a part of this
fund had been loaned to the people of Guilan,
who also suffered sorely from the war, and
the balance had been deposited with the banking
firm of Toumaniatz Freres, which shortly after

55

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

had gone bankrupt. As a result of the criminal
misplacement of the fund, none of it had been
advanced to the people for whom it was intended.

In 1922, the country was just getting on its
feet and taking breath preparatory to a slow
economic recovery. Evidences of business de-
pression were everywhere. Some of the nuost
famous of the pre-war banking firms and mer-
chants were bankrupt. Once-wealthy landowners
were insolvent. Once-flourishing industries had
languished. There was lack of confidence every-
where. Hardly a city, town, or village in the
country, with the possible exception of Tabriz,
showed any evidence of growth. Under such cir-
cumstances, it was surprising that the system of
responsible government was working as .well as it
did; and the absence of revolutionary or Bolshe-
vistic tendencies, at such a time, constitutes h.
tribute to the inherent stability of the Persian.

The demoralizing and wasteful effects of poli-
tics were apparent everywhere. With an aver-
age tenure of three months, and with much polit-
ical pressure on him, a minister of finance was
unable, as a rule, to know his administration or
to carry out any far-reaching programs. Polit-
ical opportunism determined his course of action.
Even if he were personally honest, he could not
oppose those who were politically influential.
Under the circumstances, when a delicate question

.56

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

presented itself he usually preferred to make no
decision at all rather than to run the risk of
making an enemy. Persian ofl5cials wore past
masters in the gentle art of “passing the buck.”
When some action had to be taken, a commission
was usually appointed which, unable or unwilling
to come to a clear-cut decision, was followed by
another similar body. In many cases conunis-
sions are useful coordinating agencies, but in
Persia they were too frequently set up for pur-
poses of delay. Correspondence with taxpayers
in arrears dragged on with no decisive action.
Dossiers grew to voluminous proportions. Cases
were never closed. Positions, if not sold out-
right, were given to men simply because they
were the relatives or friends of powerful per-
sonages. Nepotism reigned. Meritorious work
only occasionally met with reward. Dismissals
for incompetence and promotions for merit were
equally rare. Disponsibles, many of them cap-
able young men, were numbered by the hundreds,
reflecting the wide-spread state of unemployment
in the country.

OflSces were over-staffed and a majority of the
employees were underpaid. Tax-collectors and
local inspectors, paid as low as six tomans a
month, naturally eked out their living by extor-
tion, accepting bribes, or other illegitimate prac-
tices. In spite of low salaries and little actual

57

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

work, the expenditures of the ministry exceeded
its budget.

There was a general absence of the methods of
control usually found in financial administrations.
Forms were few, inspections infrequent, and
auditing nearly a lost art. A dozen so-called in-
spectors were at desks in the ministry and they
immediately made a collective complaint to me
that they were given nothing to do.

Almost one half of the revenue of the country
was derived from the customs tariff. The cus-
toms receipts, which had fallen to two and one
half million tomans in 1917-18, had risen to almost
seven million in 1922-23. The administration of
the customs revenues was in the hands of foreign
experts, and, happily, called for no immediate at-
tention on our part; but the tariff itself was a
problem of the first magnitude.

In the Treaty of Turkoman Chai, of February
22, 1828, following, the Russo-Persian War, a
reciprocal five-per-cent, ad-valorem tariff on im-
ports and exports was established between the
two countries. No period for this agreement was
stated in the treaty, and, consequently, up to the
World War, Persia was unable without the con-
sent of the Russian Government to change any
tariff rate affecting Russia. Treatment equiv-
alent to that accorded Russia was in the course of
time demanded by and granted other nations. In

. 58

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

these treaties, however, the five-per-cent, rate was
applied only to imports into and exports from
Persia and was not accorded on imports of
Persian goods into other countries, which re-
ceived, instead, the benefit of the most-favored-
nation clause. In 1901, the Shah, being in need
of a foreign loan, was obliged to negotiate with
Pussia for a revision of the tariff. The resulting
tariff, effective February 8, 1903, was placed on
a specific basis, export duties were largely elim-
inated, and low rates were placed on commodities
of interest to Bussia. On February 9, 1903, an
agreement was entered into with Great Britain
by which certain rates were modified in the
interest of British trade. The epitomized result
was that the commodities of interest to Russia
bore an average tax of 4.75 per cent., while
commodities of interest to Great Britain paid an
average of 26.77 per cent. This tariff was deeply
resented by the Persian merchants, but their pro-
tests were without result. In his “Strangling of
Persia,” Shuster states that this tariff was
“absolutely prejudicial to the interests of Persia
and is so grossly partial to Russian interests and
trade as to render it the most conspicuously un-
successful tariff in the world, from the viewpoint
of the people in whose behalf it is supposed to be
framed.”^ In connection with the proposed

1 Strangling of Persia, p. 313.

59

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Anglo-Persian Agreement, a new tariff was writ-
ten by a joint commission of representatives of
the two countries. It was decided to augment the
revenues of the Persian Government, and to that
end the sclicdules were generally increased. In
this 1920 tariff agreement, however, a provision
was inserted for a joint revision of the tariff in
the future and reductions were arranged on
British goods considered to have been overtaxed
in the tariff of 1903. Nevertheless, the average
rate, in the 1920 tariff, on the principal commod-
ities of interest to Russia was 13.07 per cent.,
while the average on those of interest to Great
Britain was 14.88 per cent. A slight advantage
remained with Russian trade, but on the whole
an equality was established between the two coun-
tries, and this tariff represented a distinct im-
provement so far as the interests of Persia w^ire
concerned. It was put into effect March 22, 1920,
and was enforced for nearly two years. Although
the Soviet Government, in 1921, denounced all
treaties and conventions concluded by the former
Czarist Government with Persia, — including, nat-
urally, the Customs Convention of 1903, — ^it
nevertheless insisted on a return to that tariff
pending the determination of the rates to be
levied on Russian goods as provided for in an-
other article of the Treaty of 1921. As a result,
the merchandise of all nations other than Russia

• eo

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

was paying customs duties according to the 1920
tariif, while Russian goods were paying the
duties of 1903. The treasury was suffering a
loss estimated at one million tomans a year, the
principle of equality of commercial opportunity,
to which the countries concerned have given their
verbal adherence, was set at naught through no
fault of the Persian Government, and the dis-
crimination which existed was giving to other na-
tions and to a large body of Persian merchants a
just cause of complaint.

The second important source of external rev-
enue were the oil royalties from the concession, in
the South, of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.
These revenues had risen to their highest point
in 1921, and in the year of our arrival had started
a decline which, in the face of increasing produc-
tion, was discouraging and inexplicable to the
Persians. The latter were hoping, however, to
obtain another source of revenue in the northern
oil concession, but at the time of our arrival nego-
tiations had dragged on for more than a year and
were still undecided.

The internal taxes of the country wore a cha-
otic mixture of customary survivals and legisla-
tive enactment, for an adequate discussion of
which a volume would be required. Since my pur-
pose is to tell the story of the American Mission
in the light of the problems that faced it, I shall

61

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

not attempt a comprehensive exposition of this
or any other branch of the fiscal system.

The internal revenue had in the past been for
the most part farmed out or collected by the
provincial governors and tribal chiefs. When we
arrived, the governors had in general lost their
revenue-collecting function, although they were
still inclined to interfere in this connection with
the activities of the financial agents. Generally
speaking, the chiefs of the great tribes collected
the taxes of the tribes ; and the Sheikh of Moham-
merah in Khozistan was virtually in the position
of a tributary chief, who was waxing rich on the
revenues of his province and was not compolled to
pay his tribute to the Central Government. The
practice of farming revenues had been thoroughly
discredited by the unsavory and unprofitable to-
bacco and opium monopolies ; but there was, when
we came, a proposition under consideration to
lease the government monopoly of sheep’s intes-
tines; and the collection of many of the minor
miscellaneous taxes was granted by contract to
private individuals.

Of the sources of internal revenue, there were
three which were identified directly with agricul-
ture. The direct tax on arbabi or privately
owned lands, commonly called the maliat, was in
general, particularly when a survey had been
made, a tithe of the proprietor’s net share of the

62

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

product of the village ; when no survey had been
made, the tax was levied in accordance with the
tax roll. A survey is a rough census of a village,
including the area of cultivated land, its produc-
ing capacity, its live stock, its number of fruit-
trees, and its population. Surveys had been car-
ried out mainly to adjust the complaints of
taxpayers, and had never extended to more than
a fraction of the landed property in the country.
The main dependence in collecting this tax, there-
fore, was on the ancient rolls, which were partly
in the hands of the mostowfis. Since the rolls
had been prepared, great changes had occurred.
New villages had appeared which were not taxed
at all; villages which had disappeared were still
taxed; other villages were undertaxed or over-
taxed, according to their growth or decline.

Before we arrived, steps had already been
taken to modernize the archaic tax system. A
project of law had been introduced into the Maj-
less providing for a survey of all the landed prop-
erty in the whole country and fixing a uniform tax
on land.

We found under the administration of the Min-
istry of Finance extensive areas known as kJialis-
seh or public domains. Originally all the land in
the country had theoretically belonged to the
Crown, but in course of time most of it had passed
to private ownership. To the publicly owned

63

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

areas remaining, were added lands which had
been seized from rebels, or acquired by the Gov-
ernment in other ways.

The units commonly used in Persia in describ-
ing land holdings are the village and the pasture.
The village may be of any size and may have sev-
eral subsidiary villages around it. Likewise, the
pasture may be sufficient only for the live stoclc of
a small village or large enough to permit the
summer grazing of the flocks of an entire tribe.

It was impossible to estimate the area of the
pastures and barren and uncultivated lands
owned by the State; but although the records
were incomplete, a fairly accurate idea could
be gained of the number and area of the vil-
lages.

There was a total of 1245 villages recorded as
public domains, of which 360 were in Azerbaid-
•jan, and 179 in the Province of Teheran, 'ftie
area of the villages in the latter province had
been determined with fair accuracy at 250 square
miles. On that basis the Government-owned vil-
lages of the whole empire could be conservatively
estimated in area at 1750 square miles. There
were, however, vast areas owned by the State
which were not included in the list of recorded
.villages. The Province of Seistan, for example,
with an area of three thousand square miles, was
almost entirely the property of the Government.

64

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

Many public-domains villages, particularly in
the Province of Mazanderan, had fallen into the
hands of private individuals, and other villages
which had been seized by the Government were
claimed by individuals. Disputes between the
Ministry of Finance and individuals regarding
the ownership of villages had filled many dossiers
in the ministry, had led to the formation of many
commissions, and had engaged the attention of
the Council of Ministers.

The Tribunal of the Ministry of Finance — ^at
that time, perhaps, the only permanent adminis-
trative court in the Government — ^was supposed
to have jurisdiction over these cases. The Coun-
cil of Ministers had, also, established a permanent
Commission of Farmans, consisting largely of old
mostowfis, for the sole purpose of examining and
determining the validity of royal farmans pos-
sessed by individuals. Previous to our coming, a
number of forged farmans had been discovered,
but no effective action had been taken against the
perpetrators. In order still further to quiet
titles, the Council of Ministers had decided for
the guidance of the Commission of Farmans that
any village which had been in the continuous pos-
session of an individual for thirty years or more
should be considered the private property of that
individual. The Council of Ministers, however,
had subsequently issued other decisions on the

65

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

subject, and little progress had in fact been made
with respect to the settlement of land disputes.
This was one of the problems which we were
called upon to assist in solving.

The public domains were either leased to
private individuals or operated directly by the
Government ; but the Government had not proved
itself efficient either as a landlord or as a pro-
prietor. Many of the public-domains villages
were ruined; scarcely one was in a prosperous
condition.

Many of the public domains had been leased by
royal farmans to individuals on condition that a
percentage of the crops should be paid to the
Government as rent. Due to the changed condi-
tions, the rent fixed at the time of cession bore no
longer any relation to the producing value of- the
properties, and the Ministry of Finance found it
difficult and in many cases impossible to collect
the full rent of the ceded domains.

At the time of our arrival, the Minister of Fi-
nance had already drafted projects, for submis-
sion to the Majless, for the sale of the public do-
mains of Teheran Province and for the adjust-
ment of the rent of ceded domains.

Extensive and valuable properties known as
owghafsaukaf, endowments or pious foundations,
were scattered over the country. These were, in
general, the bequests of individuals who in their

66

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

wills had stipulated that the income of the property
should be devoted to religious, educational, chari-
table, or, in a few instances, other specified pur-
poses. Most of these properties were managed
by clericals under the supervision, prescribed by
law, of the Ministry of Public Instruction. Five
per cent, of the revenue therefrom was supposed
to be paid to the Government, to defray the ex-
penses of supervision, but the actual receipts
from this source were insignificant. There was,
apparently, no complete list or valuation of the
properties, and the Government’s part in their
administration was extremely weak.

There were no taxes on commercial documents,
on non-rented real estate in cities, on incomes, on
sales, or on inheritances. Generally speaking, the
landowners were heavily taxed as compared with
the merchants.

The khanevari, a kind of conscription-tax paid
by the villagers, had survived from a time when
quotas of soldiers were assigned to the villages.
This tax, as well as the poll-tax which also had
survived, was inequitable and extremely unpop-
ular.

A large part of the direct taxes were paid in
kind, i. e.» in wheat, barley, straw, rice, or other
products. It was impossible to convert all of
these kind taxes, — that is, to collect from the pro-
prietor their value in cash, — ^because in many

67

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

regions in Persia there was not yet any general
conunerce in agricultural products with a re-
sulting money economy. There were, however,
frequent conversions, usually at the request of the
taxpayer; and these conversions, as well as the
sales of the tax-grain, presented much difficulty
and opportunity for dishonesty.

The land-taxes had not been collected in’ full.
Exemptions and reductions had been given on no
equitable or sound basis, and some of the largest
taxpayers had failed for years to pay their taxes
and owed amounts ranging from a few thousand
tomans to several hundred thousand. Many Per-
sians urged me to make no attempt to collect
these arrears. In the actual collections there
were numerous irregularities. Collectors fre-
quently gave personal receipts to taxpayers and
the revenues received went into the pockets of the
•collectors. Occasionally receipts were given for
large amounts when no money had been collected.

Two important taxes were levied on transporta-
tion: the road-tolls collected on means of trans-
port using the constructed highways, and the
navaghel collected at the gates of the cities and
towns. With respect to both of these revenues,
there were serious leakages, and both were viewed
with disfavor, particularly by foreigners. Cer-
tain of the legations had protested against the

68

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

navaghel on treaty grounds. Both taxes seemed
to us to be theoretically had, but in practice it
was impossible to abolish them until we found
some other revenue to take their place.

Of the indirect taxes, the most important were
the taxes on opium and tobacco and the excise or
tax on intoxicating liquors. While an important
source of revenue, opium as a problem in Persia
is less fiscal than it is hygienic, moral, economic,
and political. It will therefore be discussed in
another chapter. The tobacco-tax seemed to
offer no special difficulties. The excise was in
a peculiar situation, due to the fact that traffic in
intoxicating liquors, while not actively or effec-
tively prohibited, falls under a religious ban and
therefore receives no legal sanction; and the col-
lection of the excise tax was sometimes opposed
because it seemed to involve an official recogni-
tion of a practice which was contrary to religious
teachings.

There were about two hundred miscellaneous
taxes^ most of them customary and many of them
local. These taxes, which had been abandoned
here and there, were vexatious to the people and
led to much difficulty. Constituting a veritable
fiscal junk-shop, they included taxes on fish
markets, on rafts, on charcoal, on the transport of
melted butter, on cutting the throats of dying ani-

69

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

mals, on lotteries, on gallnuts, and direct taxes on
one hundred and forty-nine occupations, mostly
crafts.

Aside from the revenues which were being
temporarily collected by the Ministry of War,
there were various receipts collected by other
ministries, the most important being the revenues
of the Ministries of Posts and Telegraphs and of
Public Works.

The Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, with
substantial revenues and a large organization, en-
joyed virtually a free hand with its revenue and
expenditures. A part of the services of the Min-
istry of Posts and Telegraphs has been for many
years monopolized by Mokhber ed Dowleh, whoso
extensive Teheran park had been rented and put
at our disposal by the Government. After the
death of Mokhber ed Dowleh, some years befoiie,
the ministry which he had exploited with so much
profit to himself seems to have been considered
the peculiar appanage of his family. Certain
members of the family have been friendly to the
American Mission; but in one of them, who
adhered like a leach to the office of Under-
secretary of the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
graphs, we encountered one of the most tenacious
opponents of reform. The Administration of
Posts had been for some time directed by a Bel-
gian, M. Camille Molitor, brother of Lambert,

70

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

who was made the target of intrigues and propa-
ganda and who, shortly before our arrival, was
finally dismissed — ^mainly, it is said, through the
efforts of the younger Mokhber ed Dowleh. The
results of our struggles to control the finances of
the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs will be set
forth in later chapters.

All revenues derived from roads, railroads,
mines, forests, fisheries, telephones, and miscel-
laneous concessions and leases were under the ad-
ministration of the Ministry of Public Works.
These collections were in disorder; arrears had
accumulated; and in general they were in as un-
satisfactory a state as were the concessions, con-
tracts, and leases on which they were based.

The Shah left to the constitutional Government
a legacy of farmans and concessions granting spe-
cial privileges to Persians and foreigners. Nu-
merous grants, many of which are of doubtful
legality, were to prove embarrassing and compli-
cating factors in the carrying out of plans for
economic development.

Other ministries, such as those of Foreign Af-
fairs, Interior, Justice, and Public Instruction,
also had revenues which were only partially re-
ceived or collected by the Ministry of Finance.

Some fifty thousand pensioners were on the
pay-roll of the Government, requiring annually
almost a million tomans. On our arrival, pen-

71

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

sions had been some months in arrears, and flocks
of pensioners gathered daily at the ministry and
even around the automobile of the Prime Min-
ister.

In the flscal year 1922-23, the year of our ar-
rival, there was a deficit which, if complete
accounts were at hand, would probably be found to
approximate four million tomans or about twenty
per cent, of the estimated revenues. The em-
ployees of the Government were in arrears for
several months. The result was general stagna-
tion in the Civil Service, and in the case of
revenue-collecting ofBcials, loss of revenue. The
day after I took up my work at the Ministry of
Finance, General Westdahl, the Swedish Director
of Police, called on me, reporting that the police
had gone on strike for their salaries and re-
quested five thousand tomans. Claims against
•the Government had accumulated and were sel-
dom either definitely accepted or definitely re-
jected. When a Persian claimant became too
troublesome, he was given an order on a delin-
quent taxpayer for the amount due him and was
expected to collect the tax and pay himself. Al-
though the claimant usually failed to collect, the
claim and the tax were entered in the accounts as
paid.

Lacking confidence in the treasury, which was
too often empty, many of those to whom periodi-

72

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

cal payments were due had succeeded in having
their payments assigned to specified revenues,
usually the customs.

Prior to our arrival, the Customs Administra-
tion had become in some respects a semi-independ-
ent organization. It possessed a separate budget
and it made its own payments directly from its
receipts. It was also accustomed to make pay-
ments on the order of the Minister of Finance;
and the Government had also in various cases as-
signed the customs revenues for the payment of
certain recurrent expenses. Thus, the salaries,
not only of the Belgian officials hut also of vari-
ous foreign pensioners, were a special charge on
the customs receipts.

Money collected in the provinces was not re-
mitted to the center. Accordingly, some of the
claimants were satisfied, for the moment at least,
with orders on provincial financial agencies.
Many pensions were payable in the provinces.

No regular procedure controlled the making of
payments. The Minister of Finance sent orders
of payment directly to the Treasurer and the min-
ister signed the checks. When funds were not at
hand, the pensioners were given pay-orders which
they sold at a discount to speculators in the
bazaars who were strong enough to bring political
pressure successfully on the minister. There
were standing orders to pay a fixed amount daily

73

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

or monthly to pensioners and these orders re-
mained in force, although no credits for the pay-
ment had been voted by the Majless and in some
cases the pensioner had died. Many such stand-
ing orders had been purchased by others.

There was no proper control over the purchas-
ing of supplies. Each of the various ministers
designated some employee as a supply officer and
authorized him to supply the needs of his ministry
at a fixed monthly price, which was paid to him
regardless of the quantity or the value of the sup-
plies that he had furnished. There was virtually
no property-accounting of any kind. The credit
of the country had fallen low. In general, the
Government was able to purchase its supplies
only for cash before delivery.

Accounts were months or even years in arrears,
and no budget was ever liquidated. No accounts
‘were rendered for trust funds. Salaries were
frequently paid in advance; and in many in-
stances cash balances were carried, not as cash
but in the form of the receipts of those to whom
the cash had been advanced without authority.

When the American Mission took up its work,
we found that fundamental financial legislation
had been enacted, much of it along sound lines.
The Constitution provides that the approval of
the Majless shall be necessary for the regulation
of all financial matters, the preparation and exe-

74

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

cution of the budget, the imposition of new taxes
or the reduction of or exemption from existing
taxes, the sale or transfer of any national re-
source or property, the grant of concessions for
the formation of any public company or associa-
tion, the grant of commercial, industrial, agricul-
tural, or other concessions, the contracting of
loans, and the construction of railroads and high-
ways. It is provided that the budget of each
ministry shall be ready fifteen days before the
end of the fiscal year. It is prescribed especially
that the expenditures of the Court shall be de-
termined by law and that the military expendi-
tures shall be approved each year by the Majless.
It is stipulated in the Constitution that no order
for the payment of any allowance or gratuity can
be made on the Treasury, save in accordance with
law, and a Court of Accounts was foreseen, to ex-
amine the accounts of the Government; and it is
specially set forth that, except in such cases as
are explicitly made an exception by law, nothing
can under any pretext be demanded from the peo-
ple except under the title of state, provincial, de-
partmental, and municipal taxes. The General
Accounting Law, a comprehensive statute passed
by the Majless in 1289 (1910-11), prescribes in
detail the budgetary procedure, and regulates the
manner of making payments, the form of govern-
ment accounting, the examination and settlement

75

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

of the accounts, and the control of state property.
This law had, apparently, never been properly
enforced. There was another law determining
the organization of the Ministry of Finance,
which was considered by some to be in effect but
which had been suspended at one time in order to
give a free hand to a reform minister of finance.
On account of that circumstance and the fact that
it was a moot question whether the law had ever
been revived after its suspension, we decided to
disregard it. Had we been held to its prescrip-
tions, we should have been greatly hampered in
the reorganization of the ministry.

In spite of the fact that adequate legal provi-
sion for a budget had existed in Persia for twelve
years, there was, strictly speaking, no budget un-
til after the arrival of the American Mission.
For the fiscal year 1922-23, the ministries had
•submitted detailed budgets to the Majless, but
these had not been voted in detail or observed
by the Government in its expenditures. In the
case of all the important branches of the Govern-
ment, including certain administrations of the
Ministry of Finance, expenditures greatly ex-
ceeded the global credits which had been approved
by the Majless.

An important appanage of the Ministry of
Finance was the Alimentation Service. On ac-
count of transportation diflSculties, surplus wheat

76

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

and barley may be rotting in the fields in one part
of Persia, while six hundred miles away the popu-
lation may be suffering from a bread famine.
Such a famine at the close of the war compelled
the Government to establish throughout Teheran
and adjacent provinces a monopoly of grain, fix-
ing the price of its purchase from the landowners
and of its sale to the bakers, as well as the price
of bread, assuming at the same time the control of
grain transport and of the one hundred and fifty-
nine bakeries of Teheran. The administration of
this monopoly constituted one of the most re-
sponsible and delicate duties of the Ministry of
Finance. In the southern part of Teheran, there
is a huge ambar or granary with a capacity of
four hundred thousand bushels, where the grain is
stored and cleaned and from which it is delivered
to the bakers. The total receipts from wheat sold
in Teheran amount to over two million tomans,
and the total receipts of the Alimentation Service,
from all sources, amount to almost three million
tomans.

Under this system of control, the Government is
of course held responsible for the price of grain,
as well as for the price and quality of bread.
Those in charge of the administration of this
service had to steer skilfully between the produc-
ing Scylla and the consuming Charybdis. The
administration brought the Government into vital

77

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

business relations with influential classes of the
population; and, since bread is the chief food of
the majority of the people, it became — ^in the
stalls of the bakers, in the barracks of the sol-
diers and policemen, in the hands of laborers eat-
ing at their work, and on the tables of the people
generally — ^not merely a symbol of governmental
efficiency but also an indication of the political at-
titude of a government toward the people. This
phase of government was, in more than one sense,
every day in the mouths of the people. The con-
duct of the Alimentation Service more than once
seemed a matter of life and death. It was some-
times a matter of life and death for cabinets, for
it was well understood that bad bread or scarce
bread might bring about the fall of a government.
Before our arrival, the service had usually been
operated at a loss ; and we found that it had been
unable the previous year to repay the loan that
had been made by the Imperial Bank of Persia
for financing the purchase of grain.

The Bank d’Escompte de Perse, which had been
transferred by the Soviet Government to the Per-
sian people, was at the time of our arrival in a
state of liquidation, with no cash balance, but with
some tangible property and intangible assets dif-
ficult to realize but greatly exceeding its liabil-
ities.

In presenting a summary of the conditions that

78

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

existed in the financial administration on our ar-
rival, it is possible that I shall create an impres-
sion that Persians are inherently incapable of
progress or of efficient administration, and that
the improvements effected during the last three
years are to be credited solely to the American
Mission. Such an impression I wish to avoid.
The American Mission has proved itself, in my
opinion, an efficient instrument, a useful adjunct,
an important stabilizing institution, an educative
influence ; it has not been, and does not desire to
be, a dictatorial power in Persia. The making of
modern Persia should be, and I hope always will
be, in the hands of the Persians.

Moreover, the Persian financial picture, even as
it was at the time of our arrival, has its brighter
features and interpretative background. One of
the most encouraging factors was that the Per-
sians clearly recognized the existing evils as evils,
and wanted these evils removed. In spite of the
irresponsible practices of the Shahs and the pres-
sure of foreign interests, the greater part of the
economic resources of the country stiU remained
at the disposal of the Persian people. The per-
capita debt and the per-capita taxation were
small; the currency, except for a certain amount
of defective coins in circulation, was thoroughly
sound; there, had been no inflation or deprecia-
tion ; the assets and public services of the Govern-

79

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

ment commanded respect. The country pos-
sessed a banking system which, while not so
competitive as the Persians wished, was sound,
and had already given and was destined to give
valuable assistance to the Government. The
chairman of the Imperial Persian Bank at the
annual meeting on December 28, 1922, made the
following remarks :

“Throughout the year, even during the change
of the prime ministers, the Cossack leader, Beza
Khan, has continued to hold the post of War Min-
ister, and it is impossible not to admire the deter-
mination and efficiency which this able oflScer has
exhibited in the control of his department. He
appears to have so reorganized the various armed
units existing in the country that he has succeeded
in providing Persia with quite a fairly strong and
well-disciplined military force, and the success of
his efforts is reflected in the increased tranquillity
which has prevailed throughout the country.
For example, to quote only our own experience,
for the first time for seven years wo are able to
record that not one of our branches has been
closed during the year on account of disturbances,
and you will notice that for the second year since
the war we are able to hold our annual meeting in
December, a result of the general improvement of
communications which has followed the establish-
ment of better order and security in the provinces,

80

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

“Last year I alluded to the reported desire of
the Persian Government to obtain once again the
services of Mr. Morgan Shuster as their £nancial
adviser. Mr. Shuster, I understand, was unable
to return to Persia, but another American gentle-
man, Dr. Millspaugh, was selected for this difficult
post, and he arrived at Teheran with his staff a
few weeks ago. This is an event of good augury
for the country, if the Persian Government will
invest him with the authority necessary for the
successful exercise of strong financial control.
Persia, like many other countries since the war,
has found it difficult to balance its budget, but she
has an industrious and thrifty population, her
currency is in no way depreciated, and both the
former financial advisers, Mr. Morgan Shuster
and Mr. Armitage-Smith, formed the opinion that,
if the system of taxation and the methods of col-
lection were reformed and brought up to date,
Persia should have no difficulty in paying her
way. Neither of these gentlemen, unfortunately,
was able to stay long enough to carry out their
plans. We very sincerely hope that a more
kindly fortune may attend the efforts of Mr. Mill-
spaugh to put the financial administration oh a
sound footing. We cordially welcome his ap-
pointment, and it will be the duty and the priv-
ilege of our officers in Persia to afford him all the
assistance in their power.’*

81

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

The psychological, social, economic, and politi-
cal conditions of the country, — ^which I shall re-
fer to more fully later, — ^when sympathetically
viewed in their various relationships, did not ap-
pear to present insuperable obstacles. Hope lay
in the history of the people, in their proved re-
cuperative powers. Progress, which had its
roots deep in the sentiments of the people and its
flowering in the Parliament, had already borne
fruit before our arrival. The Constitution and
the laws which had already been enacted, offered
the legal foundation on which to build a solid
financial and economic structure. Eeza Khan
Pahlevi and his army contributed the authority,
the force, and the leadership essential for the
maintenance of unity and order, for the collection
of the revenues, and for the carrying out of a
sound economic program.

The deputies of the fourth Majlcss, which was
sitting at the time of our arrival, were sincerely
desirous of reform along nationalistic lines; they
realized that they had not succeeded yet in per-
fecting parliamentary control of the finances;
they took pains to inform me that the American
Mission was the creature of the Parliament ; and
they showed themselves willing to give coopera-
tion and support. The young Persians quickly
showed themselves intelligent and willing workers,

82

HOW WE FOUND THE FINANCES

amenable to leadership and keen to apply modem
methods.

If the ground had not been thus prepared, and
if we had not received cooperation from the Gov-
ernment, the Majless, and the Persian finance em-
ployees, our work would indeed have been difficult.

CHAPTER IV

PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

IN any country, the psychology of the people
and the working of their social and political
institutions have a most important bearing
on economic conditions and on the conduct of
any particular administration. We had agreed
in our contracts not to interfere in the religious or
political affairs of Persia, and to have due regard
for its laws. A conscientious adherence to the
spirit of our contracts required that we should
become acquainted as speedily and as fully as pos-
sible with what constitutes the political affairs
and the laws and customs of the country. It was
necessary, above all, that we should grasp the feel-
ings of the people, their habits of thought, their
points of view, and the way in which they would
be likely to react to any steps that we might take.

I had been repeatedly warned in the United
States that the Persians were an Oriental people
and that Oriental “psychology” is quite different
from ours, and almost impossible for a new-comer
in the Orient to comprehend. I had been duly
impressed with the alleged fact that “East is East

84

PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

and West is West, and never the twain shall
meet. ” Having never heretofore had an occasion
to deal with Orientals collectively, I anticipated
that the Oriental mind, whatever it might be,
would prove to be one of our most subtle prob-
lems. I had visions of the Sphynx and of bronze
Buddhas, accepted symbols of Eastern subtlety
and immobility. One man who applied for a
position on the American Mission offered as
his outstanding qualification a special power to
“interpret” the mind of the Oriental. Fortu-
nately, we did not take him with us.

Occidentals, for many reasons, are likely to
believe, whether it is true or not, that the people
of the Orient, including the Persians, possess in-
nate and unchangeable traits of character that
render the Occidental and the Oriental as anti-
thetic as the two poles. A visitor to Persia, or
probably to any other Oriental country, is in-
stantly and deeply impressed with the strange-
ness of things: the unintelligible language, the
picturesque dress, the different habits and cus-
toms, the multifarious peculiarities of the streets
and bazaars, the primitive agriculture and handi-
crafts, the absence of modern sanitation methods,
the mosques, the muezzin, the veiled women, the
camels, the donkeys, and the thousand and one
other singularities which attract the traveler and
enliven the pages of his book. Faced by such ap-

85

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

pearances of almost incredible difference, one’s
mind turns instinctively to contrasts rather than
to comparisons. It is only after becoming accus-
tomed to the new surroundings that one perceives
and appreciates the points of likeness. The tribal
instinct too, unless a conscious effort is made to
correct it, gives form and color to many of our
opinions and leads us to consider any foreigner
as an “inferior.” Travelers and press corre-
spondents in Persia, from whom we get much of
our information, are naturally disposed to play
up the strange and the sensational. Diplomats
in Teheran, the spirit of whose despatches seeps
through their foreign offices to the public, seem
inclined to attribute to “Oriental” character the
annoying delays and reversals, which, however,
occur in negotiations in all capitals and should be
particularly expected in a country where the' les-
sons of diplomatic history point especially to the
value of caution. The same may be said of the
views of foreigners doing business in Persia. In-
stead of denouncing their customers as “impos-
sible,” they would do better to adapt their
methods to their customers’ requirements and
points of view. Absorption in administration,
which is the lot of many foreigners in Persia,
tends to bring evils into relief and to create feel-
ings of antagonism. In my case, there seemed to
be at first a deliberate conspiracy among the Per-

86

PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

sians themselves to blacken the reputation of
their countrymen. When we arrived, almost
every Persian with whom I talked, having had
some disappointing experience or subjective in-
terest, leveled a withering indictment at all Per-
sians except himself.

Nothing seems to me more useful, in reaching
reasoned conclusions regarding a foreign people,
than the mustering by the observer of as much
judicial temperament and objectivity as possible,
a sense of historical perspective, and a willing-
ness to make comparisons.

With regard to comparisons, it is unlikely, of
course, that peoples unfold their histories in per-
fect parallels any more than in recurring cycles.
The complex phenomena of racial and national de-
velopment in different countries are, probably,
not subject to precise comparisons. I realize,
moreover, the danger of premature conclusions
and of generalizations from insufficient data. I
can make no pretensions to ethnological knowl-
edge, and I have had no special opportunity to
observe the psychology, either individual or col-
lective, of the Arab, Egyptian, Turk, Hindu, Chi-
nese, or Japanese. It is possible that these other
of the so-called Oriental peoples do possess, as
compared with the American, British, or Conti-
nental European, permanent and striking differ-
ences in character.

87

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

The multifarious and pressing demands of
financial administration leave little time for any
deliberate and well-planned excursion into the
fascinating field of racial and social psychology.
But these observations, which could not under the
circumstances bo deliberate and well planned,
have been by force of the same circumstances
more or less inevitable as preparation for our
work and by-products of it.

The members of the American Mission have
been at once the guests and the employees of the
Persian people ; we have been under the necessity
of selling our ideas to them, and we have had to
win their consent in financial matters to our
leadership. Our task has been, therefore, essen-
tially human and personal, and it has been neces-
sary for us to adapt our methods and ideas to the
personalities and viewpoints of the people whom
we were serving and striving to lead and among
whom we were living.

In this chapter, my intention, therefore, is
merely to state some of the results of my own
personal, incidental, and unscientific observations
in a most fascinating field. If my tentative con-
clusions seem erroneous or unacceptable to those
who are better equipped than I to form conclu-
sions, I shall still have been true to my purpose,
which is only to set forth the acts and ideas with
which the American Mission has proceeded to the

88

PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

doing of its task in Persia. Personal judgments,
whether right or wrong, are a part of the story.

Nevertheless, I feel that I have had, in the
course of my work, an exceptional opportunity to
become acquainted with the Persian people.
From the beginning, I have had a constant suc-
cession of calls to make and to receive. I have
been in intimate contact with Persion officialdom,
from the Shah and Prime Minister down to the
least of the poor disponibles. I have become ac-
quainted with most of the merchants and large
proprietors. I receive every day a number of let-
ters from Persians, some of them anonymous,
many of them personal, most of them revealing.

My calendar at the Ministry of Finance ordi-
narily shows all my office hours taken by appoint-
ments a week in advance. I have been criticized
both for being inaccessible and for giving so much
of my time to visitors. I have had thousands of
talks with Persians, and almost all have contrib-
uted in some way to my understanding of Persian
character, but if I had seen all who wished to talk
with me, I should have had no time left for the
correspondence of the ministry.

Judged by their original stock, the Persians
are our first cousins. Persia has an admixture of
various racial elements, but the core of the popu-
lation is Aryan. An ancient inscription calls
King Darius “an Aryan of Aryan race,” and

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

“Iran” suggests its own derivation. The Per-
sians are, as a race, dark, but there are many
blonds among them. In physical appearance
they are in general fine-looking, congenial speci-
mens. Zoka ol Molk once laughingly told me how,
after one of his speeches at Paris during the
Peace Conference, a lady with the light of sur-
prised discovery in her eyes, came to him ex-
claiming, “Why, you are just like us! I thought
you would be queer. ”

A well-known banker of Boston invited Mr.
Alai, when he was in this country, to address the
financiers of that city. Before the luncheon, Mr.
Alai’s sponsor was asked, “What kind of fellow
is a Persian, anyway?” but after the luncheon
those who had come to scoff or be bored or
amused, remained willingly to listen during the
better part of the afternoon, with respectful at-
• tention, to a man whose face, dress, mind, and
language made a captivating appeal to the best
American business man.

In my opinion, by far the most numerous of the
special characteristics of the Persian people are
products of their economic and social environ-
ment. We have seen in America how in vari-
ous sections of the country — due to hard living,
the institution of slavery, climate, isolation,
frontier conditions, or what not — certain defin-
able and recognizable local types of personality

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PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY.

and character have taken shape. It would not he
surprising if the peculiar conditions — ^historical,
geographical, topographical, climatic, economic,
and social — which have existed in Persia should
have developed certain special characteristics in
the people. These special characteristics unques-
tionably exist, but they partly or wholly disap-
pear in the case of Persians who have lived dur-
ing the formative periods of their lives in West-
ern countries or have been educated abroad or in
the American School at Teheran. One Persian
differs in character from another precisely as
Americans differ ; but apart from the superficiali-
ties of dress and manner, they look, think, talk,
and act like the rest of us. They are human
beings, having their individual virtues and faults.
They certainly are not, as a people, “inferior.”

It is impossible to describe a whole people, as
it is to indict them; but there are traits that are
common among the Persians and which percep-
tibly affect their political and economic function-
ing.

Hospitality is the Persian trait which first im-
presses itself on the sojourner in Persia. Fron-
tier conditions exist and the population is scanty.
Property is largely in land ; and wealth is neither
liquid nor expendible as in the Western countries.
Many of the forms of recreation and luxury
that are available in the West— ^such as the

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

opera, theater, restaurants, summer resorts, pro-
fessional sports, sanitaria, country clubs, yachting,
petting parties, or stock-exchange speculation — •
are virtually non-existent in Persia. It is nat-
ural, then, that wealth as it exists in Persia,
should express itself in a leisured life, beautiful
parks and houses, numerous servants, large fam-
ilies, gorgeous rugs and ornamentations, an over-
flowing table, fine horses, and unstinted hospital-
ity. In Persia, as in other similar regions, the
slowness and difficulties of transportation bring
few visitors to one ’s house ; and the stranger who
happens to stop is peculiarly appreciated. He is
ushered into the house with the respectful salaams
of the servants ; when he leaves, ho is escorted to
the gate or even accompanied a part of the way by
his host. A favorite expression of Persian wel-
come is, “My house is your house.”

In social matters, the Persian is punctilious and
formal. In his language he has one form of ad-
dress for inferiors, one for equals, and one for su-
periors. He has careful regard for the rank of
his guest. The question of precedence is one that
Persians never overlook.

The simple and in many respects wholesome
manifestations of a social system rooted in an
agricultural economy, are sometimes cited by for-
eigners as proof of the Persians’ superficiality
and inherent love of display. The same social

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PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

characteristics, however, have appeared in other
countries at a similar stage in their economic
development, for example in the Southern States
of America before the Civil War. Moreover,
formality and preoccupation with matters of offi-
cial precedence and personal prestige are by no
means peculiar at the present time to Persia and
the Persians. These manifestations are found in
every capital, particularly in the diplomatic com-
munity, and at Teheran foreigners in general at-
tach quite as much importance to these matters as
do the Persians.

From what has been said, however, it must not
be inferred that there is no democratic spirit in
Persia. On the contrary, I should say that the
Persians are essentially democratic. Among a
people still living in an agricultural economy and
just emerging from a monarchical and quasi-
feudal regime, hierarchies, social gradations, and
formalities are to be expected. On the other
hand, there is no caste system in Persia ; the Con-
stitution establishes universal suffrage and places
all Persians equal before the law; the Prime Min-
ister, some of the recent ministers, and one or
two of the wealthiest and most influential mer-
chants have risen from the humblest origins;
others who were once powers in the conntry are
now stripped of wealth, position, and influence;
titles have been abolished by act of Parliament.

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Many of the institutions and customs which
survive, although in appearance aristocratic, are
in my opinion valuable as social brakes, prevent-
ing a too-rapid growth of democracy.

There are two qualities which are held by most
foreign observers and even by the Persians them-
selves to be rare in Persia, — energy and honesty.
These are the qualities which are held in highest
esteem by the Persians themselves; but, when
found, are supposed to be seldom if ever found in
combination.

As for energy, it is quite true the Persian im-
presses one as slow, inactive, and procrastinating.
He goes about his work leisurely, taking more in-
tellectual interest in philosophy and poetry than
in more practical subjects. He wastes much time
in talk, particularly of politics ; and his conversa-
tion concerns itself for the most part with persons
or with points that seem irrelevant. He usually
hesitates long before coming to a decision. One
of the most common criticisms of the Persian offi-
cial is that he appears to be unable or unwilling
to decide any question whatever. The Persian
participants in a conference on any subject are
seldom those who urge action or press for an
agreement. On the other hand, they often seem
to welcome most the proposal which postpones the
issue and settles nothing.

Some time ago, a sketch in an American hu-

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PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

morous weekly pictured the American as a devout
worshiper of a metallic idol which he carries in
his pocket or sets in front of him on his desk or
mantel and to which he makes obeisance a hun-
dred times a day. The Persian certainly is no
slave of the clock or watch; he docs not worship
Time. He apparently does not view life as a
closely timed schedule.

An observer in Persia sees on all sides the ap-
pearance of idleness. The peasants go to the
fields at nine or ten o’clock in the morning; the
traders in the bazaars sit cross-legged in their
stalls, languidly letting custom come to them; in
almost every Persian home one can meet good-
looking, well-dressed, educated young men who
are doing nothing; in the tea-houses and caravan-
saries and along the streets and roads are groups
of Persians, lounging, talking, smoking, or playing
cards ; on the sidewalks or by the side of the road,
one frequently passes peasants or laborers lying
on their faces in the hot sun, sleeping; whatever
Persians may be doing, they never seem to be in
a hurry; an official conference called for four
o’clock will get down to work at five-thirty; the
numerous holidays, the noonday siesta in the
summer-time, the superfluous servants, as well
as the familiar traits of indecision and procrasti-
nation, all seem presumptive evidence of a lazy
population.

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Nevertheless, one must look beneath the surface
before pronouncing judgment. Some of these
conditions are, as we have seen, the natural ac-
companiments of an agricultural economy. The
basic and predominant industry of Persia is ag-
riculture. The transportation situation fixes a
more or less definite limit to the expana.ion ot
agricultural production ; and for the same reason
the purchasing power of the population can ex-
pand but slowly. There is lack of coordination
between production and distribution. Popula-
tion has all the time pressed on subsistence. The
result is an unemployment situation so general, so
chronic, and so familiar that it seems at first sight
as natural and as characteristic a feature of the
country as the landscape and the language. I am
certain, however, that the wide-spread unemploy-
ment and part-employment in Persia constitute
for the most part an economic condition and not
an inherent racial or personal defect. Introduce
the stimulus, the opportunities, and the demands
of industry, and much of the present idleness and
apparent lethargy will disappear. Moreover, if
we were fortunate enough to get accurate statis-
tics and charitable enough to make comparisons,
we should probably find that there is in Persia at
present no more idleness proportionately than in
the whole of western Europe at various times or

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PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

in parts of western Europe at the present time,
or in numerous villages in America.

It is possible that from this serious and long-
standing unemployment situation in Persia, there
may have come a depressing and demoralizing in-
fection, which has conceivably determined to some
extent the habits and points of view of the people.
In Persia, moreover, as in other countries, much
apparent idleness springs from social stand-
ards whether economically explainable or not.
For example, a Persian disponible comes to my
office seeking a job. He explains that he has a
family of eleven; that he has been out of work
seventeen months; that he has exhausted every
resource ; that creditors are perching in flocks on
his doorstep ; that even now he is selling his fur-
niture to buy bread ; and that unless work is given
him, he will be driven to suicide. He finishes his
story by stating that, prior to his dismissal, he
had served faithfully and honestly as a clerk, an
inspector, and financial agent for almost sixteen
years. Knowing of a vacant job carrying a
salary of one hundred tomans a month, I offer it
to him ; but my offer is promptly declined, for the
reason that his last salary had been one hundred
and twenty-five tomans and his pride would not
permit him to accept what might be construed as
a demotion. The above is a fairly accurate illus-

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

tration of the family or individual pride exhibited
by most Persians of the office-holding class, their
curious sensitiveness to anything which might
imperil prestige, which leads them, although they
usually have no aversion whatever to work, to
prefer unemployment rather than demotion or
manual labor.

Generally speaking, the Persians are by char-
acter neither lazy, slow, nor sluggish. When cir-
cumstances permit, they are not only intelligent
but also quick, energetic, and industrious.
When a Persian laborer is once put on a job, he
works hard. The Persian employees in the finan-
cial administration compare favorably in faithful-
ness, devotion to duty, and steady application to
their tasks, with the best government employees
in any Western country. They have, naturally,
much to learn of method, but of industriousness
and ambition they show no lack. They willingly
work overtime and forfeit their leaves of absence.
The personnel of the new Persian Army is hard
worked and strictly disciplined, but it reveals, so
far as I can see, no inherent incapacity for sol-
diering. In respect of hard work, as in other
respects, the Persians are peculiarly amenable to
leadership, example, and new demands; and they
are already revealing what is in them, in re-
sponse to the example of energy and hard work
set by their Prime Minister, Reza Khan Pahlevi,

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PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

who is himself, like many of the ministers and
deputies, an easy refutation of the charge that all
Persians are lazy. It is probable, also, that the
hard work of the American Mission has aroused
in many Persians, particularly the young men, a
capacity for toil that was formerly latent; and
it is certain that the new vision of a developed
industrial Persia, with its obvious demands on
the energies of men, is having its stimulating
effect.

It is necessary to examine also, with some care,
the current belief, held by Persians as well as by
foreigners, that the Persians are generally dis-
honest. The Standard Dictionary defines “hon-
est” as “fair and candid in dealing with others;
true, just; upright; trustworthy; . . . free from
fraud; equitable; fair. Of respectable quality of
appearance ; creditable ; unimpeached. Char-
acterized by openness or sincerity, frank. . . .
One who is honest in the ordinary sense acts or
is always disposed to act with careful regard for
the rights of others, especially in matters of busi-
ness or property. . . . The honest man does not
steal, cheat, or defraud. . . . One who is honest
in the highest and fullest sense is scrupulously
careful to adhere to all known truth and right
even in thought.” The antonyms of honest are
given by that authority as “deceitful, dishonest,
disingenuous, faithless, false, fraudulent, hypo-

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

critical, lying, mendacious, perfidious, traitorous,
treacherous, unfaithful, unscrupulous, untrue."
To these antonyms might be added, with special
reference to public honesty, such concepts as self-
ish, unpatriotic, unsocial; for the individual’s con-
ception of his duty to society and to the State has
much to do in determining his thought and con-;
duct in public matters and his relations with his
Government. Judged by such exacting defini-
tions, most Persians and, for that matter, most
Americans and Europeans, would probably be
found wanting.

The standards of morality are of course rela-
tive. What may seem immoral to an American
will be moral to another nationality; what seems
immoral to a Persian may be moral to an Ameri-
can. We can make no progress in understanding
the Persian, or in working with him, if we ignore
his own moral standards, as well as the social and
economic conditions that determine his conduct,
and if we persist in judging him by the exacting
absolute standards of the West, by which the
Westerner himself is often weighed and found
wanting.

Because of my paucity of information on those
points, I do not wish to concern myself here with
the private honesty of the Persians, or even, to
any extent, with their commercial honesty. With
regard to the latter C. J. Wills is quoted in the

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PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

Encyclopaedia Britannica as saying; “In com-
mercial morality, a Persian merchant will
compare not unfavorably with the European
generally.”

In the mind of the average Persian, the sense of
patriotism and of social responsibility is rudi-
mentary. In the past, he has belonged to a family
or a tribe which has seemed to him an almost com-
plete and self-sufficient social and economic or-
ganization. He tends instinctively, therefore, to
give his allegiance to his family, tribe, or com-
munity, rather than to the State. This partic-
ularistic state of mind was a marked accompani-
ment of European feudalism, and existed very
recently in Japan. The Persian loyalty to family
is no more immoral than the choice made by
Robert E. Lee when he decided to serve Virginia
against the United States. Even in America to-
day, the sense of loyalty to a city or to a family
leads often to a mode of thought and action which,
judged broadly and objectively, cannot be char-
acterized as “fair,” “candid,” “free from
fraud,” or “characterized by openness and sin-
cerity.” An American booster who is engaged in
the praiseworthy task of “selling” his home town,
is frequently a liar, albeit his consciousness of
“public spirit” smothers any scruples that might
otherwise assert themselves.

When a Persian comes to the Ministry of
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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Finance, as thousands do in the course of a year,
with some special business, — ^for example, a mon-
etary claim, a request for the appointment of a
brother, a son, or a nephew, a petition for tax-
exemption, — ^too much in the way of candor should
not be expected of him. He will ask for favor-
itism ; he is a special pleader for his family or for
his own interests ; he will suppress some facts and
will give to others a favorable tinge.

But those who think they can' get things from
governments, act in the same way the world over.
I am inclined, therefore, in considering the matter
of honesty, to dismiss summarily from considera-
tion all of those acts, short of outright bribery
and stealing, which occur in the course of their
business dealings with the Government.

Moreover, acts that have the appearance of dis-
honesty in Persia are often traceable to inac-;
curacy. The Persians lack the training in precise
statement that modern science and industry have
given to "Westerners. Other acts spring from
sheer politeness. When a Persian says that the
road is good when it is really atrocious, or that
it is eight farsdkhs to Kazvin when it is really
twelve, he is not lying; he is merely being polite
and pleasant to a stranger. He is no more culp-
able than an Occidental who is virtually never
truthful in his comments to you on your personal
appearance.

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PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

It should be kept in mind that, in addition to the
family conception of social organization, the Per-
sians have never enjoyed those influences on their
standards of honesty which flow from a highly de-
veloped political system resting on the establish-
ment and strict enforcement of law or from
modern industry with its corporate organization
and its exacting human and financial require-
ments.

In a previous chapter, I referred to the corrupt
conditions that existed in the financial administra-
tion before the arrival of the American Mission,
and it is unnecessary here to describe the myriad
and ingenious forms which were assumed by
public fiscal corruption. In attacking these con-
ditions, we have acted on the opinion that they
should properly be attributed to political and ad-
ministrative immaturity rather than to any in-
herent defects in Persian character. When laws
were not enforced or did not exist, when ministers
were compelled to buy their tenure of office with
administrative favors, when public conscience
and patriotism were just taking form, when the
salaries of employees handling public money were
below a living wage, when those having political
influence were at the same time the largest tax-
payers and the largest claimants, when the Gov-
ernment had been under pressure from foreign
interests or thrown into chaos by war, when,

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

it is regrettable to have to add, foreigners repre-
senting Western governments and Western pri-
vate interests had not always offered examples
and incentives to honest conduct — ^it is not sur-
prising that corruption should have appeared in
Persia, as it has appeared in other countries.

The Persian custom of giving and receiving
presents is primarily an accompaniment or ex-
pression of hospitality. The members of the
American Mission have been offered many pres-
ents. Although it is impossible to judge motives
which are, from the nature of the case, unex-
pressed, I feel sure that few of these offers have
been tainted with any idea of bribery. It is some-
times difficult to decline a gift without seeming
discourteous, but the American Mission is at-
tempting, as far as its power extends, to assist in
eliminating from Persian politics the fact and the
appearance of bribery. We have wished to im-
press on the Persians that a high-minded public
official expects nothing as incentive or reward ex-
cept his legal compensation and the satisfactions
of service.

Before casting the first stone at the Persians,
it may be chastening to recall that only two hun-
dred years ago, Walpole, surveying Parliament,
is said to have remarked, “All of these men have
their price”; that only a few years ago America
was shocked by “corrupt and contented Phila-

104

PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

delphia" and by the “ shame ” of other cities;
that at the present time, measured not by the high'
est but by the ordinary practical standards, there
is wide-spread dishonesty among Western peoples,
including some public scandals implicating gov-
ernment officials.

It is true that the American Mission, engaged
in a work of reform and upholding honest admin-
istration, has met with opposition in Persia, but
I am convinced that a large majority of Persians
have been with us and have favored reform. In
any event, political opposition to reform, and
popular lethargy in the support of reform, are
not peculiar to Persia. Tammany, crushed to
earth, has often risen again; and General Butler
would probably have found as smooth sailing in
Teheran as in Philadelphia.

The Persian is highly intelligent, resourceful,
and quick-witted, although in view of the condi-
tions that surround him he has not yet developed
constructive ability or the business acumen which
comes by experience. Temperamentally emo-
tional, he seldom acts on impulse in important
matters. He is essentially more conservative
than the average American, and less likely to be
changeable in important matters.

Persia needs, of course, the quickening and
tonic influence of education and recreation.

The educational institutions and influences of
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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

the country are at present pathetically inade-
quate. According to statistics prepared a few
weeks ago, Persia has at present 248 Government-
supported schools, four municipal schools, 237
private schools receiving government subsidies,
107 independent schools, 47 foreign schools, ex-
cepting the American, 225 religious schools, and
983 private classes. In these schools, which total
1851, are enrolled as students 73,998 boys and 17,-
192 girls, a total of 91,190, of which 22,660 were
in Teheran. The total number of teachers is
given as 5142, and the total population of the
cities and towns in which schools are located is re-
ported to be two million. The American Presby-
terian Mission in Persia maintains 31 schools, of
which the institution at Teheran enrolls 670 stu-
dents, 500 of college grade. The graduates of this
school show the etfects not only of mental disci-
pline but also of character-training, and are living
examples of the acceleration that education gives
to progress. Many young Persians have been edu-
cated abroad, and many more long to be. I am
told that there are at least forty Persian boys
who want to come to America for a college educa-
tion and who might come if the American Im-
migration Law did not, as it is said to do, pre-
vent a foreign student from working his way
through college. There are in Persia no public
libraries worthy the name; the writing and pub-

106

PERSIAN PSYCHOLOGY

lishing of books in the Persian language is a rare
occurrence; and the Persian press, while improv-
ing, is still far from being an educative influence.
Hope lies, however, in the universal desire of
Persians to extend their educational system and
in the measures that are being taken to this end.

The development in Persia of a keener and
wider interest in physical exercise, recreation,
and outdoor sports will contribute to the creation
of a more salutary conception of honor and of
conduct — the sense of fair play, the habit of team-
work, self-mastery, perseverance, and confidence.
It is interesting to note that the game of polo,
which originated in Persia, is now played there
mainly by foreigners. There seems to be no
reason, however, why Persians should not do
well in sports, and there is apparent now among
the young men a renewed interest in physical
exercise and athletic contests. Setting-up exer-
cises are a regular feature of the Persian
soldier’s day. Football is played every after-
noon by Persian boys on the vacant lots near
Mokhber ed Dowleh Park.

Music, too, is gaining its proper place in the
life of the capital. A Persian musical club gives
concerts weekly to its members and their friends,
and band concerts take place almost daily on the
public squares.

Judged by Western standards, sanitation in
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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Persia is far from satisfactory; but, from the
standpoint of the physical health of the average
individual, health conditions in that country do
not appear unfavorable to the development of
mind and character.

108

CHAPTER V

PERSIAN POLITICS

The Persians are politically minded. Their
geographical situation and history ren-
der international politics a subject of
direct and practical interest to them. In spite
of anything that they can now do or probably
ever could do, they are entangled in interna-
tional affairs ; and at times in the past they have
come dangerously close to being strangled by the
meshes of the net that circumstances had cast
around them. Domestic politics, likewise, are to
the Persians a pot that never ceases to boil.

The Persians do not want their foreign admin-
istrators to interfere in Persian politics. Three
years ago, the Majless passed a law to the effect
that every contract for the employment of a
foreigner should contain a clause prohibiting
him from interfering in political matters; and,
in compliance with the spirit of this clause, the
members of the American Mission have care-
fully refrained from the exercise of influence in
the election of deputies, the appointment of
ministers, diplomatic negotiations on political

109

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

subjects, or any other action of the Government
not relating to a financial or economic matter.
On the other hand, certain clauses of my contract
leave me free and even make it my duty to par-
ticipate with Persian officials in diplomatic nego-
tiations on financial and economic subjects, and
of course I am expected to work in a non-
partisan way for the passage in the Majless of
financial and economic legislation. It has also,
naturally, been my desire that the American
Mission, through the example and effect of its
presence and work, should contribute to the uni-
fication and stabilization of Persia and to its
development as an independent self-governing
nation.

I went to Persia free of political prejudices
and with the firm resolve to be neutral in all
purely political matters. I realized quite well
that Great Britain and Russia were the two
countries with which Persia shared, and would
very likely continue to share, the most immediate
and difficult international questions. Toward
both of those countries, I had, like most Ameri-
cans, a feeling in general of respect and friendli-
ness ; and as an official of the Persian Government,
it was neither my inclination nor my intention to
exert any influence or take any action which would
discriminate against one of those countries in
favor of the other, or that might prejudice any

110

PERSIAN POLITICS

legal right possessed by either country in Persia.
On the other hand, it was certain that the Persian
Government did not wish the American Mission
to become the tool of any foreign legation in
Teheran, or to hesitate in opposing the economic
or financial proposals of any legation when such
proposals seemed to us to be contrary to the
interests of Persia.

With regard to Persian domestic politics, my
mind was similarly open and unprejudiced. Al-
though I am a citizen of a republic, my excursions
in political science had given me catholicity re-
garding forms of government, and it seemed to
me that a people could realize its democratic as-
pirations and develop its potentialities quite as
well under a constitutional monarchy as under a
republican form of government.

The political problems of Persia are of such
surpassing difiiculty that they should, in my opin-
ion, enlist the sympathy and aid of other coun-
tries. Persia is not only a buffer state, having
already felt the impact of external forces, but
it is also an undeveloped exploitable country
which has experienced the operations of modern
systems of economic penetration. Immature
politically and economically, Persia has suddenly
awakened to find itself faced with the demands
of an industrial world impatient of ineflSciency.
Tenacious of its sovereignty, Persia must work

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

out its problem of self-government, difficult of
solution in any country, while unifying its popu-
lation, educating its people, and developing its
economic possibilities.

When, about 1890, foreign efforts to obtain
economic privileges in Persia "became significant,
the Persian Government of that time — ^irrespon-
sible, opportunistic, and corrupt — endeavored to
keep a balance between the two competing pow-
ers and to play off one against the other. As
early as 1900, the Shah embarked on a policy of
borrowing from British and Russian sources,
mainly to make up the deficit caused by his ex-
travagance and by the corrupt and inefficient ad-
ministration of Persian finances. Finally, as a
part of their general rapprochement. Great Brit-
ain and Russia signed in 1907 an agreement in
which, after mutually engaging to respect t^ie
integrity and independence of Persia and stating
that they were “sincerely desiring the preserva-
tion of order throughout that country and its
peaceful development, as well as the permanent
establishment of equal advantages for the trade
and industry of all other nations,” Great Britain
agreed not to seek any concessions north of a line
passing from Kasr-Chirin, through Isfahan, Tezd
and Kakhk, to the intersection of the Russo-
Afghan frontier, and Russia agreed not to seek
concessions south of a line extending from the

112

PERSIAN POLITICS

Afghan frontier through Gazik, Birjand, and
Kerman, to Bandar Abbass. The Anglo-Bussian
Agreement was signed without the knowledge or
consent of the Persian Government.* Four years
later Shuster was employed by the Persian Gov-
ernment. Proceeding energetically to the accom-
plishment of his task, he soon met with the
protests and opposition of the Russian Govern-
ment, which alleged that the Treasurer-General
did not in his official acts sufficiently recognize
and respect the special interests of Russia in the
north. After a few months, the Russian Govern-
ment presented an ultimatum to the Persian
Government, demanding the dismissal of Shuster,
and he departed from Persia, followed by his
staff, early in 1912, leaving behind him a tradi-
tion which is still strong in the minds of Persian
young men, of disinterested and courageous
friendship for the Persian people.

The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907 was an-
nulled during the World War ; but in 1914 Persia
was without means to maintain the neutrality
which it had proclaimed. Within a year, Rus-
sian, Turkish, and British armies were fighting on
Persian soil, and German agents were conduct-
ing a wide-spread propaganda. There were ac-
tive fighting, plots, murders, and disorder

1 For the full text of the Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907,
see Shuster, Strangling of Persia, Introduction, p. xxiv.

113

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

throughout the whole country. Western Persia
in 1918 was in a state of famine. The trade of
■Persia came almost to a standstill, and the Gov-
ernment was unable to collect its internal taxes.
Subsidies and other advances were supplied by
the British. The distinguished and able delega-
tion which Persia sent to Paris in 1919 was -not
permitted to state its ease to the Peace Confer-
ence, and no action was taken by the conference
toward rendering assistance to Persia.

In August, 1919, an agreement was concluded
between the British minister at Teheren and the
Persian B\)reign Office. In this agreement, the
British Government agreed “to respect abso-
lutely the independence and integrity of Persia,”
to supply at Persian expense “the services of
whatever expert advisers may, after consultation
between the two Governments, be considered ne-
cessary for the several dejjartments of the Per-
sian Administration,” these advisers to be
“engaged on contracts and endowed with ade-
quate powers, the nature of which shall be the
matter of agreement between the Persian Gov-
ernment and the advisers.” The agreement also
aimed at the supplying by the British Government
of officers, munitions, and equipment, with a view
to the creation of a uniform force for the estab-
lishment and preservation of order. The British
Government also agreed to supply a loan and to

114

PERSIAN POLITICS

provide at once certain funds on account of it.
The agreement further provided for cooperation
between the British and Persian Governments for
the improvement of communications in the coun-
try through railway construction and other means
of transport. Finally, it was agreed that a joint
commission of experts should revise the Persian
customs tariff “to accord with the legitimate in-
terests of the country and to promote its pros-
perity.”^ Under the terms of the agreement,
payments were advanced for several months to
the Persian Government; Mr. Armitage-Smith, a
British Treasury official, came to Persia as Finan-
cial Adviser with a staff of British assistants,
and military and naval missions were also sent.
When the Majlcss met, it refused to ratify the
agreement; the measures which were being exe-
cuted under its terms were discontinued; and
Mr. Armitage-Smith departed, having been un-
able during his stay to obtain and exercise any
real powers. The British proceeded with the
withdrawal of their troops from Persia, and when
I arrived at Teheran, discussions were in prog-
ress which resulted in the transfer to the Per-
sian Government of the post-offices on the Persian
Gulf, which had been administered by the British.

With regard , to the present policy of the Brit-

I For the text of the Anglo-Persian Agreement, see U. S. Senate
Document No. 90, 66th Congress, Ist Session.

115

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ish Government toward Persia and the American
Mission, light may be gathered from a speech
by the Earl of Balfour in the House of Lords
on May 19, 1925, in which ho is reported by the
London ‘‘Times’’ to have said that

such information as he had, indicated that Persian fi-
nances were in a more favourable condition than were
those of many more powerful States. Persia had practi-
cally made her Budget meet. The position was in no
small measure due to the efforts of the American finan-
cial advisers whom Persia had called in to her councils.
He had not the least doubt that there had been friction,
but those who gave good advice about money were not al-
ways the most popular with those to whom the advice
was given. [Laughter.] The most friendly relations
had always existed between this country and the Sheik
of Mohammerah. The Sheik had not been treated by
us as a Prince. He had always been under the suzer-
ainty of Persia. With regard to the future movements
of the Shah, whom rumour represented as now enjoying
himself on the Riviera, he had no official information.
He was not disposed to think that it would be either
expedient or decorous to ask what the intentions of that
potentate might be. Negotiations had taken place last
year between various great oil companies, but no settle-
ment had been arrived at. He had no recent official in-
formation on the subject. The Anglo-Persian agreement
was now ancient history, — ^indeed, obsolete history, —
and there was little use in reviving that controversy
now. Nor did he think there was much substance in

. 116

PERSIAN POLITICS

some of the American criticism in which some American
critics seem to think that England was behaving or de-
sired to behave in a manner toward Persia which would
interfere with the independence of that country. Those
critics might be deserving of respect, but they were
clearly very ill-informed on the subject of Persia and
on the subject of British intentions in regard to that
country. The present Government had, and all British
Governments had had, one policy in view. We desired
to see a Persia which was independent, which was free,
and which we could treat as a neighbour on equal terms
and whose efficiency, civilization, and power we justly
regarded as security for the general position in the East
so far as our own interests were concerned. That view
is still maintained. We desired the independence of
Persia, we desired the prosperity of Persia, and we re-
joiced that its independence was secure and its prosperity
was increasing.

As Persia has in the past often swung, in her
foreign Policy, from Russia to Britain and from
Britain to Russia, I shall let George Tchitcherin
state the chronology of one of the latest oscilla-
tions :

In the meanwhile, the Anglophile Sepahdar set Feb-
ruary 20, 1921, as the date for the opening of the Par-
liament to ratify the Anglo-Persian agreement, and on
this date the Parliament was opened. On February 21,
Teheran was occupied by the Persian Cossacks of Bcza
Ehan and the members of the government of Sepahdar
were arrested. The new cabinet of Zia-Ed-Din, pub-

117

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lished the declaration of February 26, in which it an-
nounced the annulment of the Anglo-Persian Agreement
and outlined a broad plan of Internal reforms. On that
same day, February 26, in Moscow was signed the
Russian-Persian Agreement, which radically and defi-
nitely liquidated all of the traces of the former Tsarist
policy of oppression in Persia and laid the foundation
for a close fraternal relation between the peoples of
Russia and Persia.*

In the treaty of February 26,' 1921, between the
Soviet and Persian Governments, the Soviet Gov-
ernment in Article One, declared its “immutable
renunciation of the policy of force with regard to
Persia pursued by the Imperialist Governments
of Eussia,” and, “wishing to see the Persian peo-
ple independent, flourishing, and freely control-
ling the whole of its own possessions,” the Soviet
Government declared “all treaties, conventions
and agreements concluded by the late Czarist
Government with Persia and tending to the dimi-
nution of the rights of the Persian people com-
pletely null and void.” In Article Two of this
treaty, the Soviet Govermnent further branded
“as criminal the policy of the Government of
Czarist Eussia, which, without the agreement of
the peoples of Asia and under the guise of as-
suring the independence of these peoples, con-
cluded with other states of Europe treaties con-

1 George Tchitcherin in “Izvestia” of Nov. 6, 1921.

118

PERSIAN POLITICS

cerning the East which had for their ultimate ob-
ject its gradual seizure”; the Soviet Government
unconditionally rejected “that criminal policy
as not only violating the sovereignty of the states
of Asia but also leading to the organized brutal
violence of European robbers on the living body
of the peoples of the East”; and, therefore, the
Soviet Government declared “its refusal to take
part in any measures whatsoever tending to
weaken or violate the sovereignty of Persia,”
and declared “completely null and void all con-
ventions and agreements concluded by the late
Government of Russia with third powers for the
harm of Persia and concerning her.” In Article
Four, each of the contracting parties agreed to
“strictly refrain from interference in the internal
affairs of the other party.” In Article Eight, the
Soviet Government declared “its complete rejec-
tion of that financial policy which the Czarist
Government of Russia pursued in the East, sup-
plying the Government of Persia with financial
means, not in order to assist the economic de-
velopment and flourishing of the Persian people,
but in the form of the political enfetterment of
Persia.” The Soviet Government, therefore, re-
signed “all rights to the loans furnished to Persia
by the Czarist Government” and declared “such
loans null and not to be repaid,” similarly resign-
ing “all demands for the use of those state rev-

119

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

enues of Persia by which the loans were guar-
anteed,” In Article Nine, the Soviet Govern-
ment, “in accordance with its expressed condem-
nation of the colonial policy of capitalism, which
served and is serving as a reason for innumerable
miseries and shedding of blood,” renounced “the
use of those financial undertakings of Czarist
Russia which had as their object the economical
enfetterment of Persia,” and handed over “into
the complete possession of the Persian people, the
financial sums, valuables, and in general the as-
sets and liabilities of the Discount Bank of Persia,
together with the movable and immovable prop-
erty of the Bank within the territory of Persia. ’ ’
In Article Ten, repudiating “the tendency of
world imperialism which strives to build in for-
eign countries roads and telegraph lines, not so
much for the cultural development of the people
as. for insuring to itself the means of military
penetration,” “wishing to provide the Persian
people with the possibility of the free disposal of
the means of communication and correspondence,
vitally necessary for the independence and cul-
tural development of the people, and further, as
far as it can to compensate Persia for the losses
caused her by the troops of the Czarist Govern-
ment,” the Soviet Government gratuitously trans-
ferred, “as the absolute property of the Persian
people,” the following Russian establishments in

120

PERSIAN POLITICS

Persia : the highways from Enzeli to Teheran and
from Kazvin to Hamadan, the railways from
Djulfa to Tabriz and from Sofian to Lake Uru-
miah, all properties pertaining to navigation on
Lake Urumiah, all telegraph and telephone lines
constructed by the Russian Government in Persia,
and the port of Enzeli, with its goods, stores, elec-
tric power station, and other buildings. In
Article Eleven, the two contracting parties agreed
that each “shall enjoy the right of free naviga-
tion on the Caspian Sea under its own flag.”

In addition to the above renunciations and
transfers, which appear to have special reference
to the acquired rights of the former Russian Gov-
ernment itself, the Soviet Government, in Article
Twelve of the treaty, after “solemnly renouncing
the enjoyment of economic privileges based on
military predominance” declared “null and void
also all other concessions, beside those enumer-
ated in Articles Nine and Ten, forced from the
Government of Persia by the late Czarist Govern-
ment for itself and its subjects,” and the Soviet
Government returned to the Persian Government
all such concessions. The Persian Government on
its part promised in Article Thirteen not to hand
over any of the renounced or transferred conces-
sions to any third state or its citizens but to pre-
serve those rights to itself for the good of the
Persian people. Finally, in Article Sixteen of

121

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the treaty, the Soviet Government confirmed the
abolition of the extra-territorial rights which had
up to June 26, 1919, been enjoyed by Russian citi-
zens in Persia, placing Russian citizens in Persia
henceforth on an equality with Persian citizens,
subject to the same laws and amenable to the same
courts of justice.^

I have made no attempt to give an abstract of
the whole of this remarkable document ; and with
regard to its execution, it will be sufficient to say
that the concessions and properties referred to in
the treaty, with the exception of some of those
relating to the port of Enzeli,^ some minor ap-
purtenances of the former Russian Bank, and
parts of the fishery concession, were duly trans-
ferred. In quoting portions of this treaty, it has
been my purpose to set forth in substance the most
formal and authoritative declaration of post-war
Russian policy toward Persia. After reading the
document, one can scarcely be surprised that the
other party to the treaty should have felt a new
sense of security with regard to its northern fron-
tier, and that, without leaning toward Bolshevism,
it should have given again its confidence and
friendship to its northern neighbor.

Addressing the Executive Committee on the re-

1 The quotations are from the English translation of the treaty
published in the ''Manchester Guardian” of Mch. 31, 1921.

2 This port has been re-named Pahlcvi, in honor of the Prime
Minister.

122

PERSIAN POLITICS

lations of the Soviet Republics with Eastern coun-
tries, Mr. Tchitcherin, Foreign Commissaire, is
reported to have made, early in March, 1925, the
following statement about Soviet relations with
Persia :

Our friendly relations with Persia are being strength-
ened more than ever before. The Soviet Government
is endeavoring to assist Persia to stand on her own feet
and develop her national reproductive forces, while the
Czarist Government tried to prevent the growth of
these forces. The maintenance of friendly relations
with the Union of Sovietic Republics is useful to Persia
in this respect, that in her struggles to bring about re-
forms and reestablish her complete political and economic
independence, Persia can feel sure of her back.^

It would not be appropriate for me to express
any opinion regarding what I might conceive to
bo the real, as compared with the declared, .policy
of a foreign government toward Persia, or regard-
ing the motives which might impel the declared
or real policy. I have referred in a preceding
chapter to the negotiations .with the Russian
Government relative to the taritf, and it will be
my duty later to set forth the facts concerning
the fishery question, which may he found an
interesting touch-stone of Soviet policy. The

1 Translated into English from the Persian newspaper "Iran’^
of Mch. 8, 1925, and credited by that newspaper to the '‘Moseow
Wireless,” published by the Soviet Legation at Teheran.

123

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reader, however, will be left to draw his own
conclusions.

It is interesting and significant that in discus-
sions of international politics in Persia, the juxta-
position of British and Russian interests is almost
invariably premised. If the British Legation
favors a thing, it is ipso facto inferred that .the
Russian Legation is opposed to it, or vice versa.
British and Russian interests are generally con-
sidered in Persia to be as fundamentally opposed,
at least so far as Persia is concerned, as were
those of Rome and Carthage. It is of little use
to examine the question whether the opposition
of the interests of these two powers in Persia may
or may not be real and permanent, or whether the
resolving of their conflicting interests — ^if they do
really conflict and if they are ever resolved — ^may
or may not spell the doom of an independent
Persia. The fact is that Persians remember the
years, after 1890, when Persia was the inglorious
arena of a politico-economic duel — sordid years
of concessions to one power and “compensations”
to the other, years of harassment, demoralization,
and attrition. During those years, the Persians
who were in power — ^partly because of their cor-
ruption and incompetence, but largely, I believe,
because of the weakness of their country — ^bar-
tered with two countries instead of adopting and
applying to all countries a sound patriotic policy

124

PERSIAN POLITICS

based on Persia’s interests rather than on her
fears. It is a compliment to Persia that, when the
chance came, she adopted and is attempting to
carry out a policy nothing less in principle than
the familiar doctrine of the “open door.’’ It is
perhaps no less complimentary to the foreign gov-
ernments which have been chiefly concerned with
Persia that, when they were brought after the
World War to the necessity of readjustments,
they should have proclaimed policies with regard
to Persia that are, if we accept them at their face-
value, compatible with the existence of Persia
as a politically and economically sovereign nation,
and are equally compatible with the legitimate
interests of those governments and their nationals
in Persia.

In addition to securing its international posi-
tion, Persia must, in order to be a nation, develop
internal homogeneity and unity.

The bulk of the population of the country is of
Aryan stock, but some admixture of other racial
elements has taken place, particularly in the fron-
tier provinces.

The chief internal obstacles to national unity
have been the strong tribes — ^the Shahsevans and
Kurds in the northwest, the Bakhtiaris in the
southwest, the Khashgais in the south, the Balu-
chis in the southeast, and the Turkomans in the
northeast — and the semi-independent position of

125

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Sardar Aghdass or Sheikh Khaz’al, the Sheikh of
Mohammerah, at the head of the Persian Gulf.
A strong army was created through the organiz-
ing ability and leadership of Beza Khan Pahlevi,
and before the arrival of the American Mission,
he had subjugated and disarmed the recalcitrant
Kurds of Azerbaidjan. In 1924, he extended .the
power of the Central Government to Khozistan.
In 1925, the Bakhtiaris and Khashgais were being
disarmed, and the Turkomans were receiving a
quick and effective lesson in authority. Persia
is becoming a nation. Beza Khan belongs, in
many respects, to the class of statesmen of which
Henry II of England and Philip Augustus of
France were the prototypes. He has supplied the
personal and military force which are necessary
to establish the authority of the Central Govern-
ment. A tribal uprising in Persia is no proof of
incapacity for self-government. The country is
in a well-advanced state of transition from sep-
aratism to nationalism, and occasional growing
pains are to be expected. As a matter of fact.
Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy like-
wise had their periods of transition and unifica-
tion ; and even the United States, within the mem-
ory of men now living, went through a sanguinary
War before it attained national solidarity.

The Persian language, with its Arabic acquisi-
tions, is spoken over nearly the whole of the coun-

126

PERSIAN POLITICS

try, the purest Persian being heard in the Prov-
ince of Pars and in Teheran. Throughout the
country there are various spoken dialects of Pah-
levi, Kurdi, Turki, Luri, Baluchi, and others that
change almost from village to village. A common
language makes for national unity; and Persian
nationalism has shown its pride of language. In
November, 1924, a commission was organized by
order of the Prime Minister to find Persian words
to replace words of alien origin which were in
use in the army ; and on March 30, 1925, the Maj-
less passed a law establishing a new calendar in
which Persian names for the months were substi-
tuted for Arabic.

In religion, Persia is virtually homogeneous.
The prevailing and official religion is that of the
Shiah branch of Islam. Inhabitants and resi-
dents of other religions, however, such as Parsees,
Jews, and Christians, enjoy freedom of worship
and do not constitute a discordant or unsettling
element in the population.

Throughout the territory of Persia, there is a
single historical tradition. Persia is not attempt-
ing to absorb peoples or territories recently an-
nexed. The present territory of Persia has
for many centuries been recognized as Persian.
Apart from certain minor boundary rectifications
in the northeast, no part of the territory of Persia
appears to be claimed by any foreign government,

127

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

and I doubt whether there is any region of Persia
or any part of the population which, if a fair
plebiscite were taken, would vote for independence
or for annexation to another country. The polit-
ical traditions of her people run back almost un-
broken for three thousand years, to the glorious
epoch when Persia was a world empire. There
is also in the people a cultural unity and a
cultural tradition that, although tenuous, contrib-
ute to the feeling of nationality.

In general, there are in the population of Persia
no apparent differences of race, language, reli-
gion, or tradition great enough to complicate seri-
ously the accomplishment of national unity. The
principal conditions which retard unification are,
in my opinion, the sparseness of population, the
mountain ranges and deserts, and the difiSculties
of internal transportation and communication— all
of which have hindered the extension of the politi-
cal and administrative authority of the Central
Government and, economically, have tended to
create in various sections of the population, par-
ticularly at the borders, feelings of self-sufficiency
or of greater commercial dependence on a neigh-
boring country than on the other sections of
Persia.

■ Before 1906, the government of Persia was
vested in the Shah, whose power was in theory
absolute and in practice limited only by the sanc-

128

His Imperial Majesty, Ahmad, Shah of Tbusia

PERSIAN POLITICS

tions of custom, by the influence and legal author'
ity of the mujtahids or religious leaders, by the in-
fluence of the foreign legations, and by his own
formal acts and those of his predecessors, which,
particularly in the case of concessions to foreign-
ers, constituted a restraint on arbitrariness. In
1906, the Persian people forced the Shah to grant
a constitution, under which a National Consulta-
tive Assembly or Majless was established. An
attempt by Mohamed Ali Shah to overthrow the
Constitution was defeated and his abdication, in
1909, was followed by the accession of Sultan
Ahmad Shah, the present occupant of the throne.
With the exception of an unsuccessful attempt by
Mohamed Ali Shah, in 1911, to reestablish himself,
there has been no effort of any significance to re-
store absolutism. Meetings of the Parliament
were interrupted during the World War, but the
fourth Majless was elected and convened in 1921
and after an orderly election, was succeeded by
the fifth Majless, which is now in session.

The written Constitution consists of the so-
called Fundamental Laws issued by royal far-
man on December 30, 1906, and October 7, 1907.^
The principle of constitutionalism is rightly held
sacred in the minds of progressive Persians; but,
like all constitutions which have to be stretched

1 For the full text of the Constitution, see Shuster, "Strangling
of Persia,” pp. 337-356.

129

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

if they are not to be broken, the provisions of this
one have taken on in practice a measure of elas-
ticity and tentativeness.

In the Constitution, the powers of the Shah are
limited in general to those usually accorded a
monarch under the cabinet system of government.
The Prime Minister or President of the Cguncil,
who is the actual executive, is nominally appointed
by the Shah, but really by the Majless. The Pres-
ident of the Council names his ministers and in-
troduces them to the Shah and the Majless. The
President of the Council with his ministers con-
stitutes the Council of Ministers, which possesses
general executive power, issues decrees for the
enforcement of laws, and in the absence of the
Majless possesses provisional legislative power.
When the Prime Minister loses his majority in the
Majless, he resigns with all of his ministers*; and
a new cabinet is formed. In the past, there were
frequent changes of government, indicated by the
fact that there are at present eight living ex-prime
ministers of Persia and that the average tenure
of office of Ministers of Finance has been about
three months.

From the arrival of the American Mission in
Persia to the present time, however, there have
been only three changes of government, the pres-
ent one, headed by Eeza Khan Pahlevi, having

130

PERSIAN POLITICS

lasted with some changes of ministers from Oc-
tober, 1923.

The Council of Ministers meets three times a
week, in a room at the palace. The President of
the Council sits at the head of the table, with the
Minister of Finance at his right and the Minister
of Foreign Affairs at his left. The council has
its own clerical staff. Decisions are made and
business transacted with despatch.

According to the Constitution, the ministers are
responsible to the Ma jless ; they may sit and speak
in Parliament and they must answer the questions
that are addressed to them by the deputies. A
Persian minister is an altogether too busy man.
He attends his office at his ministry ; he is present
at the sittings of the Council of Ministers; he
must frequently attend the sessions of the Maj-
less. In addition he has the social responsibil-
ities which pertain to his position and he must also
play his part in the politics of the cabinet of
which he is a part. It is true that he has an under-
secretary who shares certain of his administra-
tive work and who may attend the Majless in his
place; but, nevertheless, the manifold duties that
are thrust upon him account in part for many of
the charges of slowness, procrastination, and in-
efficiency that are brought against him.

The members of the Majless are elected by uni-

131

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

versal manhood suffrage for a period of two years.
A new electoral law is now under consideration
in the Ma jless, and it is expected that it will make
substantial improvements in the methods of elec-
tion. Voting is by secret ballot, hut it extends
over a period of several weeks, and after the ac-
tual voting is completed, the counting of the bal-
lots is for some reason a laborious and time-
consuming task. The elections for the fifth Maj-
less dragged through three or four months; and
there was an interregnum of several months be-
tween the closing of the fourth Majless and the
opening of the fifth.

The maximum number of deputies is fixed at
one hundred and sixty-two, but the Constitution
prescribes that in case of necessity the number
may he increased to two hundred. At present,
the Majless is composed of one hundred and
thirty-five members. The Constitution provides
that the deputies shall represent the whole nation,
and not merely the particular classes, provinces,
departments, or districts which have elected them.
Many of the deputies, therefore, unlike the mem-
bers of the American Congress but like the mem-
bers of the British House of Commons, are not
residents of their constituencies. A distinguished
or influential Persian sometimes receives a ma-
jority of the votes in two or more districts. Beza
Ehan Pahlevi, for example, was elected by four
. 132

PERSIAN POLITICS

or five constituencies. In such an event, the
deputy-elect chooses the constituency which he de-
sires to serve. Due to the method of election and
other causes, a disproportionate number of the
deputies are residents of the capital.

In addition to the deputies of Moslem faith, the
Jewish, Armenian, and Zoroastriau minorities
each elect one representative. While the depu-
ties are nominally elected on a territorial basis,
they nevertheless represent roughly the social and
economic classes and interests of the country.
Thus, there is always in the Majless a large num-
ber of mullahs prepared to voice the important
religious interest, and a large majority of the
deputies — ^including, of course, many of the mul-
lahs— ^are landed proprietors. The present Maj-
less comprises also a few newspaper men and
one or two physicians and lawyers.

The Majless is housed in a group of well-
constructed and commodious buildings which with
the beautiful surrounding garden are the special
pride of the deputies. These buildings, as they
are at present, are a monument to the devoted
service of the Zoroastrian deputy, Arbab Khaikos-
row Shakrokh, who since the establishment of the
Majless, has been continuously the elected mana-
ger of its administrative organization.

The chamber of the Majless, with its rostrum,
its dais, its ascending rows of seats arranged in

133

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

the form of an arc, facing the president’s desk, its
galleries, its tastefully ornamented walls and ceil-
ing, its electric chandeliers, and its general dig-
nity, will compare favorably with any of the
legislative chambers at our State capitals.

At the beginning of each Majless and at the end
of each year the deputies elect from their own
number officers and commissions. They usually
select for their presiding officer a man distin-
guished for honesty, dignity, patriotism, and
statesmanship, and the present President, Mota-
men ol Molk, thoroughly exemplifies these qual-
ities. For the election of commissions, the depu-
ties are divided into six sections, each of which
chooses one, two, or three of its members, accord-
ing to the size of the commission. The Budget
Commission, the largest and most important, con-
sists of eighteen members. Other commissions
are those on Foreign Affairs, Financial Laws, Mil-
itary Affairs, Justice, Education, Economics, and
Petitions. There is also an Initiative Conunis-
sion whose function is to discuss and propose new
legislation. In February, 1924, a committee of
twelve, consisting of the leading deputies, repre-
senting all groups, was appointed at the request
of the Prime Minister to cooperate with the Gov-
ernment in the formulation of important policies.
This commission has proved to be a most useful
organ, crystallizing sentiment in the Majless and

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PERSIAN POLITICS

bringing about better cooperation between the
Government and the Parliament.

The procedure of the Majless is not unlike that
of other legislative assemblies. A project of law
is ordinarily introduced into the Majless over the
signature of the Prime Minister and the con-
cerned minister. It is then referred to the appro-
priate commission. Projects rarely go through
the commissions without amendment. After the
commission has acted on a project, it is pre-
sented to the Majless by the reporter of the com-
mission. If the Government urgently desires the
measure passed, it will ask the Majless for imme-
diate consideration, in which case the bill will be
given priority over others on the calendar. De-
bate on a bill usually starts with a formal speech
by a member of the Cabinet or by the chair-
man of the commission which has reported the
bill, followed by a speech from the leader of the
opposition. Speeches then alternate for and
against the bill. When it becomes the sense of
the deputies that the discussion is sufiScient, a mo-
tion to that effect is made and put, and if it is car-
ried, the debate is closed. The discussion of a bill
passes through two stages. The first stage is con-
cerned with the principle of the bill; the second
deals with the articles, one by one. During the
second stage, deputies may send to the rostrum
written amendments which are read by the secre-

135

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

taries. The proposer of an amendment rises in
his place and argues for the amendment; the
Government, if it opposes the amendment, makes
an opposing speech through one of its leaders. A
vote is then taken on the amendment. The Gov-
ernment can withdraw a project at any time. The
Majless takes its work seriously; its debate? are
as dignified and orderly as those in the United
States Senate; the attendance of the members is
much better ; and disturbances are no more
frequent.

The lack of lawyers in the Majless and in the
Government leads to a method in the drafting and
passing of law-projects which impresses a West-
erner as extremely loose, if not dangerous. Little
attention is paid to precision of statement, and
the provisions of a law are sometimes vague or
self -contradictory. Nevertheless, this feature' of
a Persian statute does not seem a serious defect ;
since it is the purpose of the Persian legislator to
embody in the statute only fundamental principles
and not to endeavor to foresee all possible con-
tingencies which might arise in its enforcement.

The courts of Persia are still inadequate for the
development of law. There is a judicial system,
established according to the Constitution and a
statute enacted by the Majless, but there is much
criticism of the courts for alleged incompetence,

136

PERSIAN POLITICS

corruption, slowness of procedure, and subservi-
ency to political and personal influence. The
highest court of the country declared a few months
ago that there was no penal law in force. Many
Persians appear to prefer arbitration to recourse
to the courts. Persia has produced at least one
eminent jurist in the person of Zoka ol Molk, the
present Minister of Finance, who has served with
distinction as Chief Judge of the Supreme Court.

The body of Persian law is of two classes : the
religious law, based on the Koran and adminis-
tered by the mujtahids and mullahs, and the com-
mon law, based on custom.

The civil courts take cognizance of both
branches of the law, and for the usage of the
courts the law is in process of codification by
French lawyers.

The weak point in Persian jurisprudence, at its
present stage, is with regard to the sanctions of
law. Persians too often look upon a law as
merely a pious wish. The reasons for this state
of affairs are not far to seek. The Persian is not
vindictive ; the oflBcial class, in which violations of
the public law are most likely to occur, is bound to-
gether by ties of family relationship and personal
acquaintance; due to social and economic condi-
tions, which have been previously mentioned, the
honor of the State seems less prceious than the

137

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

family. Accordingly, breaches of law sometimes
occasion superficial indignation but are usually
followed by forgiveness.

As the power of the executive becomes perma-
nent, as industry grows, as the appreciation of na-
tional unity and governmental efficiency impresses
the value of uniform rules, the substance and
the apparatus of law also will develop. There is
not, in Persia, any universal ignorance of the
meaning and value of law. There are many Per-
sians who have a thorough grounding in the his-
tory and theory of European law ; others are pro-
foundly versed in Mohammedan and Persian
law; these and others understand the need for a
better legal regime. Neither is there in Persia an
absence of law in its broad sense. The soil from
which law grows appears to exist. There is re-
spect for authority and a marked tendency to ob-
serve precedents. The people are conservative,
peaceable, and essentially law-abiding, and there
is probably less of the spirit of lawlessness in
Persia than in Western countries. There is little
disorder and there are few private crimes and mis-
demeanors. Further improvement is bound to
come from the desire to achieve the accepted evi-
dences of nationalism by abolishing the capitula-
tory rights of foreigners. Financial reform, also,
will not only raise the moral tone but encourage
independence and integrity on the part of the

138

PERSIAN POLITICS

judges by providing them with adequate salaries.

According to Persian constitutional theory, the
Majless is the depository of sovereignty in the
State ; and in practice the Majless asserts success-
fully its claim to supreme power. As the guard-
ian of the Constitution and the fundamental insti-
tution of representative government, it is right-
fully jealous of its prerogatives.

In their infancy, the parliamentary institutions
of the West were based on class- and interest-
representation. They were intended primarily as
organs for giving the approval of the taxpaying
classes to the revenue proposals of the executive.
It was centuries after their origin that they first
attempted statutory legislation, and it was still
later that they began to prescribe the rules of
administration. They were intended as places to
talk, to parler, rather than as organs of direct au-
thority. As a result of their fiscal control, they
developed the power of setting up and overthrow-
ing governments, of making laws and supervising
administration. At the end of a long chapter of
history, — ^in which parliaments were virtually
synonymous with liberty itself, — they began to
lose prestige and to experience changes.

Throughout the Western world, parliaments are
now on the defensive. They tend to abdicate
their initiative in legislation; with regard to ad-
ministration they tend to confine themselves to

139

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

powers of criticism, supervision, and veto; the
modern budget has reduced their control of ex-
penditures to a mere veto, and with regard to rev-
enues the tendency is to give the executive a
greater flexibility of action and more discretionary
power. It will bo interesting to see, therefore,
whether or not the Persian Parliament — one of
the youngest — ^will avail itself of the lessons of his-
tory and avoid the errors of other parliaments.
A country in the stage in which Persia finds itself,
needs, obviously, a strong executive. An as-
sembly cannot be at the same time the executive.
The Parliament should be the organ of public
opinion. It should control the executive without
hampering it.

The signs in the political skies of Persia which
give hope regarding the success of its parliament-
ary experiment are the following: The Persian
'Parliament consists of a single house, which^ is
not unwieldy in number. It enjoys in general
the confidence of the people. It is dignified, de-
liberate, and conservative. It tends to do too
little, rather than too much. It is on the whole
progressive and on economic matters sound. It
leaves to the executive the initiation of legislation
and confines itself mainly to laying down the gen-
eral principles of law, leaving their details to ad-
ministrative regulations. It is not capricious in
its interpellations and votes of confidence. It ad-

140

PERSIAN POLITICS

heres faithfully to the fundamental principles of
the budget — ^namely, that all proposals for ex-
penditure should originate with the executive and
that no item of expenditure should bo increased
by the Parliament.

In developing as an organ of public opinion,
the Persian Parliament is hampered by the fact
that there is in the country no public opinion such
as we know in the West. The masses of the
people are illiterate and inarticulate. The news-
papers are improving, but they are still inade-
quate as organs to mold and express opinion.
Persians, however, show an intense interest in
news, and it is astonishing how quickly rumors
rise and spread among the people. In Teheran
there are at least twenty false rumors to one true
one. Opinion, discussion, and group political
action, however, exist. Speeches on political sub-
jects are made to the people in the mosques, in
the bazaars, and at meetings in private houses.
Societies are organized for the discussion of
particular public questions. At one stage in the
history of the American Mission, a number of
the finance disponibles were organized and held
regular meetings and undoubtedly made their in-
fluence felt on the Government and in the Majless.
Lobbying is practised. The most common means
of bringing public pressure to bear on the Govern-
ment, however, is through the practice of bast.

141

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

The Persian Constitution was granted after the
people had taken bast in the British Legation —
that is, congregated there, refusing to leave until
their demands had been granted. Landowners
who believe that they have been dealt with un-
fairly by the tax-assessors take bast. For weeks
a number of claimants against the Ministry of
Finance have been taking refuge in the Majless.
Unemployed men have threatened to come to my
homo and stay there unless I gave them jobs.
Bast, at least when it is directed against Persian
officials, is one of the most powerful and effective
means of protest. The most potent, however, is
probably the closing of the bazaars. The strike
also is used, but chiefly by government employees.
In general, the Persians have a marvelous apti-
tude for passive resistance and passive protest.

In Western countries, governments function
and public opinion is expressed through political
parties. In Persia, there is an almost complete
absence of political parties in the Western sense.
There are various groups in the Majless, but these
groups do not extend outside the Majless and,
except for their parliamentary leaders, they
have no organizations. In the elections, the can-
didates are personal ; they do not represent
parties; they are not nominated by party ma-
chinery. The so-called “parties” in the Majless,
which are merely fluctuating groups of deputies

142

PERSIAN POLITICS

working together temporarily, are nnmerons,
short-lived, and constantly changing in member-
ship. The supporters of the Government and the
deputies of the Opposition are not clearly dif-
ferentiated. In October, 1924, the groups in the
Majless were: the Tajaddud (“Renewal”), which
was the majority group consisting of twenty depu-
ties; the Azadi-khdh (“Liberal”), twenty-three
members; ihe Mellioun (“National”), seven mem-
bers; the Takamol (“Evolution”), sixteen mem-
bers; the Gheyam (“To Stand”), twelve mem-
bers; the recognized opposition deputies, num-
bering thirteen; and the so-called Independ-
ents, who have similar ideas but are supposed to
act individually, eighteen in number. There were
also a few deputies who were apparently unat-
tached. During the following months, realign-
ments took place. It was reported in the press on
March 4, 1925, that a number of deputies had de-
cided to resign from the various groups to which
they belonged and form a new group to be called
Taraghi-khcih (“Progressive”), and it was re-
ported on. April 8, 1925, that ten deputies had
formed a new group to be known as Ettefagh
(“Union”).

While there is no clear differentiation among
Persian politicians on the basis of principles, —
no alternating duel between conservatives on the
one hand and radicals, liberals, progressives, or

143

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

laborites on the other, as in the United States
and Great Britain, — ^there are in Persia, never-
theless, certain fundamental political ideas which
are rallying points and which may eventually
become the issues which will divide the people
and the deputies into real parties. There is, for
example, the idea of nationalism, which is at
present potent in Persia. Around this idea
gather those who want a unified, independent
self-governing Persia, independent of foreign
governments. This idea carries with it the de-
sire for strong government and progressive
economic policies. Those Persians who adhere
to the idea of nationalism are likely to support
in principle the American Mission and any other
political institution or policy which makes for
progress.

The mullahs or religious chiefs, of course, have
been and will be for some time a factor to be
reckoned with in the social and political develop-
ment of the country. They are, from the nature
of the case, leaders of opinion; they are strong
in the Majless ; they exercise a powerful influence
in the administration of education and in the law
courts; they have certain recognized legal func-
tions, such as the attesting of deeds and other
documents. Whatever the social effects of their
influence may be, I have found from experience
that they are not hopelessly reactionary in eco-

144

New gate of abmi drillismeodsds at Teheeas

PERSIAN POLITICS

nomic and financial matters. The recognized
leader of the mullahs in the Majless is Modarres,
who was recently elected First Vice-President
of the Chamber. Modarres has the reputation
of caring nothing for money ; he lives in a simple
house and garden unfurnished except for rugs,
books, and benches. He wears the beard and
simple clothing of the old Persian, and, a scholar
among Persians, he speaks no foreign language.
Meeting him, one cannot fail to be impressed by
his simplicity, directness, and common sense. In
his public acts, he is consistent and courageous.
At heart an apparently sincere Persian national-
ist, he has often said to me: “I am not inter-
ested in the little details of administration. Talk
to me only of the big things, and if you show
that you are doing big things, I am with you.”

The general religious thought of educated
Persians is distinctly liberal. Although I have
made no studies which would equip me to dis-
cuss the religious institutions of Persia in their
relation to Persian politics and economics, it is
worth remembering in this connection that, what-
ever may be the situation in Persia, the Western
nations, with few exceptions, have had to deal in
the course of their development with authori-
tarianism and powerful priesthoods.

The position of women in Persia constitutes an
inhibition by custom and conservatism of a tre-

145

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

mendously vital political and social force. The
place of woman is considered to be in the home,
and she ordinarily has no social intercourse
except with the women of her acquaintance and
with her immediate male relatives. When ap-
pearing in public, she is completely shrouded in
a chuddar — a black covering which conceals her
head, face, figure, and dress. She lives with her
children in the anderun; her husband meets his
friends and callers in the birun, which is usually
a separate and smaller house. She marries
early, sometimes as young as eleven or twelve,
the marriage, if custom is followed, being ar-
ranged by the parents of bride and groom. She
rarely goes about in public with her husband.
It has not been my privilege to meet and talk
with Persian women: they have no part in the
official or social life to which I am admitted, amd
they are not generally employed in the public
administrations, although they serve as teachers
in the girls’ schools and as police matrons. I
have no reason, however, to suppose that they are
less intelligent or capable than the Persian men.
Among Persian men, I have never heard any talk
of the inherent inferiority of women. I do not
know whether or not Persian women are con-
tented with their lot, but certainly there are no
public manifestations of discontent on their part.
They are clearly not “emancipated” like Ameri-

146

PERSIAN POLITICS

can women, but the women of Persia are poten-
tially, and they have proved themselves in the
past to be actually, a powerful influence for good
politically. At the present time, they have
progressive ideas and purposes. They organize
societies, and a certain evolution is said to be
taking place in their customary costume.

Polygamy is not generally practised or ap-
proved in Persia; and it is probable that if the
legal and social facts were fully set forth, it would
not figure as a recognized institution at all.
There is doubtless as much sentiment in Persia
against indiscriminate marrying and loose sexual
relations as there is in Western countries, —
possibly more, — and it would be extremely dif-
ficult for a Westerner with facts available for a
fair comparison on this subject, if he were honest
with himself, to place the Persian on a lower
moral plane than himself with respect to sexual
morality or the sanctity of the family.

Of^the administrative branches of the Oovern-
ment, the most important and significant is the
Ministry of War, which is headed by Beza Khan
Pahlevi and which has jurisdiction over the army,
the Amnieh (Road Guards), and the police of
the city of Teheran. The regular army is stated
to enroll forty thousand men. It is recruited
partly by individual volunteers and partly by
soldiers furnished by the villages in proportion

147

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

roughly to the size of the village. The military
forces are entirely Persian in personnel. The
army oflScers, in many cases, have been trained
in foreign countries or under British, Swedish,
and Russian officers, while the police force was
organized and was until 1923 under the direction
of Swedish officials. The army is equipped with
motor-trucks, a few armored cars, tanks, and
aeroplanes, and has a high-power wireless station
at Teheran, with branch stations in the provincial
centers. While the army is neither organized nor
adequate for aggressive purposes, it is, to judge
by its accomplishments, well adapted and efficient
for the maintenance of order within the country.
There is a uniformed police “force" in all the
larger cities, the police of Teheran comparing
favorably with police organizations in other
countries. The Amnieh or Road Guards;; are
stationed along the highways and keep them so
safe that automobiles run at night on the northern
roads and there is little banditry in any part of
Persia.

Persia, for purposes of administration, is
divided into twenty-six provinces, which are gov-
erned by governor-generals, who in many cases
at present are military officers of high rank. The
provincial governors are directly responsible to
the Central Government and come under the juris-
diction of the Ministry of the Interior. The

148

PERSIAN POLITICS

cities and toyms are in general governed by
municipal conunissions. The last vestiges of the
ancient satrapal system of local administration
are rapidly disappearing in Persia. For a long
time after its forms had vanished, its spirit re-
mained; for governors and financial agents
bought their jobs and preyed on the people for
their compensation. Administrative services,
such as the post, telegraphs, mint, and the collec-
tion of various taxes, were farmed out. As a
result, administration became local and personal
and there were no uniform regulations applying
to the whole country. To-day, modern and uni-
form principles of administration are becoming
universal. In reacting from the ancient methods
of oppression, there has possibly been a too great
tendency toward centralization. The Constitu-
tion provides that throughout the empire provin-
cial and departmental councils (anjumans) shall
be established, the members of which shall be
elected by the local inhabitants; and legal provi-
sion has already been made for the election of
rural and town councils.

149

CHAPTER VI

USING STRANGE TOOLS

Had Wells’s “First Men in the Moon”
been the advance-guard of a foreign
financial mission- employed by the ant in-
habitants of our satellite, their experiences would
have been indeed exciting. They would doubtless
have had to use curious mechanical antennae, cal-
endars as different from ours as the hour-glass
or sun-dial is from the clock; and what troubles
they would have had with their piping insect in-
terpreters! A twentieth-century American- going
to Persia carries an equipment of language,
script, calendar, nomenclature, and habits of
work; but these, unluckily for him, arc not those
to which the Persians are in general accustomed.
He must learn other ways of working. He must
not only adapt himself to the psychology of the
people, their social life, and their political insti-
tutions, but also consciously and continually
guard against a hundred possibilities of error and
misunderstanding which arise through the em-
ployment of unfamiliar tools and instrumentali-
ties.

150

USING STRANGE TOOLS

The difference in language is a serious one. I
have yet to enlist as a member of the Financial
Mission an American who can speak or write the
Persian language. It is not, however, a difficult
language to learn to speak. Mr. Pearson and Mr.
Flannagan in a few months made encouraging
progress toward mastering the spoken language.
It contains few inflections, and rolling from the
tongue of a cultured Persian, it delights the ear
with its sonorous measured cadence. The script,
which runs from right to left, resembles in ap-
pearance tightly written American shorthand,
and except after painful study it is as impenetra-
ble as a jungle. Persians pride themselves on the
correctness of their speech, but they pride them-
selves’ still more on legible and beautiful hand-
writing. A page of Persian written by a good
scribe is as artistic as a medieval manuscript.
The line is kept scrupulously straight except for a
graceful upward curve at the left and abounds
in shadings and delicate tracery. So compact is
it, that it covers usually not more than one third
of the space of the equivalent in English.

If the Persians had not been linguists, or if they
had not shown their cosmopolitanism before we
came, by the acquisition of foreign languages, our
task would have been not merely difficult but im-
possible. Almost all Persians in official life, in-
cluding thousands of subordinate employees in

151

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

the administrations, speak, read, and write
French. Hundreds of them know English in ad-
dition to French, and many have an excellent com-
mand of our own tongue. Of the more distin-
guished public men, Motamen ol Molk, the Presi-
dent of the Majless, Zoka ol Molk, the Minister
of Finance, and deputies such as Hossein Khan
Alai, Arbab Khaikrosrow, and Taghi Zadeh, speak
excellent English. Others speak it well enough to
carry on conversations without an interpreter.
There are also, of course, numerous Persians with
a knowledge of Turkish and Russian and some
who are acquainted with German. A few of the
members of the American Mission speak French ;
but in the main, our chief reliance in conversa-
tions with Persians, other than those who under-
stand English, has been on English-speaking Per-
sian interpreters.

Each of the Americans — ^with the exception of
’Major Hall, who uses French — ^has a staff of
young Persians engaged in translating and inter-
preting. I have in my own ofiBce a Persian secre-
tary named Merat, a Persian typist named Khalil
Meskin, and a staff of interpreters, translators,
and copyists headed by an active youth named
Ettesami. "With the exception of two or three
copyists, all know English. In addition, I have
for my more important conferences and corre-
spondence, and particularly for the translation of

152

USING STRANGE TOOLS

my quarterly reports, an able Armenian Persian
of middle age, named Mirzayantz, who has seen
service in the Majless, who enjoys an exceptional
acquaintance and a high reputation among Per-
sian patriots and politicians, and who speaks
Persian, Armenian, French, and English. Af-
shar, who in the beginning was chief interpreter,
spoke Persian, English, French, Turkish, and
Arabic. Most of the English-speaking Persians
received their education in the American School
at Teheran and gained with the language some-
thing of the American conception of honor and
hard work. It is no discredit to the other Per-
sians who are associated with us, to state that it
is the increasing group of English-speaking Per-
sians, most of them young, who have been our in-
dispensable assistants.

To say that the Persians are good interpreters
is to pay them a compliment, for interpreting de-
mands to the utmost an alert intelligence, tact,
and resourcefulness. An interpreter cannot, like
a translator, thumb the pages of a dictionary.
He must have two vocabularies at his tongue’s
end, and he must not only be able to put English
words into Persian words or vice versa but also
know the delicate shades of meaning that you put
into words, and, too, the spirit that goes into the
speaking of the words. The interpreter should
convey exactly in one language what you seek to

153

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

convey in another, and shonld do it in thp same
tone, whether of cordiality, formality, cpldness,
emphasis, or anger. A first-class interpreter will
accurately sense your mood and purpose, often,
perhaps unconsciously, punctuating his interpre-
tations with the emphasis, gestures, sn^iles, and
laughs that you have added to your remarks.

It is a tribute to the character of the young Per-
sian to add that the instances in our experience
where an interpreter or translator has attempted
to misuse his peculiarly responsible position are
so rare as to be virtually negligible. There was
at first a natural and rather wide-spread feeling,
particularly among those who had met with disap-
pointment in their conversations and correspond-
ence with us, to charge their failures to our Per-
sian interpreters or translators, accusing the lat-
ter of keeping letters, from our sight or of
suppressing or coloring essential portions of con-
versations. Charges have been made, also, that
some of our interpreters and translators were
secretly intriguing with the enemies of the Ameri-
can Mission, and were deliberately putting our
words into discourteous Persian phrases in order
to set our friends and the public against us. In
my opinion, after the application of careful
checks, these charges appear to be ninety-nine and
forty-four hundredths per cent, untrue. As an
example of the feeling of our correspondents on

154

USING STRANGE TOOLS

this score, I quote below a routine English trans-
lation of a letter received in my oflSce from one
having a claim against the Adaainistration of
Posts :

Administrator General op the Finances:

I beg to say that you have said, in reply to the petition
of 14/7/03 through the administration of accounts under
No. 18604 dated 29/7/03, that you will inquire about my
demand from the Government transportation and then
will answer me. In 10/6/2 and 26 Safar 1342 I peti-
tioned concerning this fact. You have written under
No. 12771 that after investigating and getting informa-
tion from the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs you
will answer me. Now I am for fifteen months idle and
it is nearly eighteen months that my money is by your
order suspended and myself distressed and suffered dam-
ages. Is it fair to vex and annoy God's slaves? We
are like a bug whose abode is ruined by a dew. I can
find no sin or fault with myself save that I have ren-
dered service to my own Government in such a way that
the Post should not be detained. After four months of
idleness and spending one hundred tomans in the center,
they answer that I have to wait until the order for pay-
ment should be issued by you. 0 ! Sir ! 0, my mas-
ter! I have neither Noah's age, nor the Koran's
treasure, nor Job's patience. I helplessly solicit you to
command that the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs
should order the administration of Governmental trans-
portation to pay my just demand for eleven hundred
tomans and a fraction. By all the saints and by your

155

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

own honor and conscience, order them to pay my money,
so that I too, ^ould pay my creditors and in the com-
mencing winter be free from the misery of strangeness
and return back to my own nativity and, with a family
of twelve persons, pray for you. Command is your
Command,

Mohamed Hussain op Ispahan,
Resident in Eermanshah
without food and clothes.

{In caravanserai of Seka Bashi, 0 God, death or sal-
vation! If the translator does not translate this petition
in full, word for word, he may he cursed by God and
execrated by the apostle, so that Dr. Millspaugh should
peruse it and be informed of this miserable affliction.).

Another correspondent, also with his eye on the
translator, added the following:

May I be sacrificed to you : though it is unreasonable
emphasy but I request that this letter should be per-
fectly translated that you might favor one of your kind
too. Please excuse me for this remind.

It is the chance of honest error, not the inten-
tion to misinterpret or mistranslate, which con-
stitutes the problem. For months we had an
amicable disagreement with the Minister of Fi-
nance over the meaning of a certain provision of
the Civil Service Law. Finally, we were forced
to recede from our position when we found that
our English translation of the clause contained
the word “salary” when the Persian word should

156

USING STRANGE TOOLS

have been translated “pension.” Many errors
in translation are merely mistakes in spelling.
A letter may be addressed to the “Costumes”
Administration, but we send it to the customs,
not to Paris; and when a Persian translator
speaks of “passports and their vices,” we agree
from experience that visas have little of the qual-
ity of virtue. The chances of honest error are
high. It is difficult at the best for an American,
with an intellectual apparatus of American make,
to convey his ideas to another person, who may
be equally intelligent but who has a mental equip-
ment of different origin and different operation.
Most of the technical words in the vocabulary of
modern science, industry, banking, and commer-
cial law are unknown to the Persian and have no
equivalents in the Persian language. For ex-
ample, the expression “and/or” used in a pro-
posed concession was impossible of translation
into Persian and tended to obscure the meaning
of the whole document ; and much correspondence
and some expense were caused by our failure in
drafting a circular to explain clearly the dif-
ference between “accounting” forms and “ac-
countable” forms. Persian interpreters and
translators, moreover, have in many cases merely
a book or school knowledge of English without
much understanding of the idioms which are the
living flesh of our language or of the abstract

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

words which clothe our reasoning. On the other
hand, curiously enough, some Persians speak and
write better in English than they do in their own
language. I have been dazed by hearing from a
Persian, “So-and-so in your office knows English,
but he doesn’t know Persian.”

I am told that Persian is primarily a literary
language; and when the polite and poetical
phrases are omitted, it strikes one as awkward,
incorrect, or discourteous. Young men are dis-
posed sometimes to be a little impatient of lingual
adornment and to give our blunt American bus-
iness phraseology a too-literal Persian transla-
tion. For example, I wrote a letter at one time in
which I ventured the opinion that the Budget
Commission of the Majlcss had pursued a short-
sighted policy. In the Persian of my letter, -a
word was used for “short-sighted” which in-
variably gives offense to Persians; and to make
matters worse, this word appears to have been
applied to the members of the commission rather
than to their policy. Accordingly, interpretation
and translation not only retard the routine work
of administration but also consume the additional
time and energy required for explanations and
corrections.

According to the law and my contract, all offi-
cial books, records, and correspondence in the
financial administration must be in the Persian

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USING STRANGE TOOLS

language; but, to reduce so far as possible errors
and misunderstandings, we have all the outgoing
and most of the incoming correspondence trans-
lated into English and keep in the files both the
Persian and the English; many of the important
letters which I address to the Prime Minister, the
ministers, or the deputies are written and sent
with the English and Persian in parallel col-
umns; we have cautioned our translators and
interpreters to put the meaning of the English
into courteous literary Persian; and we have
ourselves taken cdre to speak and write in
simple, clear English, avoiding legal circumlocu-
tions and technical financial expressions. On the
whole the gap between the two languages has
been bridged Vdth fair success ; and the use of an
interpreter has at least one advantage: it gives
time to think during a conversation.

That tfanslation difficulties are not peculiar to
the American Mission, is shown by the following
excerpt from a Teheran newspaper :

We are informed that certain differences were created
ip the translation of the treaty between the Russian and
Persian Governments from French to Persian language
and now the matter is under discussion between the Rus-
sian Legation and the Ministry of Poreign Affairs. We
wonder how it has been signed.

Much of the discussions with the Russian lega-
tion concerning the fisheries turned on the word

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

“exploitation,” •which occurs in the Russian text
but not in the Persian, while the treaty says that
both texts shall be of equal authority.

With regard to quantity of correspondence,
Persian administrations handle as much paper as
any bureau at Washington, with probably less
red-tape, and their filing systems are efficient.
Persian ministers appear to have felt in the past
that government records were their private prop-
erty, and they acted accordingly — ^with, at times,
disastrous results to the Government. At pres-
ent, however, government documents are better
safeguarded. Many valuable records regarding
taxation and accounts are still in the hands of the
old mosto'wfis, who in most cases were honest and
experienced but who considered their fiscal rec-
ords as much their private property as a lawyer
or a physician does his o'wn library. Labor-
saving office devices are of course less necessary
where labor is cheap, and I have seen in Persia
no adding machines, cash registers, or other
mechanical appliances which are common in
American offices. There are to my knowledge no
Persian stenographers, and all of the American
members of our mission have worked for more
than a year without stenographic assistance.
The proceedings of the Majless are taken down
by a group of four young men who write by turn
in longhand; one starts when the leader touches

160

His Imperial Highness, the Valiahd, Crown Prince of Persia

USING STRANGE TOOLS

him on the shoulder and writes rapidly to the
point at which the signal is given to another. A
number of typewriters, operated by Persian typ-
ists, are in use, and some of them type in the Per-
sian language. Since our arrival, the few printed
forms that were then in use have been increased
in number, until now financial reporting and other
routine operations are conducted by the use of
appropriate forms. We have introduced the in-
delible pencil and carbon paper in the preparation
of duplicates.

The telephone system in Teheran is well in-
stalled and well conducted from the business
standpoint, and the service, which is now some-
what slow and exasperating, promises improve-
ment. The habit of calling your party by name
instead of by number causes some confusion.
Telegraph wires connect all of the principal
points in Persia, and telegraphing is cheap. The
fire-hazard in Persian cities would appear to be
serious; there is no fire-proof construction and
there are, except possibly in Rasht and one or two
other places, no fire departments. The Ministry
of Finance building burned seven years ago, and
the destruction of a part of the archives on that
occasion has embarrassed us somewhat in the
handling of old cases. Fires, however, are not
frequent in Persia.

It is a common remark that time means nothing
161

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

to an Oriental ; but an American working in Per-
sia soon learns the falsity of this generalization.
Time in Persia means a working knowledge of at
least three calendars. Furthermore, .when the
Persians see something wrong with their own
official calendar, instead of talking about it inter-
minably, they change it. The American Mission
in 'its official functioning has followed the^ Persian
solar year, beginning with Now-Ruz (New Year’s
Day), which falls on the first of Farvardin ac-
cording to the new Persian calendar and on
March 22 according to our calendar. The Arabs
are said to have introduced into Persia the lunar
year, consisting of three hundred fifty-four and
one half days and beginning on the first of Mohar-
ram. The length of the lunar month varies from
twenty-nine to thirty days, and the months are
movable according to the phases of the moon. In
1923, the first of Moharram fell on the foui^eenth
of August ; in 1924, it fell on the third of August.
The religious feasts and holidays are determined
by the lunar calendar and are likewise movable.
Both the Persian solar year and the Arabic lunar
year date from the Hejira of Mohammed in 622
A.D. ; and accordingly, when we arrived in Persia
in the fall of 1922 of the Christian era, we found
ourselves in the solar year 1301 and the lunar
year 1341. The fiscal year, fortunately, corres-
ponds with the calendar solar year. Another pe-

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USING STRANGE TOOLS

culiarity of the solar chronology is that the years
not only are numbered but have also been given,
in cycles of twelve, the names of animals. When
we arrived in Persia, we were near the end of a
cycle, the year 1301 being It-Il, the Year of the
Dog. The following year, 1302, was Tangouz-Il
the Year of the Hog; the next was Sitchghan-Il,
the Year of the Rat; and the present year is
Oud-Il, the Year of the Ox. Other years in the
cycle are named after the leopard, hare, whale,
serpent, horse, sheep, monkey, and chicken. This
cycle of years is said to have been introduced into
Persia by the Mongols, and the years so named
are called Turkish years.

The Persian months, twelve in number, are sup-
posed to correspond to the twelve signs of the
Zodiac. Up to Now-Ruz, 1.304 (i. e., March 22,
1925), the months bore Arabic names; but some
weeks previously, in accordance with the nation-
alistic trend, a number of deputies had submitted
to the Majless a bill for changing the names of the
months from Arabic to Persian and making cer-
tain changes in the length of the months. On the
last day of March, the Majless passed the law,
which legalizes the Persian solar year beginning
with the Hejira and provides that “the year-
counting method being incorrect, beginning with
the approval of this law the Turkish names which
have been customary in previous calendars shall

163

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

be annulled.” According to the new calendar,
the months are as follows: “Farvardin, Ordib-
ehesht, Khordad, Tir, Amordad, Shahrinar, Mehr,
Aban, Azar, Dei, Bahman, and Estand. ’ ’ The first
six months have thirty-one days each; the next
five, thirty days; and the twelfth month, twenty-
nine days, with an additional day in leap-years.
By abolishing, in this law, the twelve-year cycle
with its year names, the Majless took a step which
will preclude much confusipn in the records of the
Government as well as in private transactions.

The Persian week is of seven days, and the
Persian day is, according to the clock, precisely
the same as ours. I say “according to the clock,”
but the Persian’s day is regulated less by the clock
than by the rising and setting of the sun. This
fact is an important consideration in fixing the
working hours in the government administrations.
Formerly, there had been in the ministries a Single
forenoon session in the summer and a two-session
working day during the remainder of the year.
A two-session working day, however, requires a
two-hour intermission for luncheon, because Per-
sian Government employees, having no quick-
lunch counters or cafeterias to go to, ordinarily
take their meals at home, and generally they live
at a distance from the ministries. To avoid this
intermission and to enable the employees to save
the midday carriage fares to and from their

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USING STRANGE TOOLS

homes, the subordinate employees and many of
the high officials have favored a one-session day
the year round. The Persian habit of rising with
the sun, however, requires that the beginning of
their working day shall be at least an hour after
sunrise. Accordingly, our working day has be-
come almost as movable as the feasts and mourn-
ings.

There are many holidays in Persia. In addi-
tion to every Friday, which is the Mohammedan
Sabbath, the calendar for the present solar year,
1304, shows twenty-five holidays. In addition to
the numerous religious holidays, the Persians
celebrate Now-Ruz, the birthday, accession, and
coronation of the Shah, and the anniversary of
the Constitution.

When the Persian refers to an “evening” of a
certain day, he is likely to have in mind, as we do
in speaking of Christmas Eve, the evening before
the day. On one occasion Mrs. Millspaugh hired
a juggler to come to the house on Thursday eve-
ning to entertain some dinner guests. To our
surprise, he came on Wednesday evening.

The climate of Persia creates no serious dif-
ficulties in administrative work. The offices are
airy, the temperature in the summer does not get
high before noon, and one who dislikes drafts and
whirling papers is thankful that electric fans are
not procurable. Most of the Persian officials and

165

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

foreigners, including all of the legations, go at the
end of May to summer homes at the foot of the
Elburz Mountains and return to the city early in
October. Eight or nine miles from Teheran,
picturesque villages nestle among the foot-hills
and cling to the lower slopes of the mountains.
The “up-country” gardens in these villages are
delightfully cool, and in the past some of the ad-
ministrations have been transferred bodily from
the city. At the worst, the heat in the city during
July and August is not extreme and is probably
no worse than in New York or Washington.

The system of weights and measures in Persia
has been neither uniform nor exact. The ordinary
unit of weight is the batman or man of Tabriz,
equal to 6.495 pounds or 2.946 kilograms. Two
other batmans have been in use, the so-called bat-
man of the Shah, equal to two Tabriz batmans,
and the batman of Rey, equal to four times thdt of
Tabriz. The kharvar is equal to one hundred bat-
mans. The unit of measure is the sar, of which
the one most commonly in use is about forty-one
inches. The farsakh of six thousand zars, ap-
proximately four miles, is theoretically the dis-
tance that can be walked by a horse in one hour.
One of the first acts of Eeza Khan Pahlevi, when
he became Prime Minister, was to order the for-
mation of a conunission to establish a uniform
system of weights and measures. The new sys-

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USING STRANGE TOOLS

tern which has now been proposed by the commis-
sion, is based on the metric system and will elimi-
nate the confusion which has formerly existed.
The units of currency are convenient, the toman
consisting of ten krans and the kran of twenty
chats.

A source of much confusion, which has now,
happily, been removed by the progressive action
of the present Government, existed in the names
and titles which were borne by Persians. Not
long ago family names were unknown in Persia ;
and individuals were usually called Reza, Moham-
ed, Ahmad, Hossein, Ali, Abdullah, and their
variations, any one of which was more common
in Persia than our familiar John, George, James,
or Charles has ever been in America. When a
letter was signed Mahmoud or Hassan, therefore,
it was often difficult to tell, without investigation,
which of a dozen individuals had written the let-
ter. The titles granted by the Shah had served
to some extent to remove the confusion; but the
titles also bore a similarity one to another, and
in some cases the same title was given to two or
more persons. Accordingly, the Government
some time ago provided that every Persian must
take a family name. When we arrived in Persia,
there were Persians who were known by their in-
dividual names only, a larger number known by
family names, and a host of others known only by

167

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

their titles. The word Khan, formerly a tribal
title, has become universalized in Persia and is
found in the names of virtually all Persians high
or low. The title Mirza, preceding a name, indi-
cates an educated person and most of the govern-
ment employees are Mirzas; but following the
name, Mirza signifies a prince of the royal family,
while Zadeh in that position has the same con-
notation as the suffix in Johnson or the prefix in
McDonald. A 8 eyed is a descendant of the
Prophet; a Haji is one who has made the pil-
grimage to Mecca. To a stranger accustomed
to American family names, the use of titles
as names seems of slight value in distinguishing
one person from another, particularly as the
Persian of the titles bore in some cases a strik-
ing similarity ; for example, Nassir ol Molk, Nasr
ol Molk, and Nassir os Saltaneh are three promi-
nent Persians of different families. In addition
to numerous civil titles, there were also a num-
ber of military titles. Parliament, therefore, in
its session of May 5, 1925, passed the following
law:

Article I. The National Consultative Assembly
hereby annuls the following military titles and ranks:
Sepahsalar, Sepahdar, Sardar, Sepahbod with or with-
out a supplement — Emir-Nouyan, Emir-Touman, Emir-
Pan j, as well as other titles that are followed or pre-

168

USING STRANGE TOOLS

ceded by words such as Sepah, Lashgar, Jang, Salar,
Nezam and Emir.

Abticli] II. No titles such as those stated in Article
I shall hereafter be granted.

Article III. All civil titles shall, after three months
from the date of passage of this law, be annulled.

Official ceremonials constitute a pleasant inter-
lude in our work. The foreign employees of the
Government appear with the Persians at official
receptions, at the ceremony of opening the Maj-
less, at the Shah’s reception at Now-Euz, and at
the Court Salaams; and at most such times we
wear over our frock-coats the djobbeh, a decorated
robe with long, loose sleeves, and the kola, the
ordinary black cap of the Persians.

Naturally, an official of the Persian finances re-
ceives many communications, written and oral,
ranging from dignified and scholarly presenta-
tions of fact to petitions which would be amus-
ing if they did not also touch the heart. I have
received more than one petition from peasants
which, for lack of seals and signatures, have been
subscribed by thumb-impressions in ink. Many
such communications carry between the lines a so-
cial or economic implication or a bit of human in-
terest no less important than the intended mes-
sage of the letter. I shall close this chapter by
quoting exactly a letter of application written by

169

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

a Persian in English. It is not given in any sense
as a typical piece of Persian correspondence, but
it illustrates fairly well a phase of our experience
as well as a phase of Persian life.

Your Excellency:

This statement which it will kiss your honorable knee
and lap, it is send from one old Pupiles of your scool
in Teheran, who had been once an orphan having noth-
ing in the world except God. His highness guide me
to you little by little by good wish and kindness of your
kind nation I became prosperous instructed and edu-
cated. I know today English, medicine and Persian
languages pretty well, so that which I have, I have from
unlimited gracious and mercy of American people,
therefore I am in debt to them through the close of my
life, praying to God, to bless them, make them success-
ful in their service, increase their spirituality, and sub-
vert their bad wishers, and place most of nations under
your authority and control like unto us, v

My lord, I am sure in these few months you have un-
derstand much more than ourselves about our poverty,
wretchedness, and miserable condition, our present po-
sition dejected me so much that I quit my medical prac-
tice, obligely and with more difficulty I earn my daily
bread by teaching [English] to the poor people of
Resht. Your heartily witness will satisfy and content
you the truth of my talk, God knows with a heart full
of love and hope I desire to be received with you to your
honorary service and serve you honestly as Interpreter
or [secret explorer] at tributary office in Resht or

170

USING STRANGE TOOLS

Teheran or elsewhere, Hope your high position will not
deprive me of this request as others did at the begin-
ning. With complete humility I trust to your humanity
and kindness.

171

CHAPTER VII

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

The present chapter will carry our" story to
the premiership of Reza Khan Pahlevi,
beginning in October, 1923. During this
period of about ten months there were three gov-
ernments— ^those headed by Ghavam os Saltaneh,
Mostowfi ol Memalek, and Muchir ed Dowleh —
and four ministers of finance — Pahim ol Molk,
Nasr ol Molk, Baha ol Molk, and Zoka ol Molk.
The fourth Majless, which was in session on our
arrival, came to an end on June 22, 1923.‘ The
elections of the new deputies occurred in th,e sum-
mer and fall, but the fifth Majless did not open
until January, 1924.

During most of this period, the American Mis-
sion was at its full strength. Conditions in the
Ministry of Public Works, however, required the
presence of an American, particularly for the
supervision of expenditures on the roads. Mokh-
ber os Saltaneh, the Minister of Public Works,
— ^wbo was friendly to us, — agreed to the transfer
to that ministry of Mr. Mitchell, who is a civil
engineer with experience in road-construction, to

172

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

act as Director of Roads. A little later, the en-
tire organization in the Ministry of Public Works
devoted to the collection of road tolls was trans-
ferred to the Ministry of Finance.^ In the late
summer, Dr. Bogart, who had been employed for
one year, returned to America, and Mr. Early, on
account of illness, terminated his services. The
American experts for the administration of
Teheran municipality, through the untimely death
of Dr. Ryan, also had virtually ceased to func-
tion.

From the start, due to the decreasing number of
the mission and to the addition of new services
to the Ministry of Finance, the Americans have
been forced from time to time to take on more and
more work. Not one of my colleagues has ever
demurred, although in a few months the burden
that they bore was fairly staggering.

The frequent changes of government tended to
complicate our work. After the government fell,
it was days or even weeks before its successor was
completely formed and introduced to the Majless.
During this time, we had no Minister of Finance,
and although the under-secretary took the min-
ister’s desk, he was not clothed with the power of
approving expenditures. The passing of a prime

lUpon the transfer of Mr. Mitchell to the Ministry of Public
Works, Mr. Early became Director of Indirect Taxation, and
Colonel MacCormack, along with his other duties, became Di-
rector of Direct Taxation.

173

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

minister or a minister of finance meant a period
of partial paralysis.

Nevertheless, we were able to proceed without
interruption to the reorganization of the financial
administration. Numerous transfers were made
for the purpose of centralizing functions and re-
sponsibility. In addition to the customs agents on
the frontiers, there had been, in general, -two sets
of finance representatives in the provinces: the
financial agents in charge of disbursements and
general collections, and the indirect-tax agents,
reporting directly to the Administration of Indi-
rect Taxation. The latter were now incorporated
into the financial agencies, and the same action
was taken somewhat later with regard to' the ali-
mentation agents. After the departure of Mr.
Early, in the fall of 1923, all the branches of the
ministry having to do with the collection of inter-
nal taxes or other sources of revenue, wefe con-
solidated into the Administration of Internal
Revenue, and Colonel MacCormack was appointed
director of the new administration.

The first ten months saw, on the whole, steady
progress in our work; but the “honeymoon” of
the mission was soon over.

Opposition was of course inevitable, and it arose
first in connection with questions of personnel.
In its contract with me, the Government had
agreed to follow my recommendations regarding

174

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

the appointment, promotion, transfer, demotion,
and dismissal of employees in the Ministry of Fi-
nance and its various branches, and in the fiscal
ofSces of the other ministries. The several min-
isters of finance gave me much helpful advice, but
they never refused to follow my recommenda-
tions; and the responsibility for all such matters
settled, of course, on my shoulders. The person-
nel with which we had to deal shaded into various
classes: the active employees who were appar-
ently honest and competent ; those who were ap-
parently dishonest or incompetent; the dispon-
ibles who had good reputations, and the dispon-
ibles who had in Persian parlance “spotted”
dossiers. Many whose competency or honesty
might be questioned had powerful friends or pow-
erful enemies, while a few, for one reason or an-
other, could be appointed or dismissed without
causing a ripple outside the ministry. The Per-
sians who were interested in our success took
pains to impress upon us the extreme importance
of selecting good men for our assistants, and
those who advised us usually had from one to a
score to recommend. Many Persians expected
to see us inaugurate an immediate and general
housecleaning, while others, indifferent to the per-
sonnel in general, expected the appointment of
their friends and the dismissal of their enemies.
From the beginning it was our intention to deal

175

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

with each personnel case on its merits, to disre-
gard in appointments and dismissals any con-
siderations of the personal or political influence of
the candidate or of his friends or enemies, and
never to act in such a matter solely on the recom-
mendation of any one, even the Prime Minister,
a minister, or a deputy.

We included in the Civil Service Regulations a
clause prohibiting the employees of the financial
administration from participating in politics ; and
when the elections were begun, we issued a special
instruction warning the financial agents that they
must not use their administrative powers for or
against any candidates. There were numerous
complaints, however, that financial agents and
tax-collectors were interfering in the elections;
and we had to be wary in handling these com-
plaints, because in some instances they appeared
to be prompted more by a desire to escape the
payment of taxes than to preserve the non-
partisanship of our civil service. The following,
for example, signed by four names, was published
in a Teheran newspaper:

We, the undersigned, swear, and beg you to publish
our declaration, that, at the time A. B. was Minister of
Finance, the regions were sold. For Example, Shah-
roud was sold for Ts 370 to C. D. and in return he has
obtained about three thousand tomans from the people
by force and now ... he has sent out men to get votes.

176

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

Two of his men are working in the town and two oth-
ers in the villages. Any place that gives more votes is
free from payment of khanevari. 0 God ! King ! Dr.
Millspaugh! Should not we farmers have freedom to
elect our own deputies? We leave our houses and flee
to Estrabad . . .

Setting out to determine for ourselves the actual
merit of various Persians whom we had never pre-
viously known, we naturally acted slowly and dis-
appointed most of those who were in any way in-
terested in personnel. As soon as I was satisfied
that an employee was unfit, I recommended his
removal if there were a better man, unemployed,
to take his place — scrupulously refraining from
any inquiry regarding the family or political con-
nections of either man. In making dismissals
and appointments according to this plan, I was of
course acting contrary to all the accepted rules of
the political game; and it was not long before I
had stepped on several very sensitive toes and
two or three well-populated hornets’ nests. For
example, an influential clerical wrote me in effect
as follows : “You have in the last few weeks dis-
missed my son and my two nephews, in fact all
the members of my family who were working in
the financial administration. Why do you show
■such enmity toward my family?” With this par-
ticular patriarch, I had two hours of discussion
one morning before going to my office. I tried as

177

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

best I could to mollify injured feelings. Fre-
quently, I could cite a budgetary deficiency or an
administrative adjustment that compelled the dis-
missal ; in many cases there were specific charges
of misconduct which required suspension and trial.
In all cases, however, I pointed out that were the
mission to act according to family or political in-
fluence, the conditions in the Ministry of Finance
would be precisely the same as before our arrival,
when the head of the ministry had been subject to
influence. Particularly difficult were the cases of
those who were too old for active employment or
who were honest but lacking in energy or technical
fitness. It was difficult for those concerned to
grasp the idea that, while aiming to be just, we
were cold-blooded exponents of efficiency, not
benevolent patrons of an old men’s home. . At the
end of a few months, we had removed or trans-
ferred most of the financial agents and many of
the other employees and had appointed a number
of the best disponibles ; and as soon as it dawned
on the employees that we were seeking merit and
were not moved by political or personal considera-
tions, the morale and work of the employees be-
came noticeably better.

There was a question whether or not the under-
secretary was legally an employee of the minis-
try and covered by my contract. The under-
secretary had no lack of information and energy,

178

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

but, irrespective of the question of precedence,
which had not been settled, he did not appear to
be wholly sympathetic toward our purpose to ex-
ercise our full powers.

When I discovered, therefore, that he had or-
dered the Customs Administration, without my
knowledge or approval, to release about four hun-
dred thousand tomans’ worth of cotton held by the
Government to guarantee the debt of a bankrupt
firm, I recommended his dismissal; and in his
place the ministry appointed on my recommenda-
tion Mirza Mohamed Ali Khan Farzin, who has
served continuously since — an honest, experi-
enced, and capable financial official who as par-
liamentary under-secretary is particularly effec-
tive when defending financial projects of law in
the Majless.

The disponibles, due to budgetary limitations,
could not all be appointed. A number of them
organized, started newspaper propaganda against
the American Mission, brought pressure to bear
on deputies, and intrigued with our enemies. The
Civil Service Law provided for the payment to
all disponibles of a percentage of their last sal-
aries. During the first year, there was no provi-
sion in the budget for this expenditure, and our
refusal to make the payments naturally tended
to increase the bitterness of the disponibles
against us.

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

The Civil Service Law, which was passed soon
after our arrival and which took effect on the first
day of 1302, brought down on our heads a double
load of work and criticism. The law classifies
employees into nine grades and fixes a minimum
and maximum salary for each grade. The mini-
mum salary of the first grade is thirty-two tomans
a month ; the maximum salary of the ninth grade,
three hundred and twelve. Provision was made
in the law for the subaltern employees, those re-
ceiving less than thirty-two tomans, who consti-
tute about one half of the six thousand employees
in the financial administration. Since it was im-
possible at that time to re-classify the employees
according to the work that they were doing, we
fixed their grades and salaries to correspond as
closely as possible with the salaries that they were
then receiving. Absolute justice was out of the
question, and there was, naturally, much dissatis-
faction.

The Constitution prescribes that the construc-
tion and regulation of the budget of the Govern-
ment shall be subject to the approval of the Maj-
less, and that the budget of each ministry shall
be completed during the latter half of each year
for the following year and shall be ready fifteen
days before Now-Euz. The General Accounting
Law prescribes that each minister must send his
budget to the Ministry of Finance during the first

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GETTING DOWN TO WORK

three months of the year, and that the Minister of
Finance, after centralizing all the ministry budg-
ets, and adding the estimates of revenue, must
send the completed budget to the Majless during
the first days of the second half of the year, to be
approved by the Majless, at the latest, fifteen
days before Now-Ruz. In my contract, I was
given authority to prepare the government
budget; but in view of the existing constitutional
and legal provisions, it appeared that my budget-
ary duties began when the ministers had sub-
mitted their estimates to the Ministry of Finance.
Although I arrived in Persia in the eighth month
of 1301, the Majless had not yet passed the com-
plete budget of that year, and the ministry esti-
mates for 1302 were not yet available. Fahim ol
Molk, however, had already requested the various
ministries to prepare their estimates of expendi-
ture for the next fiscal year. After our arrival, a
commission was immediately appointed in the
Ministry of Finance to prepare estimates of rev-
enue for 1302 ; and from the start, I insisted on a
balanced budget — ^i. e., that the estimates of ex-
penditure should not exceed the estimates of rev-
enue.

The making of our first budget was a hurried
and a hit-and-miss affair. There was no budget
office in existence. The constitutional and legal
provisions, regarding preparation and passing of

181

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

the budget, while fairly good in principle, had
never in practice been observed. The accounts of
expenditures were incomplete and threw little
light on the needs of the ministries. We had no
time to make the necessary investigations. We
therefore submitted to the Government our esti-
mates of revenue and our suggestions, based on
the budget of 1301, of the amounts that might be
allotted to the various ministries in the follow-
ing year, leaving to the ministers themselves the
itemization of their expenditures. Our experi-
ence with the budget would have taught us — had
we not guessed it before — that official human na-
ture is much the same in Persia as in other coun-
tries, The ministers threw up their hands in
horror at our allotments. They pleaded the ab-
solute necessity of increased appropriations, and
the impossibility of dismissing employees for the
sake of economy. All accepted the principle of
a balanced budget, but each expected other min-
isters to do the pruning necessary to strike the
balance. When the question of the budget be-
came urgent, the Prime Minister was Mostowfl ol
Memalek, a gentle, lovable individual, who had
preserved through a long public career a distin-
guished reputation for sagacity, integrity, and
patriotism. He was in sympathy with the pur-
pose of the American Mission and genuinely de-
sired'financial reform, but, like any one else in his

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GETTING DOWN TO WORK

place, he hesitated to dictate to his ministers or
to take decisions which would result in the dismis-
sal of employees, or might in any other way alien-
ate political supporters. Finally, however, the
Minister of Finance and I discussed the matter
in the Council of Ministers, and after some
changes here and there which satisfied most of the
ministers, the budget showing a balance between
revenues and expenditures was sent to the Maj-
less.

The Chairman of the Budget Commission of the
Majless was Soleiman Mirza, an experienced par-
liamentarian, and its reporter, Firouz Mirza, a
highly intelligent scion of an influential family,
who was the generally recognized leader of the
majority in the Majless. The budget proposals
were handled by the commission with businesslike
despatch, and were approved by the Majless with-
out substantial change. Our first budget was sur-
prisingly workable. The receipts approximated
the estimates; with respect to expenditures, no
supplementary credits were required; and at the
end of the year the deficit was small compared
with that of the previous year, and there would
have been no deficit if we had not made large
payments on arreared obligations.

For the more elfective control of expenditures,
we prepared and submitted to the Majless a pro-
ject of law for the establishment of a Treasury-

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

General which should be one of the coordinate ad-
ministrations of the Ministry of Finance. This
law, passed by the Majless on Feburary 25, 1923,
provides that the Treasurer-General, until the
termination of my contract, shall be designated
by the Administrator-General of the Finances and
must be an American official. The Treasurer-
General is charged with receiving and. centraliz-
ing all government revenues ; and he is permitted
to disburse funds only upon requisitions which in
the first place shall have been certified, with re-
gard to their legality and budgetary credits, by
finance officials having no connection with the
Treasury-General, and in the second place shall
have been signed by the Minister of Finance and
myself. Penalties are provided in the law for
failure on the part of any revenue-collecting of-
ficial to deliver his receipts.

Upon the enactment of this law, Mr. McCaskey
was designated Treasurer-General and Mr. Gore
was appointed the principal officer to pass on
requisitions. When the organization of the new
administration was completed, the Minister of
Finance and I ceased to sign checks. Thereafter,
disbursements were made, except for petty pay-
ments, by checks on the Imperial Bank of Persia,
over the signature of Mr. McCaskey, on the au-
thority of requisitions signed by the minister and
myself, previously certified by Mr. Gore. The

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GETTING DOWN TO WORK

financial agents were instructed by the Treasurer-
General to remit all collections to the center and
arrangements were made with the Imperial Per-
sian Bank, as the depository of all public funds,
to handle these remittances without charge.

When the Administration of Indirect Taxation
was returned to the Ministry of Finance, we
learned that its budget for the year had already
been exceeded, and we therefore suspended fur-
ther payments to that administration until credits
could be obtained. Receiving no salaries, a group
of the employees threatened to strike, but we let
them know that if any employee quit work he
would be summarily dismissed. Although strikes
have since occurred in other ministries, there have
been none in the Ministry of Finance.

A large part of the debts due the Government
by Persians took the form of tax arrears. Our
delay in pressing for the collection of these debts
was criticized as due to lack of energy or cour-
age, but it was deliberate. The records were in
confusion and we wished to be sure of the facts
before taking action. Moreover, it seemed ad-
visable to get the routine work of the administra-
tions in good running order before undertaking
to make up for the shortcomings of the past.
Finally, we wished to convince all Persians — par-
ticularly those delinquents against whom we must
proceed — ^that we were acting fairly and thought-

185

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

fully, that we were carefully controlling the ex-
penditure of all moneys collected, and that we in-
tended to use in the general interest such control
as we had over the public funds. Measured by
Persian standards, the delinquent taxpayers were
not bad men. None of them, probably, had lost
many friends or much repute by reason of fail-
ure to pay taxes. A Persian landowner could
scarcely be blamed for dodging taxes at *a time
when the public revenues were wasted and when
the Government was giving the people a negligible
return in public service.

One of the delinquents was Sepahsalar Azam,
an aged grandee, a former Russian protege, and
a prime minister in the time of Shuster. When
approached with regard to the payment of his ar-
rear taxes, he invariably expressed complete will-
ingness to pay, but advanced substantial counter-
claims against the Government. We offered him
a settlement involving an immediate cash pay-
ment, the balance to be paid in instalments over
several years and to be secured by the revenues
of his villages. Finally, in the early summer of
1923, having made no progress in our negotiations,
we went to Reza Kahn Pahlevi and asked for his
assistance. Armed with his promise of support,
we made a final appeal to Sepahsalar. Finding
him as obdurate as ever, we ordered the finan-
cial agents to seize his properties. This action

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GETTING DOWN TO WORK

brought him to time, and an agreement for a
settlement of his debt was entered into with
him. This agreement took into consideration
his counter-claims and gave him the privilege of
paying in instalments.

Having settled with Sepahsalar Azam, we next
proceeded against the powerful Bakhtiari khans,
and succeeded by much the same methods in reach-
ing an agreement with them. In the meantime a
circular had been issued to the financial agents,
instructing them to proceed vigorously to the col-
lection of all tax arrears due in their districts,
laying down the simple general rule that each year
a taxpayer in arrears should pay an amount on
arrears equal to his current taxes. As the army
made progress in pacifying the tribes and bring-
ing rebellious local leaders under control, wo es-
tablished new sub-agencies and took steps to col-
lect the current and arrear taxes. In Azcrbaidjan
and Khorassan, Mr. Jones and Major Hall were
proceeding with success along the lines laid down
in the center. The agreements relative to tax ar-
rears have been in the main carried out with no
great difficulty.

The collection of taxes was vital to our success ;
but I am certain that we should have failed in this
regard, — in spite of the energy, tact, and resource-
fulness of Colonel MacCormack’s direction of the
Internal Revenue Administration, — had it not

187

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

been for the existence of a strong army and the
willingness of Beza Khan Pahlevi to cooperate
with us. The Minister of War had the statesman-
ship to perceive that, with respect to the collection
of taxes, the interests of the army and of the Min-
istry of Finance were identical. As Minister of
War, he was in a position to disregard the politi-
cal influence of the taxpayers. Even in. the nu-
merous oases when it was unnecessary to call on
him for direct assistance, the public knowledge
that his power was behind us was sufficient, usu-
ally, for the collection of the taxes.

Successful in the collection of arrears, the Ad-
ministration of Internal Revenue had also made
progress toward bringing system into the col-
lection of current taxes. In my sixth quarterly
report, I published a list of twenty forms which
had been adopted, covering virtually every feature
of internal-revenue administration.

In the summer of 1923, however, we reached a
crisis in the collection of the opium-tax. Opium
cultivated in Persia was subject to the ordinary
land-tax, or ten per cent, of the net share of the
proprietor. According to the Persian law, all
opium for smoking is subject to banderoling, for
which is charged a tax of 672 krans a batman. In
addition to the banderole tax, there were also col-
lected manipulation fees, warehouse charges,
transport charges, and customs duties on im-

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GETTING DOWN TO WORK

ported and exported opium. The above taxes and
charges presuppose effective control of the opium
industry by the Government ; and it had been the
effort of the Government to exercise its control
by centralizing in government warehouses, under
the supervision of government inspectors, the
preparation of the opium for commerce. In the
year before our arrival, only twenty per cent, of
the opium sap produced in Persia had been
brought under this necessary control. In other
words, almost one half of the opium had been
contraband and had largely escaped taxation.
The most important of the illicit transactions con-
sisted of smuggling within the country, for local
consumption. The smuggling business was highly
organized, as is shown by the fact that in 1923 one
smuggling transaction was discovered in which
the contraband stuff was guarded in transit by
one hundred and fifty horsemen. It was clear to
us that the extension of opium centralization, diffi-
cult as it might be, was imperatively necessary in
order to increase the revenues and to establish a
measure of government control over an industry
which public sentiment condemned and which must
eventually be restricted.

Isfahan, the center of opium-cultivation, had
thus far escaped centralization. Even when the
Ministry of War was collecting the indirect taxes,
it had tried and failed in Isfahan. Conditions

189

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

there presented peculiar difficulty. Out of a popu-
lation of approximately eighty thousand, there
were at least five thousand who gained all or a
large part of their income through the commerce
in opium. These included opium-peddlers, bro-
kers, bazaar traders, commission and export mer-
chants, packers, porters, coppersmiths, and the
manipulators of stick and cake opium. , If we
assume an average of three dependents, which is
low, it will be seen that at least a fourth of the
entire population of the city was largely depend-
ent on the opium trade. The above figures, more-
over, do not include the opium-cultivators resident
in or near the city. The wide diffusion of the
trade and the multitude of small transactions in-
creased the difficulty of centralization. During
the harvest, peddlers and small storekeepers, who
have advanced goods on credit to the peasants
during the year, go to the villages and secure their
payment in opium sap. Occasionally, at this time,
gifts of sap are made to the village mullahs ; and
the village barbers and carpenters are paid for
their services in the same medium. As soon as
the gathering of sap begins, thousands of venders
of small articles and sweetmeats go out from the
large towns and barter their wares for sap, in the
poppy fields. Dervishes, story-tellers, beggars,
musicians, and owners of performing animals go
from one field to another, and are rewarded or

190

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

given alms by having the flat side of the opium
knife scraped on their palms, or on the small bowls
carried by the dervishes. These itinerants sell
their accumulations to traveling opium-buyers,
who also purchase from the peasants. When it is
realized that there may be easily from three to five
thousand strangers in a single area during the
harvest season, each with opium sap in his or her
possession, the difficulty of centralizing the entire
crop becomes apparent. As most of these people
depend on their gains, during this season, for a
considerable portion of their annual income, the
hardships imposed on them by complete central-
ization may also be conceived. When the pro-
prietors and peasants are required to place all
their sap in the warehouses as soon as gathered,
thousands of these more or less legitimate middle-
men are deprived of their occupation.

Early in 1923, we had instructed the financial
agent of Isfahan to prepare warehouses and to
establish centralization, but he immediately en-
countered opposition. Hundreds of people took
bast in the telegraph office and wired protests to
the Government ; demonstrations took place in the
streets ; peasants were brought in from the coun-
try; armed resistance seemed likely. After des-
patching to Isfahan a tax expert who telegraphed
to me advising that we should yield to the Isfahan
opium merchants, I sent Colonel MacCormack,

191

THE AMEBICAN TASK IN PERSIA

who, except for instuctions to remove so far as
possible the legitimate grievances of the people
and to stand firm on the principle of centraliza-
tion, was given a free hand to work out, on the
ground, a solution of the problem. He found the
city in a turmoil, peasants demonstrating in the
streets, the financial agency paralyzed and ready
to surrender, and armed resistance threatening.
The Government feared serious trouble, but I was
completely confident that it could, if it would,
overcome the opposition.' Accordingly, I sub-
mitted to the Council of Ministers a telegram from
Colonel MacCormack in which he stated that he
had put into eifect various measures designed to
remove the legitimate grievances of the people,
and asked for an assertion of the authority of the
Government. The Prime Minister, who was then
Muchir Dowleh, and the Minister of War took the
wise and strong course. The former telegraphed
the governor to cooperate with Colonel MacCor-
mack, and gave the people to understand that the
Government had no intention of yielding; the lat-
ter ordered the military commander at Isfahan to
use military force, if necessary, to keep the peace.
There was for a few days some rioting in the
streets of Isfahan and five peasants were killed;
but, due to the firmness displayed by the Govern-
ment, the centralization of opium in Isfahan was
for the first time successfully instituted.

192

Amkkicaxs IX (Ijohheh axi» kola aptkh tub openixij of tub Majlbss,
Jaxuauv 20, 1024. FrtoM left to kioiit, Mr. MorASKBV, Dr. Mills-
PAUCH, AND Colonel MacCormack

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

Following our victory there, centralization was
carried out in other regions, and at the end of the
year two thirds of the opium-production of the
country had been centralized in government ware-
houses, with a satisfactory increase of revenue as
compared with the previous year.

This affair, which recalls to mind the famous
“Whisky Rebellion” in American history, was one
of our decisive battles. Had we or the Govern-
ment yielded, the prestige of the American Mis-
sion, as well as that of the Government, would
have been seriously impaired ; resistance in other
quarters and with respect to other matters would
have been encouraged ; and the efforts to establish
throughout the country respect for the authority
of the Central Government would have received
a serious setback. After experiencing centrali-
zation, the proprietors and peasants, as they came
to realize that they were receiving the profits
which formerly went to middlemen, were less op-
posed to our policy ; and in the following year we
encountered no serious difficulty with regard to
opium-collections.

Concurrently with our tax-collection efforts, the
development of our work in other directions had
presented difficulties and aroused antagonisms.
We set out to enforce the financial laws, including
the new Treasury-General law ; and the examina-
tion that we gave to requisitions and the restric-

193

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

tions that we placed on payments led to an endless
succession of complaints or differences of opinion.
Mr, Gore, as Director of Accounts and Audits, did
not court popularity, and, no respecter of persons
himself, he earned the wholesome respect of all
Persians by his strict, impartial adherence to the
law. Appeals were made to me daily on the
ground that Mr. Gore was “creating difficulties”
by his interpretation of the laws ; but on investi-
gation, I found, in virtually all cases, that Mr.
Gore had been right and that the “difficulty” ex-
isted in the law itself or in the idea of some claim-
ant that we could stretch the law to meet his par-
ticular case. But with regard to the large claim-
ants, we could do nothing during the first year
except complete the dossiers.

We also encountered difficulty in the application
of the Treasury-General law to the Ministry of
Posts and Telegraphs. In the past, as I have ex-
plained in a previous chapter, that ministry had
paid its expenses directly from its revenues. The
Treasury-General law prescribed, however, that
all government revenue should be covered into
the treasury and no disbursements should be
made except out of funds procured by requisition
on the Ministry of Finance. Some of the officials
of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, notably
the under-secretary who headed the political ma-
chine in that ministry, had reason to object to any

194

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

scrutiny or pre-audit of their expenditure. Apart
frona their real reasons, they alleged that observ-
ance of the law would lead to delays which, in the
case of the salaries of technical employees and the
purchase of forage for the horses used in mail
transport, would result in administrative demoral-
ization.

We undertook also to centralize the purchase of
government supplies. With the execution of the
budget of 1923-24, we established a General
Supply Section under the direction of Mr. Gore,
in which was centralized the purchasing of all the
civil supplies of the Government. Through stand-
ardization of equipment, prevention of over-
charging, repair of furniture, and the execution
of contracts for large quantities by public bidding,
we effected economies and reduced opportunities
for graft; but incidentally we incurred the hos-
tility of the supply officers, merchants, and others
who had profited from the loose practices that had
existed in the past.

The summer of 1923 witnessed a more or less
concerted and wide-spread attack on the American
Mission, from the elements that were affected by
our reforms. A few of the less important and
more venal newspapers launched a campaign of
persistent and scurrilous misrepresentation,
partly purchased propaganda and partly black-
mail. In these articles we were generally criti-

195

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

cized as incompetent and stubborn bunglers, who
by ill-considered action had thrown the finances
into chaos. Beyond an occasional retort in my
quarterly reports, we thought it best to meet these
attacks with silence. We were sure that a large
majority of the best Persians were with us; and
that the attacks were the vocal repercussion of
reform measures which, whatever the opposition
might be, could not have been postponed or aban-
doned ; and we had no doubt that with the support
shown by the Prime Minister and by the Minister
of War, the mission was in no serious danger.
Thanks to the cooperation of the Imperial Persian
Bank, we made payments pretty regularly, par-
ticularly to the army, and we also found time to
contribute a little to economic development and
public welfare.

We insisted that the subsidies to the Urumiah
refugees in Teheran should stop, and made ar-
rangements to pay their travel expenses back to
their homes. All of the refugees eventually left
Teheran, and it is presumed that most of them re-
turned to their homes. At the same time, we
obtained a credit from the Majless for the relief
of the devastated districts. Mr. Dunaway was
sent to Urumiah, and made loans to the land-
owners to the amount of about fifty thousand to-
mans for the purchase of oxen and seed and the
repair of buildings. Later, when we had reached

196

GETTING DOWN TO WORK

an agreement with Toumaniantz Freres for the
rehabilitation of their business, we recovered the
sum of about fifty thousand tomans which had
been deposited with them, and distributed that
sum likewise in the devastated regions.

We likewise controlled the expenditure of funds
contributed for the earthquake-stricken region of
Torbat; the repair and construction of public
buildings was resumed; we proposed a loan-
service institution to save needy people from the
grip of loan sharks; we undertook campaigns
against insect pests ; we eontributed so far as pos-
sible, in a variety of ways, to agricultural relief ;
the regularity of payments heightened the morale
of the school-teachers, the public, the sanitary
services, and other branches of the Government.

Foreign questions necessarily remained more
or less in abeyance through the year. Little
could be done with regard to foreign protests
against the navaghel ; and, through no fault of the
Persian representatives, the discussions with the
Soviet Legation on the tariff, which began in June,
1923, came to naught. The question of the north-
ern oil concession and the proposed ten-million-
dollar loan in connection with it, was clarified
through the acceptance by Sinclair, with some
modifications, of the terms fixed by the Majless.
The fourth Majless, at the very end of its session
in June, 1923, had passed an act authorizing the

197

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Ministry of Finance to negotiate a loan of five
million dollars with American banks, but no active
steps were taken for the flotation of this loan. A
flurry in international relations was created in
August, 1923, by the expulsion of a number of
Persian mujtahids from Iraq.

198

CHAPTEB Vin
GATHERING CLOUDS

IN October, 1923, there was a marked clear-
ing of the political atmosphere. The gov-
ernment of Muchir ed Dowleh fell; Reza
Khan Pahlevi became Prime Minister; the Shah
departed again for Paris; and Ghavam os Sal-
tanch, former Prime Minister, after a quick set-
tlement of his personal affairs, left for France.

I shall make no attempt to set forth or inter-
pret the feelings, fears, rumors, intrigues, or
intentions that motivated or were alleged to
motivate events. It will be sufficient for the pur-
pose of my story to call attention to the signifi-
cance of the central fact — the assumption by Reza
Khan Pahlevi of the premiership.

As he explained it in simple words to me, he
had seen that other governments had been unable
to do anything for the country and he had re-
solved to devote his power and his energies to
the task.

Since 1921, he had been the one man in the
country whose strength had rested on a founda-
tion more solid than the shifting sands of politics.

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Theoretically, it seemed a distinct advantage,
therefore, that the personal authority which had
hitherto been indirectly exercised should now be
squarely placed in its appropriate constitutional
position, and that the responsibility which had
hitherto been obscured by that of prime ministers
and shared with other ministers should now be
clearly and officially concentrated in the person
who appeared at the time most capable of effec-
tive popular leadership. There seems little ques-
tion that Beza Khan Pahlevi possessed not
merely the devotion of his army but also the
confidence of the people. He was the natural
rallying-point of nationalism; he was the logical
leader and therefore marked to bear the symbol
of leadership; he was the best hope of the coun-
try. Through much of the apparently artificial
and insincere acclamation that greeted his acces-
sion, sounded a genuine note of popular approval
and enthusiasm. Soon after his elevation to the
premiership, a reception was given him in Tehe-
ran at the house of a wealthy merchant, Moin ot
Tojjar. Addresses were presented to him, poems
were read, fireworks and illuminations lit the
eager faces of the throng in the garden outside ;
but through it all the new Prime Minister seemed
modest and serious. All of his statements on
such occasions were patriotic and statesmanlike.
He continued to transact business at his simple

200

GATHERING CLOUDS

office in the Ministry of War and at his house,
which is one of the least pretentious in Teheran;
the Council of Ministers moved to the palace in
order to give its former quarters to the Ministry
of Public Works, a change dictated by considera-
tions of convenience; the ministers, electrified by
their unique leadership, began to work as Per-
sian ministers had never worked before; every
one was inspired by the idea that big things
should and could be done for the country.

The citation of a few of the early acts of the
Prime Minister may point the direction that his
thoughts were taking. He instructed that the
elections should be hastened in order that the
Majless should meet as early as possible; he
formed a commission to report a uniform system
of weights and measures ; on his orders all of the
beggars were summarily removed from the
streets of the capital and lodged in a municipal
institution; he issued a proclamation denouncing
as unbecoming and unpatriotic the practice on the
part of Persians of frequenting the foreign lega-
tions for advice with regard to the internal af-
fairs of Persia; he gave forty thousand tomans
from the reserve fund of the Ministry of War for
the purchase of buildings for a new national uni-
versity.

In refutation of wild rumors that he would ap-
point military officers as his ministers, he selected

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

only two; Khoda Yar Khan, to whom fell the
Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs, an adminis-
tration that was clearly in need of an iron hand,
and Amir Eghtedar, Minister of the Interior,
who at Isfahan had rendered valuable assistance
to the American Mission. For the Ministry of
Finance, he selected Modir ol Molk, a civilian
politician, who had already served as Minister of
Finance and of Foreign Affairs, and who was at
the time Colonel MacCormack’s assistant in the
Alimentation Service. Zoka ol Molk, a distin-
guished jurist, then Minister of Finance, became
Minister of Foreign Affairs. Soleiman Mirza
and Moazzed os Saltaneh took charge of Public
Instruction and Justice respectively. Ezz ol Me-
malek, then an inspector of the Ministry of Fi-
nance, was named Minister of Public Works.

The change in the official position of Reza Khan
Pahlevi naturally tended to complicate his rela-
tions with the American Financial Mission. He
was now in politics as he had never been before;
and in politics, one must listen to complaints,
placate opposition, and extend favors to those
who possess influence. Formerly Reza Khan
Pahlevi had been in much the same independent
and neutral position as that of the American
Mission itself. Any unpopularity occasioned by
our financial measures or by giving support to
them Was likely to fall on the Government rather

202

GATHERING CLOUDS

than on the Minister of War. Now, when the
Minister of War was also the head of the Gov-
ernment, there w;as grave danger that the Samson
who had supported us should be eventually shorn
of his strength by the Delilah of politics. When
he was only Minister of War, our work concerned
him chiefly as it affected the functioning of the
army. As Prime Minister, he must perforce be
concerned with the budget, with taxation policy,
with alimentation, with the payment of claims,
with the Bank-i-Iran, and with a thousand mat-
ters of detail which, as they were brought within
the range of his impulsive, direct, and decisive
mentality, inevitably created a first impression
that the finances were disorganized, that we were
slow and inefficient, that in spite of many motions
we were, like windmills, getting nowhere, and that
we were tactlessly sowing seeds of discontent
among the people. Under the best of circum-
stances, we could not expect to be popular; and
although the storm of the summer of 1923 had
passed without doing any perceptible damage,
hostility to the American Mission was still in-
tense in many quarters and there were numerous
elements who looked at the latest turn of the
political wheel as an opportunity for the renewal
of their criticisms and propaganda.

The new intrigues, which took on appreciable
proportions in the fall of 1923, apparently had

203

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

as their purpose the embarrassing and discredit-
ing of the American Mission, with the aim of de-
priving us of our essential powers and ultimately,
if we became unpopular enough, of driving us out
of the country, A subtle campaign was insti-
tuted to start a quarrel between the Prime Minis-
ter and myself. I was told almost daily that
Beza Khan had decided to get rid of the American
Mission ; he was told that we were destroying the
prestige of the army and that under the cloak of
financial laws we were defying his authority and
creating disrespect for it. Petty differences, an-
noying to both of us, occurred continually, which
if it had not been for the enemies of the mission,
would never, I am confident, have appeared in a
form to require even casual discussion. In order
to banish any hope of support from the Majless,
I was told that that body, when it met, would be
the pliant tool of the Prime Minister, because of
influence exercised by him over the elections, and
that one of its first acts, if it should by chance
not be immediately dissolved, would be to con-
sider the question of the continuance of the Amer-
ican Mission in Persia.

With the departure of Mr. Early in the fall of
1923, the Financial Mission, with only nine mem-
bers, was left short-handed. While the members
of the mission in the capital willingly assumed
additional duties, there were only two Americans

204

GATHERING CLOUDS

serving in the provinces, and accordingly Mr.
Flannagan was sent as financial agent to Yazd
and Mr. Dunaway as provincial director to Ham-
adan. Finally, with the designation of Mr. Pear-
son as Director of Personnel, I was left with no
American secretary or stenographer.

Early in March, 1924, a movement started for
the establishment of a republic. The movement
was a blend of anti-dynastic, progressive, mod-
ernistic, and nationalistic sentiments, galvanized
into action and given concrete form by the popu-
larity of Reza Khan Pahlevi, who was universally
viewed as the prospective first president of the
republic. The example of Turkey probably had
influence. Except in some irresponsible quar-
ters, the movement never took on a really revolu-
tionary aspect, and, it was not, in my opinion, in
any sense symptomatic of a trend toward Bol-
shevism. The press of Teheran became ram-
pantly anti-monarchical; telegrams advocating a
republic poured in from the provinces; peaceful
demonstrations occurred; government oflSees were
closed in the provinces; and at Teheran em-
ployees left their work and presented addresses
to Reza Khan. The latter pointed out to at least
one delegation that the form of government in
modern times is not an important matter; that
there were certain backward and badly governed
republics, while there were progressive and well-

205

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

governed monarchies; and that his only desire
was to make his country progressive and well
governed whatever the superficial forms of gov-
ernment might be. Nevertheless, when the move-
ment had gathered momentum and doubtless
seemed to him to represent a spontaneous and
unanimous expression of popular feeling, he be-
came quietly and dignifiedly receptive. .For a
time, it appeared that the establishment of a re-
public was certain; but after a prolonged discus-
sion in the Majless, where the Opposition was led
by Modarres, it was decided that the change of
government should not t^e place. The Prime
Minister showed good sportsmanship; and the
agitation had stopped by the first of May.

During the course of this interesting move-
ment, the American Mission followed its policy
of strictly abstaining from any participation in
political matters. I declined to express' any
opinion on the question; and when some em-
ployees came to mo in regard to their going in a
body to the Prime Minister to voice their support
of republicanism, I told them that I was neither
for nor against any Persian political movement,
and that they must as Persian citizens use their
own judgment. I did take occasion to point out to
the Government that the closing of financial agen-
cies and the general political manoeuvering in the
provinces would cause a serious loss of revenue,

206

GATHERING CLOUDS

and in the budget an amount of about one hundred
thousand tomans was later deducted, on this ac-
count, from the estimates of revenue.

I was naturally apprehensive, also, that the
news of the movement when transmitted to for-
eign countries might create an impression which
seemed to me wholly contrary to the facts — ^that
instability and disorder existed in Persia. In
view of the withdrawal of the proposal of another
American company, the Prime Minister had de-
cided to grant the northern oil concession to the
Sinclair Exploration Company ; and a representa-
tive of an American banking firm came at this
juncture to Persia, to make the preliminary in-
vestigations regarding a loan to be floated as a
condition of the concession. He was followed
shortly afterward by the representative of an
American construction company which was inter-
ested in the prospective expenditures from the
proceeds of the loan. Other foreign companies
also were showing revival of interest in Persia.
The time did not seem propitious for a political
diversion. My view, however, would have been
precisely the same toward a Presidential election,
a cabinet crisis, or any other political develop-
ment which tended to suspend the normal course
of affairs and to divert public attention from
financial and economic matters.

The budget, our perennial crop of thorns, was
207

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

daring this period particularly prolific of trouble.
Prior to the meeting of the Majless, the prepara-
tion of the budget for 1923-24 had reached a stage
where it became clear that if we were to effect a
balance, including provision for the repayment of
a part of the advances from the Imperial Persian
Bank, it would be necessary to find new revenue
amounting to a million tomans.

As in the previous year, the ministers wanted
increased appropriations to meet their expanding
needs, and some of the proposed increases seemed
necessary. Accordingly, we prepared a number
of tax projects, including a chancellery tax, a tax
on delinquent taxpayers, an income-tax, a tax on
negotiable instruments, an extension of the rental
tax, and a sales-tax, with the idea that these
taxes would be approved by the Majless prior to
or in conjunction with its approval of the budget.

These tax projects were the first proposals that
we had made looking to the increase of revenue
and the reform of taxation by legislative enact-
ment. Our aim in these proposals was to intro-
duce more elastic taxes, to distribute the burden
of taxation more equitably, and to pave the way
for the abolition of some of the existing taxes,
such as the various archaic local imposts, the
road-tolls, the navaghel collected at the city gates,
and eventually, with the restriction of opium-
cultivation, the opium-taxes. In the sales-tax bill

208

Agha Skyed IIassan Modaiiues, Leading CLEUirAL Deputy

GATHERING CLOUDS

we proposed, in fact, the abolition of about two
hundred existing taxes. We hoped to establish
sources of revenue which, while not abundantly
productive at first, would in the course of time
provide sufficient funds for transportation devel-
opment, for agricultural reconstruction, for the
extension of educational and sanitary facilities,
for the gradual payment of claims, and possibly
for the purchase of pensions. We were also pre-
paring a new project providing for a uniform
system of land-taxes.

In the beginning, we had realized, of course,
that tax proposals, even if we had had time to sub-
mit any to the fourth Majless, would not have been
acceptable. The American Mission was an ex-
periment; and the Majless was not inclined to
vote more taxes without assurance that their dis-
position would be properly controlled. More-
over, the people were complaining of the existing
taxes, and could not be expected to favor meas-
ures which would add to their burdens.

Mohamed Ali Khan Farzin, the under-secre-
tary of the Ministry of Finance, was the only
official who advised me not to submit proposals
for new taxes in connection with the budget.
Had I followed his wise advice, much of our later
difficulties with the budget would have been ob-
viated. On the other hand, the American Mission
was being generally criticized for its rigorous

209

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

collection of taxes, and for not accomplishing any
constructive work. The existing taxes, even with
the increase we had obtained administratively,
were inadequate for the normal governmental
needs of the country and offered no opportunity
for relief to taxpayers or for constructive, social,
and economic undertakings. Persians protested
the illegality of some of them; foreign legations
held that others conflicted with the treaty rights
of their nationals. The oil royalties were de-
creasing. The negotiations with Russia regard-
ing the tariff had been thus far without result.
The new Majless was an unknown quantity and
it seemed to me that there was a fair chance that
it might, when it saw the exigencies of the situa-
tion, provide the fiscal assistance which we needed.

After much discussion with the ministers, the
budget was submitted to the Majless, with the tax
proposals, in the second month of the Persian
year. The Budget Commission promptly decided
to strike out tlie new taxes and to balance the
budget by reducing the expenditure items. A
proposal to reduce expenditures by cutting down
salaries was debated. Week after week, through
the spring into the hot summer months, the dis-
cussions went on. Various features of the
budget, which did not seem important to the com-
mission, appeared vital to me. It was impossible
for my interpreter to give me the discussions in

210

GATHERING CLOUDS

full, and it was therefore difiScult for me to ap-
preciate the point of view of the deputies or to
understand the subjects on which they desired
further information. They seemed to me to
be dilatory, obstructive, and unreasonable. I
seemed to them to be lacking in helpfulness, ob-
stinate, and equally unreasonable.

Finally after three and a half months of dis-
cussion, the commission returned the budget to
the Government for revision.

In the meantime, having bound ourselves to the
principle of making no payments without parlia-
mentary authorization, we found ourselves in
serious embarrassment on account of the lack of
credits. Lacking a voted budget for the year, the
Government each month asked the Majless to
grant a credit equal to one twelfth of the appro-
priations of the previous year. The delay in
passing these monthly credits prevented us from
making payments promptly, and caused losses of
revenue due to our inability to make the expendi-
tures which were in some cases necessary for
collection purposes.

Our troubles with the Ministry of Posts and
Telegraphs became aggravated. The under-
secretary of that ministry now made no pretense
of observing the financial laws; but having suffi-
cient receipts, he was able to satisfy the em-
ployees of his ministry by paying their salaries

211

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

promptly and regularly. We were, of course,
less interested in his political machine than we
were in the enforcement of the laws and the econ-
omizing of expenditure. My recommendation
that a Persian employee of the Ministry of Fi-
nance should be appointed Chief Accountant and
Controller of the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
graphs was, however, disregarded. I then laid
the matter, in writing, before the Prime Minister
and informed him that, since we were powerless
to force the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs to
observe the law and my contract, I should be com-
pelled, unless the Government gave me support
in this matter which seemed vital to our success in
controlling expenditures, to deduct from the
budgetary payments to the Ministry of War a
part of the amount which was estimated as losses
in the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs.

A similar situation existed in the Municipality
of Teheran, which was outside the budget of the
Government and which contended that it was like-
wise outside the terms of my contract. Dr. Ed-
ward W. Ryan, who was employed by the Persian
Government as municipal expert, had begun ener-
getically to reform the city administration and
had borrowed 250,000 tomans from the Imperial
Persian Bank for the completion of the municipal
building and the repair of the streets. His un-
timely death in September, 1923, again threw af-

212

GATHERING CLOUDS

fairs into confusion; but some months later, the
Prime Minister ordered the chief of the munici-
pality to submit in fiscal matters to the control of
the Ministry of Finance.

With the republican movement out of the way,
a veritable storm of criticism broke upon us in the
Majless and in the newspapers. Speeches were
directed at us in the Majless, and the inability of
the Minister of Finance to give prompt and de-
tailed information in reply to the numerous ques-
tions of the deputies served to create an atmos-
phere of distrust. The criticism was expressed
that we were deliberately keeping the minister in
ignorance. In and out of the Majless we were
charged with various high crimes and misde-
meanors, namely: with maintaining an excessive
budget for the Ministry of Finance; with receiv-
ing advances from the bank, contrary to the Con-
stitution; with failing to reorganize the financial
administration ; with collecting taxes illegally and
oppressively; with delays in the conduct of the
correspondence of the ministry ; with treating the
disponibles contrary to the Civil Service Law;
with irregularities in the purchase of supplies;
with failing to adapt ourselves to the mentality
of the Persian people; with disregard of the re-
sponsibility of the Minister of Finance ; with main-
taining an unnecessary number of interpreters
and translators; with having too many high-

213

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

salaried officials ; with dismissing honest men and
appointing dishonest ones; with lack of expert
knowledge; and with general incompetence.

We were not so much concerned with the criti-
cisms in themselves as we were with their signifi-
cance and effect. If the attacks in and out of
Parliament represented the real attitude of the
Government and Parliament, and if this attitude
could not he changed, then the situation boded ill
for the success of our mission. Continued public
attacks by deputies, concurrent with the other
conditions which I have mentioned in this chap-
ter, appeared certain to diminish our prestige,
to weaken our control over the personnel of the
financial administration, and to lend encourage-
ment to all who were resisting the collection of
taxes or claims.

Therefore, deciding to ask the Government for a
definite indication of its purposes, we addressed,
late in July, 1924, a letter to the Prime Minister
in which we called attention to our difficulties and
to violations of our contracts, and stated that
unless conditions were changed, there appeared
to be little hope for the accomplishment of our
task.

Shortly after, a tragic event occurred which
profoundly shocked the foreign community and
the Persian people. As I was dining one evening
late in July with the Minister of Finance in the

214

GATHERING CLOUDS

garden of the Iran Club at Gulehek, word was
brought that the American Vice-Consul Robert W.
Imhrie had been killed by a mob in the streets of
Teheran. On the following day, we attended his
funeral at the American Missionary Church.
The Prime Minister with his Cabinet was present,
and the dead American official was accorded full
military honors.

During the course of a few days the fog of
rumors lifted and the facts became fairly clear.

Major Imbrie, with a companion, — a former
American employee of the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, who had been convicted of assault and
sentenced to a year’s imprisonment at the con-
sulate,— drove in a carriage to a shrine in one of
the crowded streets near the center of Teheran.
The shrine, like many others in the city, was in
the form of a small drinking-fountain set up at
the side of the street. Reports that a miracle had
occurred a few days previously at this spot at-
tracted to it a crowd of credulous people of the
lower classes, who, stirred by the faith that
brought them there, were in no mood for toler-
ance or understanding. The tense emotionalism,
even fanaticism, manifested at such an excep-
tional place did not of course represent the
thoughts of the whole population, and a foreigner,
although feeling perfect security in general,
should have realized the extreme danger, with

215

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

respect to any religious manifestation, of provoc-
ative action or inappropriate intrusion. Major
Imbrie, however, when he reached the shrine, did
the one thing which was most likely to cause
trouble. He attempted to take a photograph of
the shrine and the near-by group of Persians,
among whom were some women. The conse-
quences were tragic : warnings, cries that Major
Imbrie had put poison in the fountain, menaces,
and — after the vice-consul with his companion
had gained his carriage and driven away — a long
pursuit through the streets, and finally a mur-
derous mob attack, wliich resulted in the death of
Major Imbrie and serious injuries to the other
American.

Altogether, the skies seemed dark in midsum-
mer of 1924.

Nevertheless, our work continued to show prog-
ress. The reorganization of the financial admin-
istration proceeded step by step. Foreign trade
and customs revenues were steadily growing; and
all internal taxes were showing an encouraging
increase, amounting for the first six months of
the year to a half-million tomans as compared
with the corresponding period of the previous
year.

In November, 1923, Colonel MacCormack with
three Persian assistants had proceeded to Khozi-

216

GATHERING CLOUDS

stan and had concluded a settlement with Sheikh
Khaz’al, according to which this most feudalistic
and opulent of Persian chiefs agreed to pay to
the Government a half -million tomans on his tax-
arrears, of which he paid in cash one hundred
thousand. The settlement, which was approved
by the Government, also bound the Sheikh to
pay his current taxes in the future. In the win-
ter of 1923, following military successes of the
army, we established financial agencies in certain
districts of Kerman, Pars, and Lorestan.

A largely attended and instructive national ex-
position of home-made goods was held at Tehe-
ran in the winter of 1923, under the management
of Motacham os Saltaneh, whose versatility in
political and economic matters had endowed him
in the past with several cabinet positions and
various industrial concessions, including an im-
portant one for the importation of silkworm eggs.

A representative of the League of Nations, Dr.
Gilmore, made a sanitary survey of Persia.

A competent Japanese economic mission in-
vestigated conditions in Persia in the winter of
1923; and at about the same time a new Kusso-
Persian Commercial Agreement was signed by
the Persian Government with the Soviet Legation.

Late in the winter a joint commission was
formed with the British Legation, and progress

217

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

was made toward reaching an agreement on the
various monetary claims of the British Govern-
ment.

A joint technical commission representing the
Persian Government and the Soviet Legation, in
spite of many sittings failed to reach an agree-
ment on the tariff question; and in the fall of
1923 pourparlers with the Russians concerning
the future of the Persian fisheries were similarly
fruitless.

218

CHAPTER IX

FAIR WEATHER

The crisis of 1924 proved, like that of 1923,
to be a passing storm. Following our
letter of protest, I had personal talks with
the Prime Minister and discussed the matter
at the Council of Ministers. The Government
showed a keen appreciation of the seriousness of
the situation. The Prime Minister assured me
that he desired as much as ever to retain the serv-
ices of the American Mission, and that he would
take steps to make our position easier. His gen-
eral attitude, which was repeated in his conversa-
tions with me, was succinctly stated in his letter
of August 6, in reply to our protest :

In continuation of my previous letter, I again re-
peat the good opinion of the Government in regard to
yourself and our unshakeable determination to empower
and aid the Mission in forwarding the services which
it has undertaken. I assure you that the observation
of the rights and powers which are given to you is and
shall be thoroughly regarded by me and by the body
of the Government.

Soon after, the Prime Minister reorganized his
219

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Cabinet, and the Government received a vote of
confidence on August 26, 1924. In the new Cabi-
net, Eeza Khan introduced as Minister of Fi-
nance, Zoka ol Molk, whose integrity and patri-
otism had won the confidence of the people and of
the Majless, and whose service as Minister of
Finance in 1923 had proved his friendship for the
American Mission. The appointmeJit of Zoka ol
Molk was the best concrete evidence that could
have been given of the good intentions of the
Prime Minister. No one, so far as I know, has
ever doubted that Zoka ol Molk is disinterestedly
devoted to the public good. He has served as
Minister of Finance to the present time ; and dur-
ing these months he has also served as Acting
Prime Minister during the absence of the head of
the Government.

In view of the vital relation of economic affairs
to our work, the appointment of the Minister of
Public Works was of special importance. For
this position, the Prime Minister appointed Sar-
dar Moazzam, a deputy of Khorassan, an ener-
getic, brilliant, ambitious, and colorful personal-
ity, whose persuasiveness and exceptional skill in
parliamentary leadership were to prove later of
invaluable aid in the passing of our projects
through the Majless. The portfolio of Posts and
Telegraphs was given to Sardar Assad, also a
deputy and a Bakhtiari khan, who assured me in

220

FAIR WEATHER

our first talk that he desired to straighten out the
difliculties which had become acute between the
two ministries. Sardar Assad was as good as
his word. He issued orders that the fiscal affairs
of his ministry should be conducted according to
law; and he installed our representative, Amid ol
Molk, as Chief-Accountant and Controller of his
ministry.

The acts of the Government with regard- to the
Imbrie affair were of interest to us, in our offi-
cial capacity, chiefly as they revealed the purpose
and strength of the Persian Government. Ex-
pressing in every possible way its horror over
the incident, the Government declared martial
law, establishing a military governor at Teheran,
made numerous arrests, and proceeded to the
prosecution of those accused of complicity in the
murder. One of those proved guilty, a private
soldier, was promptly executed; and two others,
Seyed Hossein, son of Soyed Mousa, and Ali, son
of Abou Taleb, were executed on November 3,
1924-. The Government of the United States sent
the cruiser Trenton to take the body of Vice-
Consul Imbrie from Persia to America ; and Major
Miles, then American Military Attache at Con-
stantinople, was ordered to Teheran to accompany
the body. Departing from Teheran, along the
road to the frontier, and at Bushire, the port of
embarkation, the remains of the dead American

221

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

official were accorded full military honors by the
Persian Government.

Among the demands made by the Government
of the United States were that the Persian Gov-
ernment should pay $60,000 to the widow of Major
Imbrie and should also pay the expenses of the
Trenton. The first-mentioned sum was paid im-
mediately, and the second amount, which was fixed
by the American Government at $110,000, was
paid in four instalments before the first of April,
1925. When the Persian Government had met the
various demands of the Government of the United
States, the American Legation at Teheran an-
nounced that the sum paid for the expenses of
the Trenton would be held as a trust fund, the in-
terest on which would be assigned to the educa-
tion of Persian young men in America. This
graceful and well-timed act not only served to
remove any remaining traces of friction arising
from the Imbrie incident but will also tend, in
the future, to bind still more closely the traditional
ties of friendship between America and Persia
and to contribute in a practical and fundamental
way to the progress of Persia.

The Imbrie incident was thus closed. Tragic
as the crime was, its significance must not be
exaggerated. It is of course the peculiar duty of
a government — a duty which in fact constitutes
an accepted test of its fitness for membership in

222

FAIR WEATHER

the society of independent nations — ^to protect the
lives and property of foreigners within its ter-
ritory. In this respect, Persia had had a good
record. The traditional .hospitality of the Per-
sian people toward foreigners is the special
pride of Persians. Previous to the Imbrie affair,
no foreigner in Persia, so far as I could know
or guess, felt any apprehension regarding his
safety. From the social and political points
of view, the murder of Major Imbrie can
be looked upon as a peculiarly regrettable ac-
cident, the responsibility for which could not, in
my opinion, without the most extreme casuistry,
be laid on the Persian Government or the Per-
sian people. In all truth it must be admitted
that, had Major Imbrie been ordinarily discreet,
he would not have been the incitement or the
object of a mob attack. The mob did not seek
him ; he went under provocative appearances into
a place and into conditions which had the elements
of danger. Moreover, while firmly insisting that
other nations must protect our citizens, we should
not be too quick to draw conclusions from a single
crime, however conspicuous it may be, in another
country. Western countries also have their
crimes and their mobs. If Herrin, Illinois, had
been in Persia, we should probably long ago have
despaired of that country’s capacity for self-
government. Herrin, it may of course be replied,

223

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

represents merely a pin-point of disorder in a
huge country that is on the whole capable and
law-abiding ; but, as I have already endeavored to
show, in Persia also crime and disorder are excep-
tional.

Personally, although the object of antipathies
and attacks, I have never felt in the slightest de-
gree unsafe in Persia. Nevertheless,, the Gov-
ernment in the spring of 1925 took cognizance of
letters from a disponible threatening direct ac-
tion against me, and assigned an active young
police officer to act as my guard, l! did not care
to have him accompany me in my automobile ; but,
with remarkable alertness and endurance, he kept
himself always near me when I appeared in public,
whether I happened to be walking or riding.

The budget difficulty also was quickly settled.
The Prime Minister called on me with Zoka ol
Molk, on September 23, 1924, and agreed oh reduc-
tions in the various budgets, including that of the
Ministry of War, which were necessary to balance
the general budget without new taxes. Revised
according to our agreement, the estimates of the
Government were returned to the Majless, and
received parliamentary sanction on January 1,
1925.

In the meantime, Zoka ol Molk was able to ex-
plain to the deputies many matters on which hon-
est misunderstandings had arisen, and, on Nov-

224

CrTTIXG KICK IN TUB PROVINCK OP GUILAN

FAIR WEATHER

ember 8, 1924, 1 submitted to bim a detailed mem-
orandum, which was sent to the Majless, on the
subject of the advances received from the Imperial
Persian Bank, showing that these advances had
been of public record, approved by all the prime
ministers and ministers of finance who had been
in office since our arrival, that the proceeds of
the advances had been spent in accordance with
approved budgets, and that the outstanding ad-
vances were virtually equivalent to the deficit of
the Government for the fiscal year of our arrival.

The budget as revised and finally passed was
in itself encouraging. Cuts were made in uhprO'*
ductive expenditures; credits for the Court and
for pensions were decreased ; the productive serv-
ices were left, in general, without reduction or
with slight increases. The prolonged and at times
acrimonious discussions of the budget had had its
compensations. It tended to bring the Majless,
the Government, and the American Mission into
a better understanding regarding budgetary pro-
cedure ; and, most important of all, it served to im-
press on the deputies and on the people, the neces-
sity of new sources of revenue if any new public
services were to be undertaken.

Beginning in the summer of 1924, important
political developments occurred in the southwest.
After the visit of the Prime Minister on August 6
to Khorammabad, the operations against the Lur

225

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

tribesmen proceeded satisfactorily; but a more
serious portent arose farther south. Sardar
Aghdass or Sheikh Khaz’al, the Sheikh of Moham-
merah, with whom we had in the previous year
reached a tax settlement, showed signs of unrest,
which in the course of a few weeks assumed the
aspects of a threatening rebellion. Success in the
aims which were attributed to him would have
confirmed his position as a sovereign or a semi-
sovereign chieftain, and would have been a serious
blow at the authority of the Central Government
and the unity of the country. The story will be
told largely from published documents. The fol-
lowing telegram sent on the part of Parliament
to the sheikhs (tribal chiefs) of Khozistan on
September 30, 1924, was published in the Teheran
press :

The Honorable Sheikhs of Khozistan. In view of
the fact that you have always been subservient to the
orders of the legal central government, and inasmuch
as it is just that faithful persons like you should be
kept informed of the facts, so that they should not,
through some possible misunderstanding, be misled to
take any action that might be against their own desires,
or that might be contrary to their past records, it is
necessary that I inform you that the present govern-
ment, under His Highness Sardar Sepah, enjoys the full
support of Parliament. Inasmuch as it is the duty of
the people, when a Government is supported by Parlia-

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ment, to have the same attitude toward that Qovemment
as that adopted by Parliament, any person who should
rise, or take any action, against the central government
would, therefore, be considered as an outlaw by Parlia-
ment. I am confident that, realizing the significance of
this statement, you will point out its importance to the
necessary persons.

(sd) Motamek ol Molk, President of Parliament.

Telegrams reached the Government, from
groups of political and religious bodies in various
provinces, declaring their loyalty to the Central
Government and their detestation of the acts of
Sheikh Khaz’al. Following rumors of unrest also
among the Bakhtiari tribes, Amir Eghtedar, Min-
ister of the Interior, Sardar Assad, Minister of
Posts and Telegraphs, and, in addition to Sardar
Assad, three other chiefs of the Bakhtiaris, left
for Isfahan on October 22, 1924. Information was
published, also, to the effect that the Vali of
Posht-i-Kouh, another virtually independent chief,
had risen. The army commandeered transport
means in the west and expedited the movement of
troops toward Khozistan. At the height of the
disturbance it was officially reported that there
were 22,000 government troops on the Khozistan
front. On November 5, 1924, the Prime Minister,
accompanied by a number of military officers and
civilians and four armored automobiles, left for
Isfahan. The army journal of November 6,

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA
published the following General Army Order:

Despite all my admonitions to Khaz^al and my warn-
ings to him of the evil consequences that a civil strife,
under the existing critical situation of the country, will
produce, he did not abandon his obstinate and unruly
conduct and refused to submit to and obey the orders
of the Government. I, therefore, order that the entire
army prepare all its practical and material resources
in order to destroy this last impediment against the
growth and development of the army, and consequently,
against the prosperity and progress of the country. I
am leaving for Isfahan to settle the affair.

From this date on, the Teheran papers chron-
icled the steady approach of the Prime Minister to
Mohammerah, the stronghold of the Sheikh, and
the victories of government troops in Khozistan.
The press, on November 14, published the text of
a speech delivered by Sheikh Mohammed Ali
Teherani in Parliament on November 13. Teher-
ani began his speech by referring to the great
improvement that had taken place in the army,
and said:

■^^At first troops were sent to the north and then to
the south. They reached Kerman, Pars, and finally
Khozistan. Khozistan, which is one of the important
provinces and an essential member of Persia, finally
started to have troops. The information that I have,
indicates that since the period preceding the reign of
Nasser-ed-Din Shah, no adequate army had been sent

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FAIR WEATHER

to Khozistan. In brief, Sheikh Khaz’al, a tribal chief,
noticing that a change had taken place in the army af-
fairs of Persia, — ^that the army was no longer in a state
of chaos, — ^trembled with fear. He saw that the Gov-
ernment was powerful; that it was stable. He, there-
fore, endeavored to undermine the power of the Gov-
ernment. He worried over his enormous wealth. He
made efforts to bring about a dissension among the
various tribes. He made suggestions to some of the
tribes to rise against the Central Government. To
Sardar Ashayer, Chief of the Kashgai tribe, who gives
us the honor of his presence here as member of Parlia-
ment, he suggested — as I understand, (and he can deny
the information if it is not correct), that he join him
in rising against the Central Government. He told him
that he would furnish him with all the money and arms,
if he only directed the movement. A man like Sardar
Ashayer, who loves to see that his Government is a
powerful one, and who knows that the development of
the country depends on the iiower of its army, naturally
refused the offer. Since that day Sheikh Khaz'al has
been acting against the Government. He telegraphed
to Parliament, saying that he was against Sardar Sepah,
and that he had risen against Sardar Sepkh, despite the
fact that, in case he had a complaint, he could ask
Parliament to remove it without taking up arms against
the Central Government. We held a private session in
Parliament. In order to avoid bloodshed, and to avoid
drawing our swords against each other, we negotiated
with Sheikh Khaz’al for a period of two months. He
could not, however, be persuaded, and he started certain

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

activities which the Persian people detest. [Applause.]

“In Parliament we were naturally aware of his ac-
tions. But we always believed that he would abandon
them. For this reason we did not make any statement
in Parliament. But to-day, when it has been well estab-
lished that all the tribes of Pars, as far as Behbehan,
as well as the Bakhtiaris, are in support of the Govern-
ment, that the Sheikh is isolated, and that he fights the
Government for the sake of his enormous wealth; I speak
in the name of the people of Persia, — and I am sure
all the gentlemen here support me in my declaration, —
and in the name of Persia’s independence and national-
ity, I express Persia’s detestation for the activities of
Sheikh Khaz’al and declare that he deserves punish-
ment. ’ ’ [ Applause. ]

The Prime Minister arrived at Shiraz on
November 15, and repeated to Teheran the follow-
ing telegram received from Sheikh Khaz’al, which
was read in Parliament by Zoka ol Molk on
November 18 :

His Highness the Prime-Minister, May His Dignity
be Everlasting. Certain persons had led me to believe
that Your Highness felt unkindly towards me. But I
have recently realized, thank Allah, that this is not the
fact, and this has made me very hopeful. Your High-
ness is well aware of the fact that this misunderstanding
was strengthened by the intrigues of certain selfish per-
sons and malefactors — ^not including the Bakhtiaris —

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FAIR WEATHER

who have of course never felt hostile towards Your
Highness. These persons endeavored to use me for
their selfish interests and to make me an instrument by
means of which they intended to attain their long de-
sired objects. I finally realized that the policy that
I had adopted was not a sound one, and I therefore
beg to express my regrets and to ask Your Highness to
pardon me for the unworthy steps that I have taken
during the last several months against tlie Imperial
Government. In the future as in the past I shall en-
deavor to realize my ambition, which has always been
to render the greatest amount of service to my Govern-
ment and to obey and fulfill Your Highness’ instruc-
tions to the best of my ability and sincerity. And I
have every hope that Your Highness will accept my re-
grets and will again place me under your confidence.
I understand that Your Highness intends shortly to
visit the South. If this is true, I shall very much like
to have the honor of coming to see Your Highness, in
order that I verbally express to Your Highness — as the
Head of my Government — my regrets for the past and
the assurance that I shall faithfully serve you in the
future. Awaiting the expression of kindness on the
part of Your Highness and your permission that I bo
honored by coming to see you.

(sd) Khaz’al.

To this telegram, the Prime Minister reported
that he had sent the following reply:

Hr. Sardar Aghdass. I received your telegram in

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Shiraz. I shall accept your apologies and regrets pro-
vided that you surrender unconditionally.

(sd) Reza, Prime-Minister and Commander in Chief
of the Army.

On November 23, the Prime Minister tele-
graphed that he intended to go to Mohammerah
with the army; and on November 26 he left Bu-
shire on the Persian gunboat Pahlevi. Two days
later he telegraphed that he had arrived at the
front, and in reply to another telegram from the
Sheikh couched in terms of surrender, he had
replied :

Inasmuch as he is a Persian subject, and I do not
desire to see that any Persian is destroyed, and inas-
much as I have no other intention except that of bring-
ing about the state of centralization in the country —
a principle which I have always pointed out to the
public — ^he must come to the advance part of the front,
where he must verbally plead for amnesty and i; renew
his desire to surrender.

Zoka ol Molk, as Acting Prime Minister, issued
the following statement on December 2:

A rumor, the reflection of which has appeared in some
telegraphic news sheets and local papers, has recently
prevailed with regard to the receipt by the Persian
Government from the Government of Great Britain of
certain notes concerning Khozistan. For the informa-
tion of the public I hereby deny the existence of such
potes, which would be contrary to the sovereign rights

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FAIR WEATHER

of Persia. The Persian Government is making every
effort to protect the interests of Persia.

Acting on my suggestion that in such an
emergency, provision should bo made for prompt
payments to the army, the Majless on December 2
passed the budget of the Ministry of War in ad-
vance of the general budget. The press of Decem-
ber 10 published the following telegram from the
Prime Minister :

At 5 p. M. December 5 I arrived at Nasseri. The son
of Khaz’al, accompanied by a number of the Sheikhs
and notables had come out several farsakhs to meet me.
Nasseri was illuminated and decorated. The inhabi-
tants of the town were making preparations for joy and
festivity. Ehaz’al, who had been compelled by serious
illness to go to Mohammerah, returned to Nasseri. Ac-
companied by Morteza Gholi Khan Bakhtiari, he came
to me this morning (December 6) asked for amnesty
and obtained it. All the reinforcements dispatched
from the Western Division of the Army have arrived
in Dizful. The inhabitants illuminated the city during
three successive evenings and celebrated the arrival of
the troops on a large scale.

On December 15, the Prime Minister tele-
graphed that he had completed the settlement of
the Khozistan affair ; that he had appointed Gen-
eral Fazlollah Khan as Governor-General of
Khozistan ; that the Khorammabad-Khozistan
road was re-opened to caravan traffic ; and that he

233

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

would leave for Teheran on December 17, by way
of Bagdad, making a pilgrimage on the way to
the shrines of Kerbela and Nedjef.

Following the subjugation of the Sheikh, we
sent a commission to Khozistan to organize a pro-
vincial financial administration; and it is our in-
tention in the future to collect directly the rev-
enues of that region. The Vali of Posht-i-Kouh,
who fled to Iraq after the surrender of Khaz’al,
also obtained amnesty and in April acknowledged
complete submission to the Central Government;
and at the request of the Prime Minister we im-
mediately took steps to establish financial and
customs agencies in his territory.

It can be conjectured that Khaz’al showed signs
of wavering, for in May, 1925, he came to Teheran
on the invitation of the Prime Minister ; and when
I left Persia, on leave of absence, the once semi-
sovereign chieftain was living quietly, making and
receiving no calls, in one of the residences of the
capital.

When the Prime Minister arrived in Teheran on
January 1, 1925, bronzed by his winter travels, he
was accorded a reception which far outshone that
which had greeted the Shah two years before.
Arches were erected over the streets ; public build-
ings and shops were decorated and illuminated;
a public holiday was declared; gifts were pre-
sented to him and flowers scattered in his path.

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PAIR WEATHER

Bumor had it also that, even before his arrival,
certain of the enemies of the American Mission
had attempted to win him definitely to their side.
So it is necessary now to turn in our story from
the unification of Persia to the position of the
mission.

As I have mentioned before, there was in the
Majless a group of deputies who are particularly
devoted to the ideas that underlie the presence
of the American Mission in Persia. Among these
deputies are Mostowfi ol Memalek and Muchir ed
Dowleh, ex-prime ministers, Khaikosrow Shah-
rokh, the Zoroastrian member, Hossein Khan
Alai, and Taghi Zadeh. Alai had been at one
time a forward-looking minister of public works,
and for a number of years had served with dis-
tinction in the Persian diplomatic service, being
at the time of my appointment minister at Wash-
ington. Taghi Zadeh was, in 1906, one of the
young revolutionary deputies whose eloquence
swayed the Majless and who was a strong in-
fluence in the establishment of the Constitution.
For several years he had been in Europe. The
return of these two men to Persia in the fall of
1924, and their addition to the independent group,
injected new blood, enthusiasm, hope, and energy
into the progressive forces. I do not wish to im-
ply that the five men that I have mentioned were
the most influential in the Majless or were the

235

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

only ones that were ready to defend the American
Mission. Many deputies were destined in a few
weeks to rise to the defense of the mission or of
the measures proposed by it. These men, how-
ever, formed the nucleus around which grew in a
short time a friendly majority; and since con-
ferences are most fruitful when limited in num-
ber, it was to these few men — distinguished for
probity, sagacity, and patriotism — that I turned
and was advised by others to turn for counsel and
assistance. With these deputies I have had fre-
quent meetings; and their efforts, with the help
of others and with the natural trend of circum-
stances, brought about an amazing change of at-
titude on the part of the Majless.

I speak of the natural trend of circumstances
because I believe that during its first year, the
fifth Majless, like the Prime Minister and myself,
had to pass through a period of orientation and
adjustment. Personal and local questions, which
at the start were uppermost in the minds of the
deputies, had to run their natural course ; an ap-
preciation had to bo gained of national questions ;
the deputies had to become acquainted with one
another, with the Government, and with the Amer-
ican Mission; and, finally, time worked its own
cure, for a deputy, even though desirous of con-
structive legislation, could hardly be expected to
hurry much with twenty-four, eighteen, or even

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twelve long months between him and another elec-
tion.

Feeling that much of the hostility to the Amer-
ican Mission had been duo to misunderstanding, I
adopted the policy of sending to a number of the
deputies copies of my official communications on
matters of general interest. These mimeographed
copies of memoranda, letters, and projects, cir-
culated among the deputies, made the truth known
and took the wind out of the sails of those whose
trade in intrigue had depended largely on mis-
representation or misunderstanding. On Novem-
ber 25, 1924, during the discussion of the budget,
Emad os Saltaneh, Deputy of Isfahan, delivered
a speech in defense of the mission ; and a speech
by an editor-deputy attacking the mission met
with an unfavorable reception. Later, Mirza
Abdollah Yassai, deputy of Semnan, rose splen-
didly to our defense. The changed attitude of the
Majless was concretely shown when Khaikrosrow
Shahrokh, proposing the salaries and expenses of
the Parliament for 1925-26, voluntarily reduced
the estimates by an amount of forty thousand
tomans.

In order to assist in the formulation of con-
structive economic jjrojects, the Majless estab-
lished at about this time a new commission, called
the Economics Commission, consisting of seven
able deputies under the chairmanship of Taghi

237

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Zadeh. The first work of the commission, in
which the Minister of Finance and 1 participated,
was to draft a bill, which was duly approved by
the Government, embodying a permanent pro-
gram of road-construction and maintenance and
proposing new taxes to carry out the program.

I called on the Prime Minister the day after his
return to Teheran, and found him most ‘cordial.
Returning my call a few days later, he stated that
his visit to Khozistan had. greatly impressed him
with the resources of Persia, and that he desired
more than ever to cooperate with the American
Mission in getting constructive projects through
the Majless and in attracting foreign capital to
the country for the development of its resources.
During the absence of Sardar Assad in Isfahan
and Khozistan, the Ministry of Posts and Tele-
graphs had suffered another relapse ; and, having
reached the conclusion that our difficulties' with
that ministry could not be removed so long as
Mokhber ed Dowleh remained, the Prime Minister
authorized Sardar Assad to remove him; and on
February 1, 1925, this under-secretary, who had
been a persistent stumbling-block in the path of
reform, submitted his resignation. Since that
date our relations with the Ministry of Posts and
Telegraphs have been satisfactory.

In order that there might be less danger of
misunderstanding in the future between the Gov-

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FAIR WEATHER

ernment and the American Mission, the Prime
Minister asked me to attend regularly the Satur-
day sessions of the Council of Ministers. This
I have done.

After the return of the Prime Minister, the
question of the monarchy, and particularly the
question of the position of Beza Khan Pahlevi in
the Government, became again acute. The Shah
had been in France for more than a year. The
Prime Minister, according to my information, de-
sired assurance that, in continuing the work in
which he was engaged, his position should not he
jeopardized by a state of affairs which bred un-
settling intrigues. Patriotic Persians, opposed to
any action which might disturb or appear to dis-
turb the program of economic development, de-
sired a return to political normality. Represent-
atives of the various Parliamentary groups met
and prepared a bill which was passed on February
14, 1925, naming Beza Khan Pahlevi the gen-
eralissimo of all the defensive and security forces
of the empire and providing that he should not
be removed from his post except by vote of the
Majless. On February 28, 1925, according to
press reports, the Crown Prince called on the
Prime Minister ; when, a little later, the ex-Shah,
Mohamed Ali, died in exile, the Prime Minister
was reported to have spent the day consoling the
Crown Prince; and it was also reported in the

239

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

press, about the same time, that telegrams bad
been sent to the Shah asking him to return to
Persia.

In order to facilitate further the cooperation
between the Government and the Majless, the
Prime Minister proposed on February 17, 1925,
that a commission of twelve leading deputies be
appointed to confer with the Government on im-
portant questions of policy. This commission
was appointed on March 4; its sessions were at-
tended by the President of the Majless, the Prime
Minister, the ministers, and myself, and it proved
most useful in formulating projects and expedit-
ing their passage through the Majless.

At about this time, I called the attention of the
Prime Minister to the clause in my contract, and
in the contracts of my principal assistants, which
gave either of the two parties a right to terminate
the contract at the end of three years. Sinbe the
three-year period was to end on September 29,
1925, and since many of the members of the Amer-
ican Mission were entitled to three months ’ leave
of absence, I requested the Prime Minister to in-
dicate for our guidance whether or not the Gov-
ernment intended to exercise its option. I told
him further that since some of the members of
the mission would probably wish to leave Persia,
it appeared necessary to introduce a bill into the
Majless for the employment of additional Amer-

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FAIR WEATHER

leans. He replied without hesitation that the
Government had no intention of terminating our
services, and that he would support a bill for the
employment of more Americans. Accordingly, a
project for the engagement of twelve Americans
for the financial administration was introduced
into the Majless and was passed on May 19, 1925,
without substantial opposition. "When the new
positions are filled, the mission will have sixteen
members, including an agricultural expert and
eight men for the provinces.

In accordance with the terms agreed upon for
the repayment of the advances received from the
Imperial Persian Bank, the oil royalties payable
on December 31, 1924, had not been available for
governmental expenses. On the other hand, it
had been impossible during the year to obtain new
revenue to fill the gap caused by the loss of the
royalties. As a result we had steadily fallen be-
hind in current disbursements, and as the end of
the year approached, the payment of the budg-
etary expenses was on the average about a month
in arrears. As Now-Euz — the time of holidays,
feasting, and presents — drew near, discontent
among the employees increased. Teachers went
on strike, and the Ministry of Justice made illegal
payments to its employees and judges out of its
trust funds. In order to relieve the situation, the
ministers and many of the deputies desired to

241

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

obtain another advance of a million and a half
tomans, which the bank had indicated its willing-
ness to give.

I pointed out, at this juncture, that a further
advance would be inadvisable unless the Majless
would approve an increase of taxes. Although
less than a week remained before Now-Buz and
the end of the year, the Prime Minister, went per-
sonally to the Majless on March 16, introduced a
bill that we had prepared for the amendment of
the tobacco-tax law, and asked its urgent consid-
eration. The Prime Minister and all the Cabinet
worked among the deputies and attended the ses-
sions of the Majless. The debate began the same
evening and continued on the following day, and
the bill was passed by an overwhelming majority
at eleven o’clock in the evening of the next day.
This encouraging success with a tax project is to
be credited largely to the personal exertions of
the Prime Minister and to the energy and parlia-
mentary skill of Sardar Moazzam. The new
law is estimated to produce a half-million tomans
additional revenue yearly. Its enactment is a
striking refutation of the charge that Persians
cannot make decisions or act quickly. On April
21, the Minister of Finance introduced two new
tax bills : one for a government monopoly of sugar
and tea, the proceeds to be used for the construc-

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FAIR WEATHER

tion of railroads, and the other for a tax on
matches, the revenue to be assigned to sanitation.
The first project, estimated to produce five mil-
lion tomans yearly, was passed on May 30, 1925,
and the second with an estimated annual return
of two hundred thousand tomans is expected to
be approved soon.

In May, 1925, occurred an outbreak of the
Turkomans, who inhabit Estrabad in the north-
eastern part of Persia. For some time their
sporadic forays had caused losses to the peasants
of adjacent provinces ; but, according to the state-
ment of the Assistant Minister of the Interior in
Parliament :

On about the middle of Ordibehesht (May 5) we
were in receipt of reports to the effect that the Turko-
mans had come in boats and bad suddenly landed in
Mazanderan and Tunekaboun. Also we learned that
they had committed certain acts of mischief in the
neighborhood of Bojnourd. When these events hap-
pened about a week ago, the Government lost no time
and took immediate steps to send forces and aeroplanes.
The Government's policy is to try to settle an incident
peacefully. But when this policy fails to bring forth
the desired results and encourages the outlaws, we con-
sider it as our duty to take immediate and drastic steps
to face the situation. The Ministry of War states that
forces have already been despatched and action has
been taken to suppress the insurgents. I sincerely hope

243

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

that within two or three days I shall be able to give
some good hews to Parliament.

From reports that I have received since leav-
ing Persia, I understand that this uprising has
been suppressed and its leaders appropriately
punished.

While engaged in suppressing the Turkomans,
the Prime Minister began in May, 1925, the dis-
arming of the Bakhtiari and Kashgai tribes.
Thus the work of unification proceeded apace;
and, as if to put a seal on his brilliant accomplish-
ments, Keza Khan Pahlevi, in the summer of 1925,
personally visited Azerbaidjan, the scene of his
first triumph, and Khorassan, of his latest. The
stability of Persia is further shown by the fact
that during the Kurdish uprising in Turkey, in
March, 1925, there was, according to reports, per-
fect calm in the Kurdish region of Persia.

Starting in the spring of 1925, the fourth fiscal
year that we have experienced in Persia, we were
able to chronicle a continuance of financial prog-
ress. Incomplete accounts for the fiscal year
ending March 21, 1925, indicated that the deficit
had been brought down to probably one half of
one per cent, of the total budget. In spite of
serious crop failures which not only aggravated
our alimentation difiSculties but also reduced

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FAIR WEATHER

revenues, the receipts from internal taxes for the
year were twelve per cent, more than in the
previous year. Our control over expenditures
was tightening. Centralized purchasing had ef-
fected a clear saving of over fifty thousand
tomans. The assets and liabilities of the Bank-i-
Iran were transferred to the Ministry of I’inance ;
and there was strong sentiment among the Per-
sians for the establishment of a Persian national
bank. Projects for the purchase of pensions, for
the payment of Persian claims, and for agricul-
tural relief, were pending in tlio Parliament. The
adverse balance of trade, without considering “in-
visible” exports and imports, was steadily de-
creasing. Importations of silver were keeping
the mint working day and night. The tariff and
fishery problems, under discussion with the Soviet
Legation, were still unsolved, but a reasonable
offer made by the British Government seemed to
present a practicable basis for the settlement of
its monetary claims. An able special envoy from
the Netherlands visited Persia early in 1925 to
study the economic situation. The cities of
Persia, such as Teheran, Tabriz, and Eesht, were
widening their streets, and the roads of Persia
were noticeably improved. To demonstrate that
Persia is not interested solely in financial and
economic progress, one new tax project was ear-

245

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

marked for sanitation and another for education;
the calendar was reformed and titles abolished;
a large part of a code of commerce was put into
effect; a project for electoral reform was ad-
vanced to its third reading; a law abolishing ob-
solescent imperial farmans and a bill defining the
terms of Persian citizenship were introduced.

246

CHAPTER X

AGRICULTURE, MANUFACTURING,
TRANSPORTATION, AND
COMMERCE

My contract with the Persian Govern-
ment provides that the Administrator-
General of the Finances shall be con-
sulted by the Government “in regard to all com-
mercial and industrial concessions and shall have
an opportunity to express his opinion regarding
them orally or in writing,” and “shall as far as
possible exert his utmost endeavors to extend,
facilitate, and encourage the investment of foreign
capital in Persia, with a view of overcoming in
every way the economic crisis in Persia and to
contribute to the economic development of Persia
on a sound basis.” Under these provisions of
my contract, I have been in almost daily consulta-
tion with the Government on economic subjects.

The Persians are undertaking a task which has
been, and still is, baffling and discouraging even
to the politically gifted and experienced Anglo-
Saxons. They are molding a nation, which they
hope may be unified and independent; they are

247

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

making a government, which they wish to be a
representative, respectable, and efficient instru-
ment of economic and social progress. They are
apparently getting ahead in their task in spite of
formidable difficulties. The geographical situa-
tion of the country is, of course, one of the handi-
caps. As a young and none too reverent Persian
once remarked to me, “God had become’ careless
when he got around to make Persia.” Largely
because of geography, it is necessary at this late
date for Persia to modernize its primitive culture
and to develop neglected resources while working
out the problem of self-government.

Varieties of soil and temperature, as well as
varying degrees of rainfall, — ranging from desert
conditions in the center, to the over-abundant
rainfall of the north coast, — render Persia almost
self-sufficient as regards its agricultural and live-
stock production. It is perhaps difficult or impos-
sible to find Persian-grown pineapples, bananas,
or maize; and the different variations in form,
color, and flavor resulting from modern, scientific
breeding are not so evident in Persian markets
and on Persian tables as in Western countries;
but, nevertheless, an enumeration of the things
which are or can be produced in Persia would
constitute almost a complete list of the world’s
agricultural products. The chief exportable agri-
cultural and live-stock products are dates, figs,

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AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

wheat, barley, cotton, tobacco, opium, silk, raisins,
rice, sheep’s intestines, and wool. In addition,
Persia grows, for its own consumption, tea of
good quality, olives, fruits, vegetables, and nuts,
and all kinds of meats (except, of course, pork
and pork products). Game is abundant. Herds
of gazelles may be seen from the roads ; partridge-
shooting and trout-fishing are common sports.

Nevertheless, with the exception of opium and
fresh and dried fruits, Persia was at the time of
our arrival exporting only insignificant quantities
of agricultural and animal products. The lack
of agricultural exports other than those men-
tioned, was duo chiefly to the difficult transport
conditions and the stoppage of trade with Russia.

The village system of agriculture, somewhat
similar to the manorial system of medieval
Europe, exists throughout most of the country.
The villages, with the surrounding cultivated land,
range in size from a few acres to several square
miles ; in population they vary from a few families
to several thousand. Some of the villages attain
the proportions of towns or small cities, with
caravansaries, mosques, bazaars, numerous shops
of tradesmen and artisans, and extensive gardens.
Many villages are owned by landlords who reside
in Teheran or other cities. They make occasional
visits to their properties, but usually leave the
details of administration to their agents. The

249

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

arable land around a village is divided into strips
or blocks, and these are apportioned among the
peasants for cultivation.

The peasants live in the village, and with their
women, children, and farm animals go out to the
surrounding fields during the day.

Only a fraction of the rural area of Persia is
cultivated. Between villages lie stretches of
pasture-lands or of land which though fertile is
bare because of the absence of water. Almost
anywhere, when water and seed are brought, the
soil blossoms like the delta region of Egypt. The
average rainfall in the interior, however, is only
about six inches, and agricultural production,
therefore, depends on irrigation. Irrigation in
the interior is effected in general by means of
kanats or underground canals, through which
water is carried to the towns and villages and
made available for the watering of the fields.
Every hundred yards or more there is an open-
ing into the kanat, from the surface, and fhrough
these openings the peasants descend to clean
away sediment or to remove other obstacles.
Near cities or large villages, the landscape is
fairly pockmarked with the crater-like openings
to the kanats.

During the war — due to devastation by the
armies, the industrial depression, and in many
regions the scattering of the inhabitants — ^villages

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AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

and kanats went to ruin. There are, I dare say,
few villages in Persia which do not show more or
less the ravages of the last few years. Some are
wholly ruined and deserted ; the mud houses fallen
down ; the kanats caved in and dry ; the fields bare
and baked.

About six months after my arrival in Persia,
the financial agent of Garrous, in northwestern
Persia, reported that of two hundred and forty-
one villages in his district, one hundred and six
were ruined and without inhabitants, while the re-
mainder were partly ruined and partly tenantless.

By tax-exemptions, loans of seed, and, as in the
Urumiah region, loans of money for the repair of
buildings and the purchase of seed, oxen, and
implements, some assistance has already been
given in the reconstruction of agriculture. In the
spring of 1925, the Government introduced into
the Majless a bill, which was favorably reported
by the Budget Commission, authorizing the Min-
istry of Finance to grant loans to landowners, out
of the retirement-pension fund, on the security of
real estate, for the reconstruction of villages ; and
it is also the purpose of the Government to use a
part of the proceeds of a foreign loan for the
reconstruction of irrigation. At present, im-
provement may be scarcely perceptible ; but with
the continuance of order in the country, with the
re-opening of foreign trade, with the improve-

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

ment of internal transportation, and with well-
planned financial assistance by the Government,
the recovery of agriculture should in a few years
become marked.

Three years ago modern agricultural machinery
was virtually unknown in Persia. Plowing was
by wooden plows drawn by oxen, or in some cases
the ground was spaded by hand; the grain was
cut by sickles, drawn by donkeys, threshed by
tramping with oxen driven round and round in
circles over the heaped-up grain, and winnowed
by the wind. Since our arrival, Russian, British,
and American agricultural machinery has been
imported, and is finding a steady sale to the more
progressive landowners.

Parm machinery has been demonstrated at the
Agricultural School at Teheran, which is directed
by the Minister of Finance ; and these demonstra-
tions are always attended in large numbers by in-
terested Persian officials and proprietors. Also,
plans are under way for the establishment of
model farms and experiment stations.

Fertilizer is little used, and probably in most
districts unnecessary. The fields are cultivated
one year and lie fallow the next.

The distribution of the crop, among the various
factors in its production, is a complicated matter,
which is, however, of much practical importance
from the viewpoint of land-taxation, as well as

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AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

from the broader viewpoint of the wage system
and the distribution of wealth. Owing to the
varying climate, the lack of homogeneity, the
absence of uniform customs, the difference in the
number of peasants in different places, and the
fact that some landlords have more power than
others, there is no uniform rule with regard to
the apportionment of the crop. In general, it may
be said that in a typical village irrigated by means
of kanats, there are five factors in production, —
land, labor, oxen, water, and seed, — and to the
one who provides each factor a fifth of the product
is given. "Where the land is watered sufficiently
by rain or by natural streams, the distribution is
different. In some places the peasant may re-
ceive two thirds or three fifths of the crop; in
other places the proprietor likewise may receive
two, three, or even four of the shares. If there
is, as is likely, a gavhand or cow-keeper, he will
receive one fifth of the product; and if he also
furnishes the seed, he may get two fifths, or one
third. There are also laborers who are employed
by the peasants for wages and servants who re-
ceive little more than a bare livelihood.

Local government in a Persian village is simple.
The principal authority in agricultural affairs is
the kakhoda or head-man. In many districts, the
distribution of water is in the special charge of a
water-man. When a dispute arises over water or

253

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

land, it is often submitted to the impartial de-
cision of the graybeards. When any case requir-
ing a legal judgment arises, appeal is made to the
local mullahs, to the sub-governor, or even to the
governor of the province.

In most of the villages, unfortunately, there
are at present no schools, courts, or police.
Nevertheless, there is little crime or disorder.

Almost every Persian village has its own char-
acter and traditions, being locally famous for its
melons, fruit, rugs, embroidery, or other handi-
craft, or for the industry, intelligence, or bravery
of its people.

The following extracts, in free translation from
the report of one of our cadastral surveyors, will
throw light on the conditions in the Veramin
district about twenty miles from Teheran: • .

Veramin comprises three hundred and sixty villages,
of which fifty-two, belong to the Government. Its
length from north to south is twelve farsakhs [about
forty-eight miles] ; its width from east to west is ten
farsakhs [about forty miles]. Only one tenth of this
district is cultivated. The soil consists of sand and
clay, and, if dug to the depth of from five to twenty-
five yards, water will be found. Veramin is irrigated
by two hundred and thirty kanats running from the
Djajeroud River. There is no rain after the middle of
spring. There are no thunder-storms and the wind is
insufficient. In summer the east wind is warm, west

254

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

wind cool. The quantity of seed sown is nine thousand
khavars per annum, about ninety thousand bushels.
The principal crops are wheat, barley, millet, corn, rye,
and rice. When there is no damage, wheat produces
eighteen-fold and other grains from twenty-five to
seventy-fold. Poppy, cotton, sunfiower, and caster are
also raised. The fruits are figs, pomegranates, and
apricots; the fruitless trees are poplar, sycamore, and
ash. The farm animals are principally camels, sheep,
goats, horses, mules, and donkeys; and domestic fowls
are represented by turkeys and hens. There are no
schools. Most of the peasants are poor and many of
them have left their homes.

The following abstract of a report prepared by
another Persian finance official describes condi-
tions in the province of Isfahan :

Most of the land is irrigated by the river Zayendeh-
Bood, flowing from Zardkooh Mountains, one hundred
miles to the west of Isfahan, but in some districts irriga-
tion is from wells. In spring the excess flow of the
river loses itself in the sand tract called Gav-Khooni,
a hundred miles to the east of Isfahan. The climate is
moderate. In the summer the maximum temperature
is from thirty-two to thirty-six Centigrade in the sun.
The minimum is from twenty-one to twenty-five. The
freezing season lasts for two months during the winter,
with a moderate fall of snow. There is no rain during
the summer and there are no clouds. Soft and cooling
breezes blow from the south and west. Thunder-storms
are rare. The soil is clay and chalk mixed in some

255

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

sections with fine sand. Alfalfa, clover, and maize are
cultivated successfully; the climate is very favorable
for growing mulberry trees; grapes are most successful.
The inhabitants are penurious, credulous, and satisfied.
There are well-bred horses, swift donkeys, camels, mules,
and load donkeys. Large fat-tailed and Turkish sheep
are realred' plentifully. Good cows are rarely seen.
Hens are common; tui*eys, geese, and ducks are rare.
Apples, pears, apricots, and peaches are of remarkable
size and fine flavor, and the quinces and melons are the
best in Persia. Opium is extensively cultivated. To-
bacco and cotton are also important crops. Rice is also
produced in some districts.

The most significant feature of agriculture in
Persia, is its comparatively limited area. In the
areas actually under cultivation at present, pro-
duction can probably, by obvious and practicable
measures, be increased sufficiently to support a
population two or three times as great - as the
present population of the country. The most
needed measures for the increase of agricultural
production are the reconstruction of ruined vil-
lages ; the combating of insect pests and diseases
of plants and animals; the improvement of seed
and methods of cultivation ; the use of agricultural
machinery ; the substitution in certain districts of
crops better adapted to the climate than those
grown at present, and the construction of large-
scale irrigation works. The application of these
measures is imperatively needed at present to im-

256

Garden of Dr. Millspaugh's summer home at Tajrish

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

prove the living conditions of the people and to
insure against famine.

The general stimulation, to any great extent,
of agricultural production in Persia, however,
would not be economically desirable or possible
until improved transportation facilities had been
provided and markets had been found for the ex-
cess production. The resumption of trade with
Russia provides such a market for certain of the
surplus products of the Caspian littoral. The ex-
portation of the surplus production of other parts
of Persia must wait, in general, until markets
have been found and means provided in the in-
terior of Persia for the transportation of its
products to the frontiers.

Of the insect pests which prey on the crops of
Persia, locusts and grasshoppers are a perennial
cause of loss; but one of the most serious pests
which we have had to combat, in our efforts to
preserve the crops of Teheran Province and to
protect the bread-supply of the capital, is the
senn. This insect breeds on a mountainside near
Teheran, emerges from the bushes early in the
spring, and starts its flight to the fields. It is
said to suck the sap in the grain-stems as a silk>
worm eats a mulberry leaf. It is understood that
about seventeen years ago, after a very cold
winter, the senn almost disappeared and the price
of wheat decreased to about a quarter of its pres-

257

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

ent price. We have attempted, with the as-
sistance of the army, to bum the breeding-places
of the insects, and have also paid the peasants for
gathering them by hand. None of these measures,
however, have thus far been effective, and it is
hoped that the new American agricultural expert
may succeed in solving this important problem.

Anthrax and cattle-plague, during the past year
or two, have killed increasing numbers of cattle,
and have seriously handicapped production
through losses of work-oxen. Serum for inocula-
tion, however, is now successfully made in Persia,
and it is hoped this will check the spread of these
diseases.

No survey of Persian agriculture would be com-
plete without a reference to opium-cultivation.
There are none among the thinking classes in
Persia who do not realize the serious moral,
physiological, and economic menace of the opium
habit. The Persian Government had before our
arrival taken steps to regulate the trade in opium.
It has been ready, I am convinced, to cooperate
whole-heartedly with other nations in controlling
the export trade in Persian opium, in restricting
its cultivation in Persia, and in limiting its con-
sumption to medicinal requirements, even though
these measures should bring about a serious
sacrifice of revenue. Irrespective of the revenue
which is derived by the Government from it,

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AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

opium-cultivation in Persia constitutes one of the
important agricultural industries, and the only
one which makes any substantial contribution to
the export trade. Opium is a compact commodity
representing large value in small bulk; and not-
withstanding that it must be carried long dis-
tances by wagons and pack-animals, it can be
transported and exported at a profit. The opium
poppy is raised in eighteen of the twenty-six
provinces; its cultivation is scattered over an
area of four hundred thousand square miles. The
total aimual production is approximately a thou-
sand tons. In 1923-24, exports of opium through
the customs-houses were valued at 6,021,971 to-
mans, or 15.6 per cent, of the total export trade of
Persia, exclusive of petroleum.^

Allowing for undervaluation and for contra-
band shipments, the opium exports may be safely
estimated at from one fifth to one fourth of the
total exports of Persia, exclusive of petroleum.
In many districts, opium is virtually the only crop
which yields cash returns, and a large number of
people are almost or wholly dependent on the
opium business for their livelihood. In Isfahan,
the center of opium-production, it is estimated

1 Petroleum, the principal Persian export, does not figure
in the balance of trade, since it virtually returns to Persia
only the royalties paid to the Government, the payment of
wages of employees, and a small amount paid for supplies in
Persia.

259

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

that at least one quarter of the population of the
city is dependent more or less on the opium trade.^

Nevertheless, there is no disinclination in Persia
to face the fact that measures for the agricultural
and commercial development of Persia must be
considered in the light of the ultimate restriction
of opium-cultivation and export, and that any such
measures — if they are far-sighted, sound, and
comprehensive — ^must include plans for the sub-
stitution of other exportable crops for opium.
Among the crops which appear possible thus to
substitute are wheat, silk, tobacco, cotton, tea,
hemp and flax, and dried fruits. It may be pos-
sible, also, to find a measure of compensation in
the future production of beef cattle, wool, and
lambskins for export, and in the development of
mineral resources. The practical realization of
such substitutions, however, will demand careful
experimentation and systematic preparation, the
finding of markets abroad, and particularly the
improvement of transportation in Persia.

At the recent Opium Conference at Geneva, the
Persian Government laid its case frankly and
fully before the other nations. The remarkable
significance of its action seems in some quarters
to have been overlooked. An opium-producing
country, with a large industry and an important
part of its export trade and revenue at stake,

1 See page above.

260

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

Persia, nevertheless, declared in good faith its
entire willingness to adopt measures in accord
with the most enlightened conceptions of the
world’s moral and hygienic needs, provided only
that the other nations — ^which are wealthier than
Persia, have infinitely less, economically, at stake,
and from the hygienic standpoint will benefit im-
measurably more than Persia by the restriction of
opium production — should assist in carrying out
any practical economic measure which may be
demonstrably necessary to bring about the cur-
tailment of opium-cultivation in the country.

It is not necessary or appropriate here to dis-
cuss the reasons for the failure of the Geneva
Conference. It seems clear, however, that the
Persian position at the conference was neither
obstructive nor impracticable. There was no in-
tention on the part of Persia to fix conditions
merely for purposes of procrastination, or to use
the opium question as a pretext for procuring a
foreign loan. It is true that Persia, in laying her
cards on the conference table, stated that a
foreign loan of perhaps ten million tomans (not
ten million “tom-cats” as some of the Geneva
delegates remarked), with certain reasonable as-
sistance in connection with the tariff and foreign
claims, seemed to be the quickest and most
practical method of financing the industrial change
required by the restriction of opium-production.

261

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Our estimate of the exact sum required for the
processes of substitution, was of course tenta-
tive; and I hope it will be possible for some au-
thoritative body to send a competent commission
to Persia to study the situation on the ground and
report the facts to the world.

Tobacco grown in Persia is of three kinds:
water-pipe, grown in the southern provinces, pipe
tobacco, raised in the northwest, and cigarette
tobacco, produced in Guilan and Mazanderan, on
the Caspian coast. Persian tobacco is of excel-
lent quality and should find a readier sale abroad.

The soil and climate of Persia are favorable for
cotton-growing. The chief drawbacks thus far
have been the crude methods of cultivation and
the poor selection of seed. Before the war the
production of cotton in Persia had reached 140,-
000 bales of five hundred pounds each, constitut-
ing almost a fifth of the exports of Persia. In
1920-21, the exports were less than 3000 bales.
Due to the loss of markets, because of the World
War and the Revolution in Russia, cotton-culti-
vation was largely abandoned and other crops
were planted instead.

The war and its incidental effects cut down silk-
production in Persia ninety per cent. The cen-
ters of silkworm breeding are in the Caspian
provinces. The mulberry, however, can be grown
in most of the provinces ; and there is now before

262

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

the Majless a project granting to a French com-
pany a non-monopolistic concession for the im-
portation of silkworm eggs. When this conces-
sion goes into effect, an adequate supply of
healthy eggs will be assured and the silk industry
should advance.

Tea-planting was started seventeen years ago,
in the province of Guilan on the Caspian coast;
and a Dutch tea expert has now been engaged to
supervise and encourage the further development
of this industry.

In the absence of transportation facilities,
cheap fuel, and the development of its natural re-
sources, Persia has thus far shown hardly a
semblance of modern industrial development.
The carpets and rugs, silks and embroidery, pot-
tery, silver, and brass of Persia are world-
famous; but the manufacture of these articles is
almost entirely by hand, the so-called factories
at Sultanabad (Aragh) and Hamadan consisting
of hand-looms. Handicraft work of artistic merit
and high quality is done in the villages by the
peasants during the winter months. Persians
are industrious and skilful workers, adaptable to
jiew methods, apt at handling machinery, and
amenable to expert direction; but the conditions
in the country have rendered the development of
manufacturing on any large or modern scale eco-
nomically unjustified. The chief hindrances are

263

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

the high cost of fuel, the lack of other power, the
absence of transport facilities, and the cheapness
of hand labor.

In order to encourage textile manufacturing,
the Majless had passed a law, shortly before our
arrival, requiring all officials and employees of
the Persian Government — ^including those of the
army, road guards, and police — to wear clothes
of Persian manufacture, and subjecting to a fine
any who should be discovered wearing foreign-
made dress. We were interested in the execu-
tion of this law from the point of view of getting
the fines into the treasury; and, fairly well en-
forced, the law has distinctly encouraged the
spinning and weaving industry. Requests are
now frequently addressed to the Ministry of Fi-
nance for the exemption of imports of spinning
and weaving machinery from customs duties;, and
road-tolls. With the approval of the Govern-
ment, we have in general complied with such re-
quests. A large spinning factory, to be equipped
with German machinery, is now under construc-
tion at Isfahan. Attempts have been made to es-
tablish iu Persia the manufacture of sugar,
matches, leather, boots and shoes, and buttons.
A well-equipped sugar-beet factory stands un-
used a few miles from Teheran, and a match fac-
tory is operating at Tabriz. An interesting
exhibition of Persian home-craft products and

264

AGRICUL'fURE AND COMMERCE

foreign machinery was held at Teheran in the
winter of 1923.

Trades unions and employers’ federations do
not exist in Persia; but there are merchants’
guilds and chambers of commerce. Labor is
cheap, and the unemployment situation in Persia
is chronic — vindicated by the large number of dis-
ponibles ; the number of idle, both rich and poor ;
the number of low-paid servants, and the hordes
of beggars that infest certain of the towns.

There are in Persia no industrial stock com-
panies or societies, in the Western sense; al-
though Persians associate quite commonly into
partnerships and groups. There appears to be
little liquid capital in Persia available for invest-
ment, for the incomes of the large proprietors are
largely in kind; but some Persian money is in-
vested in foreign securities.

The unsettled conditions in the country, the
individuality of the Persian, and the absence of
adequate means for enforcing laws and contracts,
have in the past discouraged association for the
investment of capital in industrial undertakings.
At present, however, a part of a commercial code
has been put into execution, stability and security
exist in the country, the indiscriminate granting
of contracts and concessions has ceased, oppor-
tunities for investment are becoming more ap-
parent, and it is expected that with returning

265

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

prosperity a larger amount of the available capi-
tal of Persians will be offered for investment in
the country. Persians with capital to invest are
already showing marked activity, and the Govern-
ment and the Majless desire to have them par-
ticipate in the development of the country with
or without association with foreigners. Never-
theless, Persia, for many years to come, must
depend largely on foreign capital and foreign
initiative.

The improvement of transportation facilities
seems to offer the key to the economic develop-
ment of this retarded region.

The principal commercial entrances of the
country are the ports of Bandar Abbass, Bushire,
and Mohammerah on the southern coast ; the port
of Pahlevi on the Caspian; Kasr-Chirin oh the
Ira^ frontier in the west near Khanikin, tho ter-
minal of the railroad running north from Basra
through Bagdad; Julfa on the Russian frontier in
the northwest, connected by railroad with Tabriz
and Tiflis; and Duzdab, the Persian head of the
Indian railway in the southeast.

Persia has been an isolated country. When
the tide of the world’s commeree, industry, and
civilization moved westward, it was left, fig-
uratively and literally, high and dry. Even in
the last three years, however, the country has be-
come more accessible. In 1922, the American

266

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Mission went to Persia by the Red Sea — ^Persian-
Gulf route — ^touching at Port Said, Aden, Bom-
bay, Karachi, Bushire and Basra, traveling by
rail from Basra up the Euphrates to Bagdad, and
on to the Persian frontier. To-day, there are
regular departures of seven-passenger limousines
from Teheran via Bagdad to Beirut, making the
trip in about six days. The route through* Russia
also is open. When transit through the Caucasus
is fully reestablished, and when the projected
railroad is built from Bagdad to Haifa on the Red
Sea, Persia will be brought nearer to the world’s
markets. It appears probable, also, that con-
struction in Turkey may bring northwest Persia
nearer to Trebizond on the Black Sea.

During the World War, the British built motor
highways from the Iraq frontier to Kazvin, from
Duzdab near the Indian frontier to Meshed, and
other shorter roads, and they extended the Indian
railways through the Baluchistan desert to Duz-
dab. The railway, which had been built before
the war by the Russians, from Julfa to Tabriz,
with a branch from Sofian to Lake Urumiah,
was transferred to the Persian Government by
the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921, together with
the highway and other transportation concessions
which had been granted to Russians. Neverthe-
less, with these railroads completed and projected,

268

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

steam transportation would lead no farther than
the doorsteps of Persia.

To understand the internal transportation prob-
lem of Persia, one must recall again that it is a
large country, walled in and crossed by mountain

TRANSPORT ROUTES IN PERSIA

ranges, with no navigable rivers except the Karun
in the southwest, which is navigable for a hundred
miles with an average depth of four feet.

The only constructed roads suitable for heavy
269

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

motor traffic are the highway from Kasr-Chirin
to Kazvin, through Kermanshah and Hamadan, a
distance of 380 miles; the road from Pahlevi to
Kazvin through Eesht, a distance of about 140
miles ; the highway from Tabriz to Julfa, parallel-
ing the railroad, a distance of 80 miles; and the
road from Julfa to Khoi in Aizerbaidjan, about 60
miles long. The road from Kazvin to Teheran,
a level stretch of 90 miles, is partly constructed
and is suitable for and is in use by motor traffic.
There is an unmetaled but passable road from
Teheran to Meshed, a distance of 584 miles, and
also one from Teheran to Isfahan, a distance of
240 miles. The roads from Isfahan to Shiraz
(290 miles) and from Isfahan through Yezd to
Kerman (400 miles), as well as the roads from
Meshed to Duzdab (600 miles), and from Duzdab
to Kerman (300 miles), from Bushire to Shiraz
(180 miles), and from Teheran through Ghbm to
Aragh (about 120 miles) are passable by motor-
cars. The non-metaled roads are for the most
part caravan trails, and, naturally, present incon-
veniences or difficulties to the passage of motor-
cars at certain points or during certain seasons
of the year, particularly the rainy season; and
the passes on the Kazvin-Tabriz and Bushir-
Isfahan roads are particularly difficult. There
are several roads in the oil-fields built by the
Anglo-Persian Gil Company; and there is a de-

270

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

cauville railroad in the southern oil-fields about
thirty-eight miles in length, used for the transpor-
tation of the company’s materials.

There are, of course, numerous other trade
routes in Persia, probably the most important be-
ing the route northward to Teheran from Moham-
merah, and the northwest route from Tabriz to
Trebizond on the Black Sea.

When we arrived in Persia the metaled roads
from Kasr-Chirin to Kazvin, which had been built
by the British and Russians, and from Kazvin to
Pahlevi, which had been built by the Russians,
were rapidly deteriorating; and other roads were
in bad condition. The transfer of Mr. Mitchell to
the Ministry of Public Works was followed by
prompt steps to elfect the necessary emergency
repairs, keep the roads in passable condition, and
to make all possible improvements until funds
would be available for a general program of re-
habilitation and construction.

Early in 1925, the Economics Commission of
the Majless formulated a project of law, which
was approved by the Government and now awaits
Parliamentary sanction, setting forth a definite
program of highway-construction and mainte-
nance, and providing new taxes to supply the nec-
essary funds. The project proposes the repair of
the roads from Kasr-Chirin to Kazvin, from Pah-
levi to Kazvin, and from Tabriz to Julfa, and the

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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

construction of the roads from the frontier to
Kasr-Chirin ; from Kazvin to Teheran ; from Kaz-
vin to Tabriz; from Khoi to Bayazet; from Te-
heran to Meshed Hissar ; from Teheran to
Meshed; from Teheran to Bushire, via Ghom,
Isfahan, and Shiraz; from Teheran to Moham-
merah, via Ghom, Aragh (Sultanabad), and Diz-
ful ; from Meshed to Duzdab, and from Meshed to
Hendan. The army has done excellent work in
constructing roads in Azerbaidjan and Khozistan.

Boad-construction and maintenance had in the
past been complicated and retarded by the prac-
tice of granting to private individuals, Persian or
foreign, contracts for the building of certain roads
with the privilege, over a period of years, of col-
lecting the road-tolls on the constructed road.
During the last two years a number of these con-
tracts have been annulled by reason of non-
performance, and it is expected that in the ’future
the roads will be built and maintained with gov-
ernment funds.

When Shuster left Persia, in 1912, there was
one automobile in the country, a French car be-
longing to the Shah. During the World War a
small car of American manufacture was intro-
duced. The commerce of Persia is still to a large
extent carried on camels, donkeys, mules, and
horses, and in horse-drawn wagons ; but automo-
biles and motor-trucks are now a familiar sight

272

Miuza IIassan Khan Piunia Mostowfi ol Mkmalek, in-

(FOKMEKLY MuCHIH ED DOW- PLUENTIAL INDEPENDENT DEI'UTY,

LEH), LEADING INDEPENDENT PHIMB MINISTKII, FkBUITAUY-

DBPUTY, PUIMB MlXlSTBU, JUNE- JUNE, 1923

October, 1923

Mirza IIossbin Khan Pirnia

(FOHMKRLY MOTAMEN OL MOLK),

Presidei^t of the Majless

Sardar Moazzam KhorassAni,
Minister of Public Works

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

on the highways and are rapidly increasing in
number. In 1924, some camel-drivers complained
to the Parliament and the Prime Minister that —
to quote the English translation of their petition
— ^“the speedy traffic of motor-cars at night in-
flicts casualties on embarrassed camels.” Ac-
cordingly, the road guards were instructed to re-
quest the chauffeurs “to drive slowly at night,
particularly when approaching files of camels.”

Before the war, a Russian company operated
a motor-bus service between Teheran and Pahlevi.
Recently, a Russian-Persian company has been
formed, called the Auto-Iran Company, which of-
fered, if the Persian Government would reduce
the road-tolls, to operate one hundred passenger-
and freight-cars over the same route. Unable
in accordance with its treaty obligations to give
special favors with respect to road-tolls, the
Government reduced the tolls on all roads ; and it
is hoped that the new service will soon be in-
augurated.

In view of existing transportation routes, a
large part of Persian commerce has been forced
to pass through Russia and Iraq. As a feature
of the country’s policy to make itself economically
independent,* Persians are looking toward Moham-
merah and Trebizond as future outlets for com-
merce.

In accordance with the Russo-Persian Treaty of
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THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

1921, the Tabriz- Julfa Railroad had been trans-
ferred as a gift to the Persian people. Aside
from the monetary claims against it, which are
considered a debt of the Russian Government,
the actual condition of the railroad was deplor-
able. For a time, on account of the condition of
the ties and the locomotives, the trains ran a poor
second to the camel caravans on thre highway ; but
rehabilitation is now under way; we have recently
purchased two more locomotives, thirty cars, and
a year’s supply of fuel-oil; and the cross-ties,
which had become so rotten that spikes could be
pulled out with one’s fingers, are being replaced.

Lying west of Tabriz, between the city and the
Turkish frontier, stretches the beautiful expanse
of Lake Urumiah. From Sofian, northwest of
Tabriz, a branch of the Tabriz-Julfa Railroad ex-
tends to the lake at Sharif-Khaneh. Some dis-
tance north of the lake is the important trade
route to Trebizond, passing through Marand and
Khoi. Northwest of it is the country of the Kurd-
ish tribes; and around the southern end lies the
remarkably productive agricultural regions of
Urumiah, Sodj-Bolag, and Maraga.

There existed on the lake a fleet of seven motor-
driven boats and fifteen barges, which, with ex-
tensive shore installations, were in good condi-
tion. The entire navigation on the lake was in
the hands of the Persian Government, being man-

274

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

aged by the administration of the Tabriz-Julfa
Railroad. There were also a few boats and barges
belonging to an Englishman named Stevens and a
Russian named Bodaghiantz. The boats were in
poor condition, and the properties on shore were
of little value; but, resting their case on various
documents and contradictory decrees from Per-
sian governments of the past, Stevens and Boda-
ghiantz laid claim to the monopoly of navigation
on the lake. Finally, some months after our ar-
rival, their claims and properties were purchased ;
and the Persian Government thus possesses, free
of any claim, the navigation rights and an ade-
quate fleet of boats, which are already an excellent
source of revenue for the Government. Repair
cost is reduced to a minimum because there is no
fish or animal life in the lake and the dense salt
content prevents decay of timbers. The boats
and barges proved of great value in the subjuga-
tion of the Kurds.

The importance of the Duzdab extension of the
Indian railways, offering an outlet for the wool
and cotton of Khorassan and the grain of Seistan,
is shown by import and export figures. Before
the World War the total trade through Duzdab
amounted to less than a half-million tomans, but
in 1922-23 it had risen to almost nine million
tomans. Major Hall has made the interesting
proposal that a light railway be constructed from

275

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Seistan to Duzdab, a distance of about one hun-
dred and thirty-five miles, which would facilitate
the shipment of Seistan wheat to the Indian mark-
ets, difficult at present, due to the high cost of
animal transport.

Many years before the arrival of the Amer-
ican Mission in Persia, projects for railroad-
construction had been elaborated and discussed,
and had been the subject of diplomatic correspond-
ence.

On September 16, 1888, Nasr ed Din Shah gave
assurance to the British Government that when-
ever a railroad concession should be given in the
north, a concession for a railroad from Teheran
to Shustar would be given to a British company ;
that no railroad concession in the south would
without consultation with the British Government
be granted to any foreign company ; and, further,
that no permission would be given for the con-
struction in Persia of any but commercial rail-
ways. In 1911 and afterward, there was further
correspondence with the British Legation at Te-
heran and with British interests ; and letters were
addressed by Prince Ferouz, then Persian Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, to the Persian Bailway
Syndicate, Ltd., with respect to options for the
construction of railways from Mohammerah
through Khorammabad to Teheran and from
Khanikin to Teheran, with a branch to Pahlevi.

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AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

The period of time mentioned in the correspon-
dence, having expired without any further de-
cision or agreement and* apparently without the
exchange of consideration, the syndicate re-
quested the Government to pay for the expenses
of the preliminary surveys which had been per-
formed by the syndicate on behalf of the Govern-
ment. It appears, therefore, that there is in
existence at the present time no concession or con-
tract for the construction or operation of a rail-
road in Persia.^

There are in Persia a number of short railways,
which are of local industrial importance, but bear
no relation to the general transportation problem
of the country, for example : the tracks in the oil-
fields; the railroad at Teheran, nine miles in
length, from the city to the shrine of Shah Abdul
Azim; the Resht-Pir Bazaar Railroad, five miles
long; the Punel-Mordab Railroad in Guilan, a
very short line not now operating; the Tooleh
Railroad in Guilan, extending from the coast into
the forests, a distance of twenty-four miles, now
in a state of ruin; the Resht-Selki Sar Railroad,
twenty-eight miles long, built for lumbering pur-
poses and now almost totally destroyed; the
LijarM-Ghazian line at Resht, laid for the trans-

iWith the exception of a line about five miles long, running
from Rei^t to Pir-Bazaar on the Caspian Coast, the lease of
which was recently given.

277

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

portation of stone and cement from the sea, now
in a state of complete min; and the short line
built to the iron-mine at Amol in Mazanderan, but
now ruined.

In May, 1925, as I have mentioned, the Majless
passed a law establishing a government monopoly
of sugar and tea, the proceeds of which, estimated
at five million tomans annually, are to be devoted
to the construction of railways.

It is recognized, that while railroads are neces-
sary and inevitable in a progressive and develop-
ing Persia, they must be based on and fed by a
modern system of highways; and it is doubtful,
furthermore, whether an extensive or expensive
system of railroads is practicable in Persia. On
paved highways, much of Persia’s trade may be
carried in motor-tmcks; and the initial cost of a
system of motor-truck transport will be insignifi-
cant compared with that of a railroad, to say noth-
ing of the lower operating costs and the greater
flexibility of motor transport.

Persians, however, are alert not merely to the
economic advantages of railroads but also to their
social and political benefits. They feel that rail-
roads will stir, educate, and modernize the people,
and will contribute, more than any other procur-
able influence, to the unification and better admin-
istration of the country. In this, they are un-
questionably right; and the ultimate value of an

278

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

investment by the Persian Government in rail-
roads cannot be fixed solely by the tangible fiscal
and business estimates which might be determin-
ing in a Western country.

The principles which are now held in view in
Persia, in the discussion of the transportation
problem, are that railroads or any other improved
transportation facilities must be commercial in
purpose, and principally for the interest of that
country, and not, except incidentally, for the mili-
tary, political, or commercial interests of any
other country ; that they must lead to independent
or competing outlets; that they should be con-
structed by foreign firms under contracts, and
after construction should be owned and operated
by the Persian Government, or operated by a pri-
vate company under lease.

Taking Teheran as the political and economic
center of gravity in Persia, and with the above
principles in mind, Persians have visions of a rail-
road running from the capital, southward to
Mohammerah on the Persian Gulf; and another,
perhaps, connecting in a northwesterly direction,
by way of Tabriz, with Trebizond on the Black
Sea. More ambitious imaginations picture a
south-north trunk-line, from Mohammerah to Pah-
levi or Bandar Jaz on the Caspian, and a west-
east line from Khanikin and Kasr-Chirin to Duz-
dab. The project for a pipe-line and railroad

279

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

from the Iraq oil-fields to Haifa on the Mediter-
ranean, should be reckoned with. If this rail-
road is ever constructed, it will provide the short-
est and presumedly the cheapest route for com-
merce between Persia and western Europe; and
would naturally lessen the value of the Moham-
merah route or any other route into Persia.
The present trend of Persian trade with the
West, however, is toward the Mohammerah-
Khorammabad route.

During the past two years, aviation has taken
its place in the air and in the imagination of Per-
sia. Army aeroplanes have operated in Khozi-
stan and in the Turkoman country ; and a German
company, applying for an air-mail contract, has
flown its planes, with many Persian passengers,
over Teheran and to and from Baku. •

The telegraph was introduced into Persia in
1862. Up to 1909, it was farmed out to individu-
als under contract, but since that date it has been
operated directly by the Government, through the
Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs. Persia has
been a member of the International Telegraphic
Union since 1869. There are now about one hun-
dred and fifty telegraph offices in the country, and
the lines have a total length, approximately, of
ten thousand miles. In 1922-23, the telegraph
system transmitted in the interior over seven
hundred thousand private telegrams and about

280

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

two hundred thousand government telegrams.
There are also two foreign telegraph lines in
Persia.

A Persian telephone company was established
at Teheran and given a concession by imperial
farman about twenty years ago. It has twenty-
one share-holders, and five hundred and thirty-
five shares of a par value of a thousand tomans
each. Operating in most of the cities and towns
of Persia, its subscribers in Teheran numbered
1136 in 1922-23, and 1326 in 1924-25 ; and during
the same three years the number of subscribers
rose, in Kermanshah, from 89 to 145; in Hama-
dan, from 104 to 144; and in Yezd, from 29 to 47.
The company is now putting its wires under-
ground in Teheran, and is making other plans to
improve its service. There are no long-distance
telephone lines in Persia, the longest line extend-
ing about a hundred miles.

The army purchased from the Russian Govern-
ment a high-power wireless plant which was
erected and, in the presence of the Prime Min-
ister, enthusiastically dedicated in the spring of
1925. The main station near Teheran is said to
be powerful enough to communicate with Euro-
pean stations.

When the American Mission arrived, the com-
merce of Persia was suffering acutely from the
effects of the World War, although it had al-

281

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

ready begun to show hopeful signs of recovery.

The principal imports of Persia are sugar, cot-
ton material, and tea ; the principal articles of ex-
port (excluding petroleum and petroleum prod-
ucts) are wool, carpets, opium, raw cotton, and
fresh and dried fruits. In the figures which fol-
low, there are excluded from calculation the ex-
ports of petroleum by the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company, as well as the importations, during the
war and afterward, by foreign troops. Of the
real trade of Persia, exports had fallen, in 1918-
19, to less than 20 per cent, of the total ; but they
had risen in 1922-23 to 33 per cent, and in 1923-24
to thirty-six. The adverse balance, which had
reached 44,240,300 tomans in 1919-20, had fallen
to 31,354,400 tomans in 1922-23 and 30,875,700
tomans in 1923-24. According to available fig-
ures, the adverse balance for 1924-25 should not
exceed 28,000,000 tomans.

The “invisible” exports of Persia are difficult
to estimate. They include the amounts spent by
foreign representatives, residents, and travelers in
the country, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company roy-
alties, and the payments of this company in Per-
sia for labor and supplies, amounting, it is stated,
to about four hundred thousand pounds sterling.

In the face of the large adverse balance of
trade, importers, unable to buy foreign currency
to pay for their foreign purchases, began in some

282

AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

instances to export Persian silver currency at its
bullion value. Fearing that the country would be
drained of its silver, and hoping to check the im-
portation of foreign goods, particularly luxuries,
the Majless, in a state approaching alarm, passed
a law prohibiting the export of gold and silver.
We did our best to enforce this law, but smuggling
has been widely practised. At present, however,
silver is flowing into Persia and the execution of
the law is of little practical importance.

There was also seriously discussed, in the Maj-
less, a project of law prohibiting the importation
of luxuries; but it was realized that most of the
imports of Persia are necessities, and that in any
event the Government might better turn its at-
tention to increasing exports than artificially re-
stricting imports. The law was not passed.

Russia held first place in the export trade of
Persia until 1918-19, when it was displaced by
Great Britain. In the import trade of Persia,
Russia also led until 1915-16, when it was sup-
planted by Great Britain. In 1923-24, Persian
importations from the British Empire (including
India) amounted to 43,724,091 tomans, while those
from Russia totaled only 10,515,879 tomans.

In 1913-14, Persian exports to Russia amounted
to thirty million tomans ; in 1921-22, they had de-
clined to less than three million tomans; in
1922-23, they still stood at little more than six mil-

283

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

lion tomans; but in 1923-24, they had already
risen to about sixteen million tomans. The open-
ing of trade with Russia is all important to Per-
sian commerce. Steps to this end have been
taken, a Russo-Persian Commercial Treaty hav-
ing been signed and submitted to the Majless for
ratification.

In view of the importance to Persia of trade
with and through Russia, the monopolization of
trade by the Soviet Government is of great in-
terest. In Persia, there is no tendency to commu-
nism. The Government exorcises important eco-
nomic functions, but it has never, so far as I can
see, shown any tendency to subvert individual
initiative in industry or to extend its economic
functions except when clearly necessary in the in-
terest of the Treasury and public welfare. Per-
sian merchants and producers, moreover, show
little inclination to combine to protect their busi-
ness and prices. As a result, their exports to or
through Russia are at the mercy of the Soviet
trade monopoly. In the case of the products of
the north, such as rice and sugar, the monopoly is
in a position to refrain from purchasing until
prices fall; while the Persian producers, acting
individually, have no means to keep prices up.
Eventually, the Persian Government may be com-
pelled to take action to protect the interests of its
producers.

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AGRICULTURE AND COMMERCE

The Soviet Government apparently follows,
with regard to its external operations, the prac-
tice of establishing associations with Soviet con-
trol and Persian participation. In this respect, it
appears to apply to Persians in their own country
substantially the same policy as to foreigners do-
ing business in Bussia.

The famous carpets and rugs of Persia, consti-
tuting a unique industry of the country, and its
most valued export, have been for many years
in serious danger, because of the importation and
use of aniline dyes and to the competition of
China, In 1909, the importation of aniline dyes
was prohibited, but this measure was ineffective,
due to the smuggling across the exposed frontiers.
Later, a special tax was imposed on exported
aniline-dyed carpets, but this measure met with
the strong opposition of the merchants, and it has
not been possible to levy a tax high enough to be
effective. Since March 21, 1922, this tax has been
fixed at twelve per cent, ad valorem. A Belgian
expert is employed by the Persian Government to
examine the carpets for aniline. In spite of these
measures, the carpet industry is in serious dan-
ger. In order to save it, it will be necessary not
only to combat aniline but also to meet Chinese
competition by restoring the historical and artis-
tic purity of the old Persian patterns. Steps to
this end are being taken.

285

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

In Persia, there are three foreign banks of im-
portance. The Imperial Bank of Persia acts for
the Government in connection with the service of
the foreign funded debt, receiving the southern
customs receipts as they fall due, paying the cou-
pons in London, and delivering the balance to the
Persian Treasury. It likewise reQeives from the
provincial financial agents tax revenues for re-
mittance to Teheran, and effects remittances of
government funds to the provinces without charge.
It furnishes the Ministry of Finance with tem-
porary over-drafts pending the collection of the
revenues. It cooperates in the matter of nickel
coinage, and in the purchase and importation of
silver for coinage at the Imperial Mint. Should
the Persian Government hereafter decide to adopt
a gold standard, the Imperial Bank of Persia is
bound by the terms of its concession to assist the
Government to that end. The bank is a British
institution, and, in return for the concession that
it holds, pays the Government six per cent, of its
net profits, with a minimum yearly payment of
four thousand pounds. The Imperial Ottoman
Bank has several branches in Persia; and there
has recently been established in Teheran and
northern Persia the Russo-Persian Bank, whose
principal business is in connection with Russian
commerce.

286

CHAPTER XI

NATURAL RESOURCES AND OTHER
ASSETS

IN 1901, an Englishman, William Knox
D’Arcy, obtained from the Shah a conces-
sion for the exportation, refining, transpor-
tation, and sale of petroleum, natural gas, asphalt,
and ozokerite, throughout the Persian Empire
with the exception of the five northern provinces
along the Caspian Sea. Under the concession,
which was to run for sixty years, the Persian
Government receives sixteen per cent, of the net
profits. Oil was struck in 1908, and in the follow-
ing year the Anglo-Persian Oil Company was or-
ganized, in which the British Government has
since 1914 held two thirds of the shares. The
company has established two technical schools for
the training of young Persians in the technical
phases of the oil business ; it has inaugurated va-
rious hygienic measures ; and it has established in
the oil-fields three large and well-equipped hospi-
tals and quarantine establishments, with eighteen
European physicians in the service of the com-
pany.

287

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

The island of Abadan, which fourteen years ago
was almost deserted, has become, since the erec-
tion of the company’s refinery, a city of nearly
twenty-five thousand inhabitants.

The main field of the company is in the region
of Maidan-i-Naphtun, in southwest Persia. Out-
side this field, it is conducting drilling operations,
and it reports that it has struck oil of high quality
at Kishm and near the Iraq-Persian frontier.
The output of ci'ude oil has shown a steady in-
crease, from 233,962 tons in 1913-14, to 3,714,109
tons in 1923-24. The wells are shallow, and give
a steady flow of petroleum of high-grade quality.
The remarkable well known as F 7, drilled in
1911, is stated by the company to be still giving
an undiminished flow, having produced, up to
1924, 12,000 barrels daily, or a total of over
1,400,000,000 gallons. Two ten-inch pipe-lines,
about one hundred and fifty miles in length, with
an annual capacity of five million tons, have been
constructed from the oil-field to Abadan, with
three pumping-stations.

Due, it is explained, to market conditions, the
royalties have not kept pace with the increased
production, and the decline in this revenue had
aroused the apprehensions of the Persian Govern-
ment. Nevertheless, at the time of our arrival,
there was no proper organization of the govern-
ment departments to study and handle matters

288

NATURAL RESOURCES

relating to southern oil. Under the concession,
the Persian Government is entitled to appoint
an oil commissioner, who receives from the com-
pany a salary of one thousand pounds. When
I went to Persia, this official was a young man
who showed no signs of ability, and who ap-
parently looked upon his job as a sinecure which,
as it had been obtained by influence, could be
retained in the same way. He had no files ; there
were constant disputes between him and the
Persian Legation at London. In Teheran, while
the meager communications sent by the oil com-
missioner led to no action, the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs, Public Works, and Finance all
asserted their jurisdiction over them. The first
step in bringing order out of confusion, was to
obtain the recognition of the jurisdiction of the
Ministry of Finance over all matters connected
with the royalties payable by the company, and
the right of the Ministry of Public Works to
handle all questions pertaining to the physical con-
ditions and operations in the fields. A capable ex-
minister of finance, possessing a good knowledge
of English, was then appointed oil commissioner
at London, and the Legation at London was in-
structed to keep its hands off.

In the northern part of Persia, — the region not
included in the Anglo-Persian concession, — there
are reported to exist, particularly in the provinces

289

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

of Mazanderan, Ouilan, and Azerbaidjan, numer-
ous indications of petroleum, similar to those
which occur in southern Persia and in the Mosul
region of Iraq, although probably not so extensive
or significant.

Relative to this region, there exist some claims
based on alleged grants to a Russian named
Khochtaria, the legality of which is not recognized
by the Persian Government, but which were sold
by Khochtaria to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company.

When Mr. Alai was accredited to Washington,
he announced that it was the desire of his Govern-
ment to negotiate with American companies for
the granting of an oil concession in north Persia,
to be coupled with a loan of ten million dollars.
During the next two years, negotiations were
actively pursued in the United States with the
Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, and in
Persia with the Sinclair Exploration Company,
which had sent a representative to Teheran. The
Standard, in connection with its negotiations,
effected an arrangement with the Anglo-Persian,
whereby the latter, in return for the interest it
claimed in the fields, should receive fifty per cent,
of the output; the negotiations of Sinclair, were
conducted, so far as I am informed, with no recog-
nition of the claims of the Anglo-Persian.

At the time of my arrival in Persia the negotia-
tions had reached a stage at which detailed pro-

290

NATURAL RESOURCES

posals had been submitted to the Persian Govern-
ment by both American companies. Both pro-
posed that the concession should be worked by a
subsidiary company, the capital stock and man-
agement of which should be permanently’in Amer-
ican hands. The most marked difference in the
two proposals was that the Standard desired the
royalty to be based on a percentage of the crude
production, while the Sinclair proposed that the
royalty be a percentage of the net profits.

A glance at the map of Persia will show that
any oil produced in north Persia, in excess of that
sold in the local market, will have to be trans-
ported to or through Russia, to or through Iraq,
to or through Turkey, or through south Persia to
the sea. Any of these suggested routes of trans-
portation will present extreme difficulty. Which
would be the more practicable, would depend on
the location of the producing territory, and, it
would seem, on the relations established by the
concessionary company with the Russian, Turkish,
and Iraq authorities, as well as with the Anglo-
Persian Oil Company, which holds the monopoly
of oil-transport in the south.

Had the Persian officials who were then in
power, acted with courage and decision, with a
view only to the interests of Persia, had they
gotten the best terms possible and then granted
the concession to one company or the other, all

291

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

would doubtless have been well. Instead of doing
so, the Government of the time submitted to the
Majless a project of law incorporating certain
of the provisions of both draft concessions. This
law, after months of discussion, was passed by the
Majless, and was duly circulated for the accept-
ance or rejection of American companies. The
Persian officials consulted with me freely on this
matter. The Persian Government had declared
that it was its policy to grant the oil concession
to a purely American company. Between the two
American companies which were negotiating for
the concession, I had no preference, to the extent
that they offered terms which in my opinion were
practicable and in the interest of Persia. I
recognized clearly, however, the danger of delay,
urged the Government to make a decision in favor
of one company or the other, and warned against
embodying in a law those technical provisions
which are usually subject to negotiation with
companies.

The terms proposed in the law were understood
to be unacceptable by the Standard but acceptable
with some modifications by Sinclair. The revised
Sinclair concession was thereupon submitted to
the Majless for approval; but at this juncture, the
summer of 1924, the Sinclair representative left
Teheran. Then followed the cancellation by the
Soviet Government of the Sinclair concession in

292

NATURAL RESOURCES

the island of Sakhalin, and, early in 1925, the Sin-
clair Company telegraphed the Persian Govern-
ment that, in view of the attitude taken by the
Soviet authorities, the company could no longer
go on with the northern oil concession.

For the impasse that occurred in this affair,
the Persian Government should not be too se-
verely criticized. Connected as the concession
came to be, in the minds of Persians, with the
vague “special interests" of neighboring powers,
the Government — conscious of the grave mistakes
that had been made by Persian governments in
the past, in the granting of concessions; deter-
mined to take no step which should cause later
regret; having no impartial technical adviser in
Teheran, negotiating with one company in
Teheran and with the other in New York — can
hardly be blamed for an excess of caution; and it
can be a matter of little surprise that the question,
becoming a political issue, should have been
brought to stalemate. It appears possible, how-
ever, that a solution may soon be found.

The granting of the northern oil concession,
although important, is of course in nowise the
open sesame to Persian prosperity. Neither is
it, in my opinion, an indispensable vehicle for
the flotation of a loan. There is need, however,
of cheaper petrol in Persia, for at present it sells
in Teheran at about one dollar a gallon. If pe-

293

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

troleum could be produced and refined in north
Persia so as to be supplied more cheaply, needed
encouragement would be furnished to motor-truck
transportation.

The negotiations with the Soviet Government
concerning the Caspian fisheries, reveal some of
the complications in Persia’s economic situation,
and in the position of the American Mission. It
was far from my wish to engage in controversy
with any foreign legation; but when a legation
adopts the role of applicant for a concession and,
like many other agents of business concerns in
Persia, attempts to get terms which are contrary
to the interests of the country, it is difficult to see
how I can treat the legation’s proposals as differ-
ent from any other business propositions. State-
ments, made by me according to my contract,
regarding an industrial concession, should hardly
be construed as unfriendliness, until at least my
position has been met by argument in economic,
not political, terms.

Before the World War, the sturgeon fisheries
along the Caspian coast of Persia were an im-
portant and developing industry. Several thou-
sand persons were employed, and, according to
an appraisal in 1918, the properties and equip-
ment used in the fisheries were valued at over
three million tomans.

A concession for the monopoly of these fisheries
294

NATURAL RESOURCES

was granted to a Russian named Stepan Lion-
osoff, in 1876. It was renewed in 1879, 1886,
1893, and 1896; and in 1906, the Persian Govern-
ment extended the term of the concession to 1925.
In 1916, the heirs of Lionosoff organized the K. Y.
Lionosoff Company, with a capital of about nine
million gold rubles. During the war, difficulties
arose over the payment of royalties and in 1918
the Persian Government notified the abrogation
of the concession. The Russian Legation, it
should be noted, protested the abrogation of the
Lionosoff concession. On July 19, 1919, the
fisheries were rented to a Russian named Vanitz-
off, for fifty per cent, of the net profits; but,
aside from the probable invalidity of this contract
in the first place, the lessee appears to have paid
no rent to the Persian Government. During the
war the port of Pahlevi was occupied by the
Russians, and at the close of the war the impor-
tant fishery installations of Lionosoff at that
place, fell into the possession of the Soviet
Government.

Lionosoff had establishments at various places
on the coast, — Astara, Pahlevi, Ilassan Kiadeh,
Karasoo, Meshed Hissar and Estrabad, — but
those at Pahlevi, which 1 have seen, wore the most
important. Here are warehouses, docks, curing
vats, refrigerators, a modern power plant, bar-
racks and houses for the employees, a hospital,

295

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

and a library. It is a plant that would do credit
to any industrial city.

In the Russo-Persian Treaty of 1921, Article
XIV refers directly to the fisheries. A literal
English translation of the Persian text of this
article reads as follows :

Realisdng the importance of the fisheries of the south-
ern shores of the Caspian Sea for the normal pro-
visioning of Russia, the Persian Government is ready,
after the expiration of the legal validity of its present
obligations with respect to these fisheries, to make an ar-
rangement with the Food Department of the Soviet
Republic of Russia with respect to the fisheries, the
terms of which arrangement will be prepared in the
meantime.

The Persian Government is also ready to examine,
with the Soviet Government of Russia, the means of
making already now available the produces of tlie above-
tmentioned fisheries to the Food Department of the
Soviet Republic, and before the above-mentioned terms
are prepared.

The gist of this article seems to me to be that at
the expiration of existing rights (presumably re-
ferring to those of the Lionosoffs), the Persian
Government shall conclude an agreement with the
Soviet Food Department concerning the fisheries,
with the object of insuring the normal supply of
fish to Russia, and that prior to the expiration of
existing rights, the Persian Government was

296

NATURAL RESOURCES

ready to discuss with the Soviet Government the
method by which in the meantime the Soviet Pood
Department should be assured of a sufficient
supply of the products of the fisheries. This
article should, moreover, be read in the light of
the unselfish principles and renunciations re-
peatedly and solemnly set forth by the Soviet
Government in the treaty.

The Soviet authorities continuing in occupation
of the fisheries, the Persian Government was in-
duced, in the spring of 1922, to give them the
monopoly of the purchase of fish in Pahlevi and
Hassan Kiadeh, in return for a payment of fifty
thousand tomans. This grant was evidently for
only one year, and, following the refusal of the
Soviet authorities to pay the ordinary customs
duties and taxes on fish, they were also exempted
from these charges by the Persian Government.

In accordance with Article XIV of the treaty,
representatives of the Soviet and Persian Govern-
ments met on November 20, 1921, to discuss the
question of the fisheries. This joint commission
met again on February 11, 1922, with no apparent
result; but on October 28, 1922, a protocol was
signed by representatives of the Persian and
Soviet Governments, which says:

As . per Article XIV of the Treaty of 26 February,
1921, concerning the Caspian Sea fisheries, the needed
agreement should be made after the expiration of the

297

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

period of the contract that the Persian Government has
with the third person. And as the differences arising
between the Persian Government and the firm of
Lionosoff relating to the previous contract, is not yet
settled, we take the decision in common agreement that
our sitting be suspended in order that the differences
between the Persian Government and the Lionosoff be
accommodated.

In the meantime, acting on the protests of the
Lionosoffs against the abrogation of their conces-
sion, the Persian Government appointed an arbi-
tration commission consisting of three distin-
guished Persian jurists, who apparently pos-
sessed full power to determine the rights of the
former concessionaires. The commission issued
its decision November 8, 1922, to the effect that the
abrogation of the Lionosoff concession by the Per-
sian Government had been illegal, and that, in
compensation for the damages sustained by the
concessionaires, the period of their priviliges
should be extended fifteen years, on condition that
fifty per cent, of the net profits should be paid to
the Persian Government.

This was the state of affairs, with regard to the
fisheries, on the arrival of the American Mission.
During the next two years, discussions took place
between the Persian Government and the Soviet
Legation without result. Leon and Veronica
Lionosoff reside at Teheran, and continue their

298

NATURAL RESOURCES

protests; but, Martin Lionosoif went to Bnssia,
and was reported several months ago to have sold
his fishing properties in Astara to the Soviet
Government, although Article VI of the 1893 con-
cession, which was apparently still in force, pro-
vides that “all the workshops and material of the
lessee will be regarded as a guarantee by the
Persian Government and the lessee will not have
the right to sell or transfer them to another per-
son or persons.”

In October, 1924, the Soviet representatives
finally proposed that, subject to the approval of
the Majless, the fisheries should be leased to a
company, consisting of the Soviet Government
and the Persian Government, in which each gov-
ernment should possess one half of the shares and
one half of the directors. Such an agreement
seemed to me to offer no practicable, business-
like solution; and on October 4, 1924, I advised
the Persian Government against accepting it. A
few days later the Soviet Government offered the
Persian Government a check for one hundred
thousand tomans, ostensibly to pay for the fishery
products which it was exporting. This check we
declined to receive into the treasury.

On June 5, 1924, the Russian Legation at
Teheran published the following bit of news in its
“Moscow Wireless”:

299

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

Inasmuch as the actions taken by the American advis-
ers with respect to financial reforms in Persia have been
without result, the question was discussed a few days
ago in the Persian Parliament and it was stated that it
is no longer necessary to incur losses from the American
Mission, particularly in view of the incompetence of Dr.
Millspaugh in financial matters. Some of the politicians
insisted on giving Dr. Millspaugh -one year more to
demonstrate his capacity in finance, but, nevertheless,
the dissatisfaction with him is increasing, especially be-
cause of his political interferences.^

The editor of the paper added this remark :

This rumor is quite untrue. No such discussion has
been made in the Parliament regarding Dr. Millspaugh
and no political interference is made by him. The be-
ginning of this rumor is due to the action of Dr. Mills-
paugh in protecting the rights of the Persian Govern-
ment in connection with the fisheries of Hassan Kiadeh.

A day or two after, the Minister of Finance
published the following official contradiction :

The news published in Moscow ^s wireless bulletin is
absolutely untrue. The Persian Government appreci-
ates Dr. Millspaugh ’s services in the centralization of the
revenues and the control of the governmental expendi-
tures.

Under date of October 20, 1924, a wireless des-
patch to the ‘^New York Times'^ from Moscow
contained the following statement, which may not

1 From the Persian newspaper **lTan” of June 5, 1024.

300

NATURAL RESOURCES

be authentic, but, so far as I know, has never been
disclaimed :

American financial experts appointed to organize
Persian finance have failed in their task to balance the
budget and have driven Persia to the brink of financial
ruin, says M. Shumiatzky, Soviet Minister to Persia, who
arrived in Moscow today on a short visit.

A few weeks later, the Soviet Legation having
indicated a friendly desire to discuss the matter
with me, I proposed, in a spirit of conciliation and
compromise, that after a settlement of the claims
of the Lionosolfs, and the acquisition of their
properties in a legal manner, the fisheries should
be controlled by the Persian Government but the
Soviet Government might be given minority par-
ticipation. In my proposal, I included, of course,
definite assurances regarding the normal supply
of Persian fish to the Soviet Food Department.
On learning my proposals, the representatives of
the Soviet Legation immediately ceased their dis-
cussion with me, and insisted that the original
proposition of the Legation should be submitted
to the Majless. This was done, and the matter is
now awaiting parliamentary action.

It is true that there is a slight difference be-
tween the Russian and Persian texts of Article
XIV ; but, according to the treaty, both texts shall
be controlling. Regardless of treaty interpreta-
tion or prior rights, the facts are that since the

301

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

fall of 1922 the Soviets have occupied the fisheries
of Guilan, they claim the ownership of the fisheries
of Astara, a Soviet consul has installed himself in
one of the Lionosoif buildings in another place,
and the Soviet authorities have purchased, pre-
pared, and exported fish and caviar. Their
actions with regard to the fisheries have been
taken, so far as I know, without the permission of
the Persian Government ; and it may be presumed
that no such permission has been or could be
legally g^ven without consultation with me, in
accordance with my contract, and without the ap-
proval of the Majless as prescribed in the Consti-
tution. The properties of the Lionosoffs have
meanwhile suffered constant deterioration and
spoliation. We have rented the river fisheries,
and have thus obtained a trifling amount of reve-
nue, which has barely covered the subsidies paid
to the two Lionosofis.

It is hoped that if the Majless declines to ap-
prove the proposed concession, the Soviet Govern-
ment will see that in the fishery matter, as in
others, the course most likely to be compatible with
its material interests, — ^to say nothing of its moral
and legal obligations, — ^is to respect the clear right
of Persia, in the absence of treaty restrictions,
to dispose, as a sovereign nation, of its own re-
sources within its own territory.

In the greater part of Persia there are virtually
302

NATURAL RESOURCES

no natural forests. In the north, along the Cas-
pian coast and on the slopes of the Elburz Moun-
tains, there are extensive forests. These are
largely state property; but there has been in the
past little attempt on the part of the Government
to g^ard its forest wealth. Cutting and exporta-
tion have been by official permission, but the pro-
visions made for reforestation have been inade-
quate. Pending the enactment of a forest law, by
the Majless, the Council of Ministers passed on
March 7, 1925, a decision which stipulated that all
forests were to be considered as public property
in the absence of documentary proof of private
ownership; that the Government reserved the
right in all forests, whether governmental or pri-
vate, to supervise methods of reforestation; that
the leasing of State forests and permission for
cutting, subject to the technical supervision of the
Ministry of Public Works, shall bo by public
bidding, with the approval of the Ministry of
Finance ; that the industrial trees to be especially
protected are walnut, box, myrtle, oak, pine, mul-
berry, and all black trees; that the felling of
industrial trees in private forests without the
authorization of the Ministry of Public Works, is
prohibited, and that such authorization, when
given, must include various safeguards, including
an engagement to plant five trees in place of each
one felled. The Majless has been asked to au-

303

THE AMEHICAN TASK IN PERSIA

thorize the employment of a German forest ex-
pert; and it is expected that when he arrives a
comprehensive forest policy will be formulated
and put into execution.

The mineral resources of Persia, with the
exception of petroleum, are in general unex-
plored, unconceded, and unexploited. Under-
ground mines are considered as government
property. A temporary mining code, which has
not yet been approved by the Majless, is observed
in practice by the Ministry of Public Works ; and
an agreement was reached, in 1924, between the
Ministries of Public Works and Finance, in which
the latter ministry is given full control over the
financial provisions of all mining leases. Since
no adequate geological surveys have been made
in Persia, it is impossible to specify or to evaluate
her underground riches ; but available information
indicates an amazing variety of mineral deposits.

Iron is said to be widely distributed, but the
exploitation of only two iron-mines has been
authorized, by concession. In Mazanderan, near
the Caspian coast, it is found in proximity to
coal. Various coal-mines in Persia are leased and
worked, several of them being a few miles from
Teheran. Two lead-mines are under lease ; others
have been worked but are now abandoned ; while
still others have never been exploited. Mines of
alum, orpiment, sodium sulphate, sulphur, and

304

Tadayon, LEADER OF THE Majority Fiuoitz Miuza, Dei'iity ok Ker-
in THE MAJLESS. and chairman MANSIIAH AND A MA-IOUITY LEADER

OK THE IHriMJET ('OMMISSION IN l()22-2;{

Aubab Kiiaikuosrow Shaiirokii.

rUOGRESSIVE PAKSBE DEPUTY AND
BUSINESS MANAGER OK THE

Majless

Mirza Moiiambd Ali Khan
Forougiii (formerly Zoka ol
Molk), Minister ok Finance

NATURAL RESOURCES

graphite are under lease and in process of de-
velopment. Mineral waters Of all kinds occur in
different parts of Persia, the best known being
in the neighborhood of Lake Urumiah. Numerous
salt-mines are leased by the Government, bringing
in a revenue of forty thousand tomans annually.
There is a valuable turquoise-mine in the province
of Khorassan, said to produce the best turquoise
in the world. Other turquoise-mines are located
in Kerman, Ghom, Fars, and Teheran Provinces.
Copper is widely distributed in Persia, but the
mines, a few of which are under lease, are little
worked. Valuable deposits of oxide of iron, on
the Persian Gulf, are under concession to a
Persian merchant. Tlie list of other minerals
which have been reported in Persia includes
arsenic, realgar, borax, chromium, cobalt, nickel,
emery, fire-clay, fluorite, gold, manganese, marble,
mercury, platinum, saltpeter, silver, tin, and zinc.

There are several opportunities in Persia for
hydro-electric development on a large scale. Two
such projects which have been under investigation,
involve the damming of the Djajaroud Eiver near
Teheran and the Karun Eiver near Shustar.

The crown jewels constitute an interesting part
of the national wealth of Persia. For the most
part, they came into the possession of Persia at
the conquest of India by Nadir Shah. A few
years ago their value was appraised by foreign

305

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

experts at forty million tomans. Acting on re-
ports that the jewels were deteriorating, the
Prime Minister personally inspected them on
May 15, 1924. As reported to the Treasury-
General by the Custodian of Royal Property :

He found the jewels in special sealed boxes placed on
boards erected in the vicinity of the Treasury where
they have been well ventilated by hard iron windows
opening both to the north and to the south. Neverthe-
less, he instructed that the jewels be transferred to two
of the upper store rooms known as Nasr-ed-Din Shah’s
middle bed-room where the Prime Minister himself went
and found it fit for the purpose, emphatically directing
them to block up all the openings around the said two
rooms and to furnish entrance doors with iron win-
dows for them.

We have already performed all the instructions per-
taining to the strengthening of the two rooms which
are now fit for our purpose.

As the local papers and the Majless are saying much
about these jewels, and moreover the damp weather of
the Treasury may really damage the pearls which are
the most important wealth of the country, I reported
the case so that you may arrange to advise the authori-
ties of the Ministry of Finance of the matter, and thus
bring about means of transferring the jewels to a safer
place.

In its historical monuments and antiquities,
Persia possesses a form of wealth that is of
interest and value to the whole world. Unfor-

306

NATURAL RESOURCES

tunately, many choice Persian antiquities have
been exported from the country without much
return to the Persian Government and may now
be seen only in foreign museums. The impressive
ruins of Persepolis and Susa, however, are sub-
lime reminders of the past grandeur of Persia,
and the part played by the country in the history
of civilization. The French possess a concession
for archaeological excavation in Persia ; and,
according to the Persian press, it is in process of
revision. In April, 1925, Professor Pope, of the
Art Institute of Chicago, visited Persia. He de-
livered lectures on Persian art before the public
and officials of the Government, and, under his
inspiration, a committee was organized to es-
tablish a National Museum.

307

CHAPTER Xn

CONCLUSION

The work of the American Financial Mis-
sion in Persia is now well under way. *
Three years, tlie period of our associa-
tion with the Persian problem, seem, in the
shadows of Persepolis and Susa, a mere tick of
the tireless clock of history. What Kismet has
in store for the Persians, remains for the coming
years to unfold; but, if in the heart of this
Mohammedan people lurked the killing idea that
fate had ages ago predetermined their destiny,
how could wo account for their present visions of
progress, their acceptance of change, their faith
in those who advocate a new order, their hope
in the future? There are, of course, reactionary
elements in Persia, but they are far outnumbered
by the progressives. Pessimistic observers have
more than once written cynical epitaphs for the
tomb of this ancient nation ; but Persia has refused
to be buried, and has even perversely rejected the
dictum of doctors that it had reached the final
stages of decadence and death. A marvelous re-
cuperative power possesses this ancient people

308

CONCLUSION

and in that fact, as well as in their present mani-
festations of sanity and common sense, lies their
hope for the future.

The American Mission has sometimes been com-
pared to Hercules engaged in the task of cleaning
the Augean stables, but no metaphor could be less
apt. We are playing the part neither of Hercules
nor of Sisyphus. The American Mission is not
alone in its task. Before our arrival in Persia,
the ground was prepared and the seed sown. We
have had our passing disputes with officials and
have met with opposition; but, as Muchir ed
Dowleli remarked to me a few weeks ago, the
American Mission has always had with it a vast
majority of the influential Persians.

The masses of the people are still largely in-
articulate, but the political leaders whom they
most willingly follow are those who stand for
honesty, nationalism, and progress. The work of
the American Mission, the extension of its life,
and the enlargement of its membership constitute
the best evidence of the present attitude of Per-
sians toward reform and progress. The psy-
chology of the Persian peoi)le, as I have tried to
show, is favorable to progress; the Majless, the
supreme power in the Government, is establishing
itself as an efficient legislative organ; executive
force and political leadership are in capable
hands; foreign governments have unqualifiedly

309

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

renounced any purposes of aggression or inter-
ference in Persia. Stability and order exist in the
country; Reza Khan Pahlevi’s task of cementing
the nation is approaching completion; the grow-
ing sentiment of patriotism gives vitality to the
universal desire for constructive economic meas-
ures, for education, and for sanitation. In my
last conversation with him before I left Persia,
the Prime Minister said: “You may tell to any
one you see, that the situation of Persia is secure.”

With the cooperation of the Persians, much has
been accomplished in the finances. Revenues have
been increased, expenditures controlled, and econ-
omies effected; funds have been gradually di-
verted to the items which contribute to economic
development and public welfare ; the vicious circle
of deficits and borrowings has been broken; a
beginning has been made in the settlement and
payment of claims ; the credit of the Government
has improved; the corruption that attended pre-
vious partizan and personal administrations has
almost wholly vanished ; laws have been enforced ;
the principles that budgets must be balanced and
that a nation must increase its taxes to provide
for its increased expenditures, have been given
the formal stamp of parliamentary approval.

If a miracle has occurred in Persia since the
arrival of the American Mission, it has been per-
formed by the Persians themselves, who have

310

CONCLUSION

started, as wisely and as surely as any other
government, to lay the financial foundation of
their future economic structure.

Much, however, still remains to be done.
Budgetary procedure must be improved ; through
new sources of revenue, such as the sugar-and-
tea monopoly that has just been passed, a surplus
must be created to permit transportation develop-
ment, productive public works, the rehabilitation
of agriculture, the restriction of the opium evil,
and the repeal of archaic and vexatious taxes;
famines and epidemics must be prevented; to
accelerate the carrying out of the economic and
social program, a loan should be obtained for
which Persia can offer acceptable security.

There are, of course, fairly obvious limits to
the possibilities of economic development in
Persia. The improvement of transportation
facilities must first link the producing regions
of the country with the consuming centers, and
with the world ^s markets. Given transportation,
Persian agriculture may be expected to expand
to meet the needs of a larger population, as well
as to contribute substantially to the export trade.
Persian industry, remaining true to Persian ar-
tistic traditions, can grow until it becomes a
worthy handmaid of agriculture. With transpor-
tation and the exhaustion of supplies abroad,
Persia’s mineral resources should also come to

311

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

their own. Already, apart from financial and
allied measures, signs of better times are evident.
Trade figures show a favorable trend; confidence
is returning to the business community ; bank de-
posits are increasing; the demand for more cur-
rency taxes the capacity of the mint ; never before,
perhaps, in the history of Persia were there so
many pending applications for economic conces-
sions. Of course, a country with the geograph-
ical, topographical, and climatic situation of
Persia can never hope to be a highly developed
industrial or commercial country. Montana,
Wyoming, Colorado, and Utah are rich and prom-
ising regions, but their people have no aim, I
suppose, to overtake economically New York,
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. With the con-
tinuance of satisfactory political conditions,
Persia can reasonably look forward to economic
conditions which, by the increase and the better
distribution of wealth, will absorb the unemployed
and the idle, raise the standard of living, univer-
salize education, and provide a richer and more
varied life for her people. More than this,
Persians probably do not expect or desire.

One of the most encouraging features of my
association with the Persians is that they are
one with me in recognizing that financial reor-
ganization and economic development are not ends

312

CONCLUSION

in themselves, but merely contributions to the pro-
motion of the general welfare, which perhaps can
be best defined as the greatest happiness of the
greatest number. Whether a people caught in
the elaborate mechanism of Western industrial
civilization is really happier than one living a
simpler life, is a question that probably can never
be answeredi. It would be equally difficult to
point out the features of our own civilization
which are unquestioned contributions to happi-
ness. Our nerve-specialists advise us to got back
to the simple life and to take a rest ; a majority
of the Americans and Europeans who have lived in
Persia, are content to remain there, and seem to
suffer little from the absence of what we are
pleased to prize as modern conveniences and
luxuries.

Many of the economic and financial slogans of
the international booster become clieap and mean-
ingless when tested in terms of real welfare ; and
the recent introduction of an American brand of
chewing-gum into Persia does not seem to have
been an event to bo especially celebrated. The
imitation of superficialities and the acquisition of
extravagances are, assuredly, of little importance.
It is clear that Persia should acquire as quickly
as possible all those features of our civilization
which insure against poverty, pain, and fear. On

313

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

the other hand, it would be better for many of ns
if we were to see and acquire the good in the life
of other people.

From the facts that I have set forth in this
book, no one, I believe, will gainsay that the
Persians are proceeding manfully to the solution
of their problem. While certain European coun-
tries have made excuses and floated loans, Persia,
whose neutrality was violated, has assumed the
burden of post-war reconstruction without repara-
tions and, except for a few chaotic months after
the war, without borrowing, and has also under-
taken to settle the war claims of a foreign govern-
ment. Through it all, her toman has risen in
exchange value above the dollar and the pound.
Unifying her people and maintaining order and
security, she has voted additional taxes, equal to
twenty-five per cent, of her present revenue, for
the purpose of opening her territory to the in-
dustry and civilization of the modern world. One
of the opium-producing countries, she has offered,
if given reasonable cooperation, to curtail the
cultivation of opium. A people with such a record
deserves at least to be permitted to work out un-
hindered its own destiny.

One hears the questions: “But how long will
present conditions last in Persia? What will
happen when Beza Khan Pahlevi drops his leader-
ship and power?’^ To this there can be only one

314

CONCLUSION

answer. No one can predict precisely what may
happen, but this much may certainly be said : that,
entirely apart from the person of any one leader,
there are elements of stability and progress in
Persia which have been growing stronger for a
generation. Having produced leaders in the past,
the Persian people may be expected to produce
them in the future. Every nation depends on its
leaders; and when a leader passes, there are al-
ways dire predictions of disaster. Whatever may
happen in the future, it is certain that Persia will
need the forbearance and ssonpathetic assistance
of foreign peoples more than criticism and com-
pulsion.

While I am not responsible for the foreign
policy of the Persian Government, and do not
presume to advise any other government regard-
ing its attitude toward Persia, it seems not im-
proper to add to what I have already said on the
international position of Persia, my views regard-
ing the international measures which are most
likely to assist the American Mission and Persian
progressives in their task. If I read published
diplomatic correspondence aright, adequate assur-
ances have been given by foreign governments re-
garding the territorial integrity of Persia and
equality of economic opportunity in the country.
Persia herself not merely gives lip-service to the
principle of the open door, but desires to make

315

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

the principle a practical reality by eliminating
the discredited ideas of ^‘spheres of influence’’
and ‘^special interests,” and by establishing
within her territory conditions under which for-
eign capital may genuinely compete and be treated
impartially. In a previous chapter, I have quoted
fully, from published sources, official statements
concerning the policies of Great Britain and
Russia. With respect to the general policy of the
United States Government, there is quoted below
the paraphrase of an instruction sent by the
Department of State to the American Legation at
Teheran on January 21, 1922 : »

You may inform the Persian Government that the
Government of the United States is deeply interested in
the Open Door and that it would insist upon this prin-
ciple in its exchanges with the British* or any other
Government. The American Government attaches the
greatest importance to the preservation in Persia of such
opportunity for American interests as is enjoyed by tho
interests of any other nation.

To this Muchir ed Dowleh, then Prime Minister,
made reply on January 26, 1922, as follows:

In thanking you for the communication which you
were good enough to make to me, I seize this occasion
to assure you that the Imperial Government which as
always is attaching great importance to the mainte-
nance of the principle of ‘‘open doors,” will do every-
thing in its power for the maintenance of this principle,

316

CONCLUSION

as well as for the development of the relations which
exist between our two countries, and in this respect I
count very much upon the precious assistance of the
American Government.”^

Persia itself merits a fair opportunity, not so
much for Persian capital abroad as for Persian
aspirations at home.

It is believed that if the facts of Persia were
fully known, those foreign governments which now
possess or assert a right to block her tax legisla-
tion, to prevent a revision of her tariff, and, on
one basis or another, to insist on special economic
privileges against her will, would bo willing to
recognize for her every fiscal and economic rigid
possessed by other sovereign nations, upon re-
ceiving from hed those guarantees — which, if I
interpret her policy correctly, she has given and
is still willing to give — of equality of economic
opportunity to all who have interests in her
territory.

In the first half of the nineteenth century, when
our own nation was still young, the careers of
Bolivar, Kosciusko, Kossuth, Garibaldi, and
others evoked warm expressions of sympathy in
the platforms of our parties and the resolutions
of our Congress ; but those days have almost faded
from our memories. Our present age is one per-

1 Senate Document, 68 Congress, Ist. No. 97, p. 99.

317

THE AMERICAN TASK IN PERSIA

haps not of cynicism and indifference but cer-
tainly of cold-blooded scientific administrative
realism. Persia, however, as I have sought to
show, is, according to the spirit of the age, solving
a problem rather than fighting a battle. Her
atmosphere is that of the bank rather than the
opera. Her aims are expressed in the familiar
terms of administration, economics, and finance.
She makes no appeal to emotion. Nevertheless,
viewed in a spirit of complete cold-bloodedness,
her problem integrates into the world problem,
the solution of which depends on stabilization
through the perfecting of existing units of social
organization, and through the creation of guaran-
tees of free and frictionless economic circulation.
There is, in my opinion, little hope for a contri-
bution to the solution of the problem of Persia
or of the world, in those old practices which were
casual and inefficient — ^politico-economic penetra-
tion, the tutelage of the weak by the strong, forced
exploitation, and the agglomerating of empires.

318

INDEX

Abadan, 288
Abbass, Shah, 6
Afshar, Mirza Reza Khan, 36
Aghdass, Sardar; see Moham-
merah. Sheikh of
Agriculture, 6, 248
Alai, Mirza Hossein Khan, 19,
90, 152, 235, 290
American Presbyterian Mission,
100

American School, Teheran, 91
Amerie, Mirza Sultan Mo-
hammed Khan, 36
Amid ol Molk, 223
Amnieh (Road Guards), 147
Amol, 278

Anglo-Persian Agreement of
1919, 114

Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 61,
216, 270, 282, 287
Anglo-Russian Agreement of
1907, 113
Aniline dyes, 285
Aragh, 270

Arhahi ( privately owned lands ) ,
62

Area, 0

Armitage-Smith, Financial Ad-
viser, 13, 28, 40, 81, 115
Ashayer, Sardar, 229
Askabad, 10

Assad, Sardar, Minister of
Posts and Telegraphs, 220,
227, 238
Astara, 295

Auto-Iran Company, 273
Aviation, 280
Azadirhhdh, 143

Azam, Sepahsalar, 186
Azerbaidjan, Province of, 10,
38, 44, 66, 64, 187, 244, 270,
290

Baha ol Molk, Minister of Fi-
nance, 172

Bakhtiari, 126, 187, 227, 244

Balfour, Earl of, 116

Baluchi, 125

Baluchi dialect, 127

Bandar Abbass, 113, 266

Bandar Jaz, 279

Bank d’Escomptc dc Perse, 78

Bank-Mran, 38, 203, 245

Banks, 286

Bast, 141

Bayazet, 272

Birjand, 113

Bizot, Financial Adviser, 12, 40
Bogart, E. B., Dr., 19, 38, 173
Bojnourd, 243

British-Russian Agreement of
1907, 11
Bushire, 266

Calendar, 127, 162
Camel, 272
Carpets, 285
Communism, 284
Cotton, 262
Courts, 136
Crown jewels, 305

Demavend, 9

Discount Bank of Persia, 120
Dizful, 272
Djajaroud River, 305

INDEX

Djavad Khan, 28
Djulfa, 121

Dunaway, John A., 19, 38, 196,
205

Duzdab, 10, 266

Early, C. C., 19, 38, 173, 204
Eghtedar, Amir, Minister of the
Interior, 202, 227
Elburz Mountains, 166, 303
Emad os Saltaneh, 237
Enzeli, 121 ; see also Pahlevi
Estrabad, 243, 295
Ettefagh, 143
Exports, 282

Ezz ol Memalek, Minister of
Public Works, 202

Fahim ol Molk, Minister of Fi-
nance, 30, 47, 172
Fare, Province of, 127, 217, 305
Farzin, Mirza Mohamcd Ali
Khan, 179, 209
Fazlollah Khan, General, 233
Ferouz, Prince, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, 270
Firouz Mirza, 183
Fisheries, 8, 294
Flannagan, James H., 19, 27,
38, 151, 205
Forests, 303

Garrous, 251
Gazik, 113

General Accounting Law, 75
Ghavam os Saltaneh, Prime
Minister, 31, 172, 199
Ghazian, 277
Oheyam, 143
Ghom, 270, 305
Gilmore, Dr., 217
Gore, Frank H., 19, 184, 194
Guilan, 55, 262, 200

Hall, Melvin, Major, 19, 38, 152,
187, 275

Hamadan, 121, 263, 270
Hassan Kiadeh, 295
Hydro-electric resources, 305

Imbrie, Robert W., American
Vice-Consul, 215, 221
Imperial Bank of Persia, 41, 47,
78, 184, 208, 212, 241, 286
Imperial Ottoman Bank, 286
Imports, 282

Industrial development, 263
“Iran,” newspaper, 31, 123
Iron, 304
Irrigation, 250

Isfahan, 112, 189, 227, 259, 264,
270

Jones, Edmund IL, 19, 38, 187
Julfa, 266, 270

Kakhk, 112
Karasoo, 295
Karun River, 269, 305
Kasr-Chirin, 112, 260, 269
Kazvin, 121, 270
Kerman, 113, 217, 305
Kermanshah, 270
Khaikrosrow Shahrokh, Ar-
bab, 133, 152, 235
Khalisseh (public domain), 63
Khanevari ( conscription-tax ) ,
67

Khanikin, 266, 276
Khashgai, 125, 244
Khaz’al, Sheikh; see Moham-
merah, Sheikh of
Khochtaria grants, 290
Khoda Yar Khan, Minister of
Posts and Telegraphs, 202
Khoi, 270
Khorammabad, 225
Khorassan, 10, 38, 187, 244, 305
Khozistan, 126, 216, 226, 238
Kishm, 288

Kuli Khan, Ali, Kabil ed
Dowleh. 32

320

INDEX

Kurd, 125, 244, 274

Kurdi dialect, 127

Lead, 304

Legislative procedure, 134
Lijarki, 277

Lionosoff concession, 205
l^orcstaii, 217
Lur, 225
Luri dialect, 127

MacCormack, D. W., Col., 10,
38, 48, 173, 187, 102, 202, 216
Maidan-i-Naplitun, 288
Majless, organization, 131 ; pro-
cedure, 135
Maliatf 62
Maraga, 274
Marund, 274

Mazandcran, Province of, 65,
243, 262, 200, 304
McCaskey, Charles I., 18, 38,
184

Mcllioun^ 143
Mcslied, 270, 205
Mirzayantz, 153
Mitchell, T. C., 10, 38, 48, 172,
271

!Moa/zani, Sardar, 220, 242
Moaz/ed os Saltaneh, Minister
of dust ice, 202

Modarres, First Vice-President
of Majless, 145, 206
Modir ol Molk, Minister of Fi-
nance, 202

Mohamed Ali Shah, 120, 230
Mohammerah, 266
Mohammerah, Sheikh of, 62,
116, 126, 217, 226
Moin ol Tojjar, 200
Mokhber ed Dowleh, 70, 238
Mokhber ed Dowleh Park, 26,
107

Mokh1)er os Saltan eh. Minister
of Public Works, 172

Molitor, Camille, 70
Molitor, Lambert, Adminis-
trator-General of Customs,
30

Mornard, Treasurer-General, 13,
21

Mostowfi ol Memalck, Prime
Minister, 172, 182, 235
Motacham os Saltaiieh, 217
Motamon ol Molk, President of
Majless, 134, 152, 227
Muchir ed Dowleh, Prime Min-
ister, 17, 172, 102, 109, 235,
300, 316

Kadir Shah, 305
iNaincs and titles, 167
Nasr ed Din Shah, 270, 306
Nasscry, Mirza Mahmoud Khan,
24, 27

Nassir ol Molk, Minister of Fi-
nance, 24, 160, 172
Naus, Director of Customs, 12
Navaghcl, 08, 107

Oil, 287

Opium, tax on, 60, 188; cul-
tivation of, 258

Owyhaf (pious foundations), 66

Pahlcvi, 122, 270, 205; see also
Enzeli

Pahlevi, Reza Khan; see Reza
Khan Pahlevi
Peahlevi dialect, 127
Pearson, Thomas, Captain, 19,
27, 38, 151, 205
Persian Railway Sjmdicate,
Ltd., 276
Pir Bazaar, 277
I’ope, Professor, 307
Population, 6

Posht-i-Kouh, Vali of, 227
Psychology, Persian, 84
Punel, 277

321

INDEX

Railways, 8, 121, 266, 268, 273,
276

Rainfall, 6
Resht, 245, 270

Reza Khan Pahlevi, Minister of
War, Prime Minister, 36, 43,
80, 98, 117, 126, 130, 132, 147,
166, 172, 186, 188, 199, 220,
239, 244, 310
Roads, 269
Rugs, 285

Russo-Persian Bank, 286
Russo-Pcrsian Commercial
Agreement, 217, 268, 273, 296
Ryan, Edward, W., Dr., 21, 173,
212

Schools, 106

Seistan, Province of, 64, 276
Selki-Sar, 277
Shahsevan, 126
Sharif -Khaneh, 274
Shiraz, 270

Shumiatzky, Soviet Minister to
Persia, 301
Shustar, 276, 305
Shuster, W. Morgan, Treasurer-
General, 12, 27, 46, 69, 81,
113, 186
Silk, 262

Sinclair Exploration Company,
197, 207, 290
Sodj-Bolag, 274
Sofian, 121, 268, 274
Solciman Mirza, Chairman of
Budget Commission, 183;
Minister of Public Instruc-
tion, 202

Standard Oil Company of New
Jersey, 290
Sturgeon, 294
Sultan Ahmad Shah, 129
Sultanabad, 263

Tajaddud, 143
Takamol, 143
TaraghirkhCth, 143
Tariff, 58

Tchitcherin, George, 117, 123
Tea, 263

Teberani, Sheikh Mohammed
Ali, 228
Telegraph, 280
Telephone, 281
Tobacco, 262
Tooleh, 277
Torbat, 197

Toumaniatz Frferes, 65, 197
Transport routes, 269
Treasury Gendarmerie, 46
Trenton, 221
Tunekal^un, 243
Turki dialect, 127
Turkoman, 125, 243
Turkoman Chai, Treaty of, 68
Turquoise, 305

Urumiah, 55, 196, 251
Urumiah Lake, 121, 268, 274,
305

Valiahd (Crown Prince), 32,
239

Vanitzoff concession, 295

Weights and measures, 166
Westdahl, General, Director of
Police, 72
Wireless, 281
Women, position of, 145

Yassai, Mirza Abdollah, 237
Yezd, 112, 270

Zadeh, Taghi, 152, 235
Zia Din, Prime Minister, 44,
117

Zoka ol Molk, 90

Tabriz, 56, 121, 245, 264, 270

1 18 35

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American task in Persia.
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